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I. Introduction 
Our tripartite system of government places responsibility for lawmaking 
firmly in the legislative branch—and congressional overrides are the primary 
means through which Congress signals disagreement with judicial interpre-
tations of statutes.  But in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,1 the 
Supreme Court held that Congress’s partial codification and partial override 
of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,2 a judicial decision interpreting the causa-
tion standard under Title VII, did not control the interpretation of analogous 
language in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),3 and 
further that Congress’s “neglect[ing]” to amend the ADEA when it amended 
Title VII should be interpreted as a clear signal that Congress intended the 
language in the ADEA to be interpreted differently.4  Strikingly, the Court 
did not even apply its own prior (partially overridden, partially codified) 
precedent.  Rather, the Court adopted the standard proposed by the dissent in 
Price Waterhouse, an approach that was clearly disfavored by both Congress
and a majority of the Justices in the earlier case.  The Gross Court’s 
reasoning rests on the counterintuitive conclusion that Congress, in 
expressing its disapproval of a judicial interpretation through enactment of an 
override, embraced the application of that disfavored interpretation to other 
statutes.  Lower courts, following typical rules of statutory interpretation, 
have quickly applied Gross to reinterpret the causation standard under 
numerous other employment laws.5
The rule of interpretation that the Court announced in Gross is radically 
asymmetrical.  It permits a single judicial interpretation to spread readily 
across multiple statutes but places upon Congress the burden of amending an 
1. 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). 
2. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
3. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 (stating that the Court had “never” held that the  “burden-
shifting framework” endorsed by Congress’s post-Price Waterhouse amendments to Title VII was 
applicable to ADEA claims and holding that “we decline to do so now”). 
4. Id.
5. This has not been uniform, however.  Courts have struggled to determine whether Gross,
Price Waterhouse, or the causation standard in Title VII should be applied.  See infra Part V.
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uncertain, and constantly growing, group of statutes to end reliance on such a 
single judicial interpretation.  This approach improperly cabins the effects of 
congressional overrides and dramatically aggrandizes the judicial role; it also 
unmoors the Supreme Court from the rules of precedent that typically 
constrain judicial interpretation.  It distorts the separation of powers, making 
it difficult for overrides to serve their intended role as a check on judicial 
lawmaking, and causes significant confusion, inefficiency, and irregularity 
within statutory law.  It also increases the risk of ends-oriented judicial 
interpretation.6
Gross has not been a popular decision.  In the short time since it was 
decided, several commentators have argued against the but-for causation 
standard imposed by the Court7 on the normative ground that it makes it too 
difficult for employees to prove that they were victims of discrimination in 
situations where the employer’s action was based on a combination of 
legitimate and illegitimate factors.8  Several also contend that, as a matter of 
jurisprudence, the Court’s departure from Price Waterhouse was 
unwarranted.9  The four dissenting Justices in Gross likewise argued that 
Price Waterhouse should have controlled the interpretation of the ADEA and 
that the test that the majority adopted was substantively problematic.10
My critique differs.  I think that the Court’s approach in Gross was
fundamentally flawed; I also believe that simply following Price Waterhouse 
would have been almost as troubling.  Rather, I contend that the Court was 
justified in revisiting the meaning of the ADEA’s statutory language—but 
6. See infra subpart II(A) & Part VI. 
7. Gross interpreted the ADEA’s prohibition on discrimination against an individual “because 
of such individual’s age” to require a plaintiff to prove that age was the but-for cause of an adverse 
employment action, even if that action was allegedly based on a mix of legitimate and illegitimate 
factors.  29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006); Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350–51. 
8. See, e.g., Michael Foreman, Gross v. FBL Financial Services—Oh So Gross!, 40 U. MEM. L.
REV. 681, 691–92 (2010) (arguing that plaintiffs lack access to relevant evidence needed to prove 
but-for causation in mixed-motive cases); Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV.
857, 881 (2010) (contending that any form of causation standard is difficult for antidiscrimination 
plaintiffs to meet because the relevant evidence remains in the defendant’s control but that “proving 
but-for causation is particularly difficult”); cf. Michael C. Harper, The Causation Standard in 
Federal Employment Law: Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., and the Unfulfilled Promise of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 69, 133–39 (2010) (arguing that Congress should adopt a 
more lenient “contributing cause” standard for all employment discrimination statutes). 
9. For examples of post-Gross commentary arguing that Price Waterhouse should have 
controlled the interpretation of analogous language in the ADEA, see Harper, supra note 8, at 107–
08; Melissa Hart, Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Court’s 2008–2009 Labor and Employment 
Cases, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 253, 270 (2009); Katz, supra note 8, at 870–71; and 
Catherine T. Struve, Shifting Burdens: Discrimination Law Through the Lens of Jury Instructions,
51 B.C. L. REV. 279, 288–315 (2010).  In earlier work, predating Gross, Professor Katz argued that 
lower courts could legitimately depart from Price Waterhouse to adopt a “unified” approach 
somewhat similar to that which I am proposing.  Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment 
(Really), 59 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 659–81 (2008) [hereinafter Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment]. 
10. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2354–57 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Price Waterhouse
should govern the ADEA); id. at 2358–59 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that proving but-for 
causation is very difficult for plaintiffs). 
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that in doing so, it should have applied a rebuttable presumption that the 
language of the ADEA be interpreted consistent with the meaning that 
Congress signaled it preferred for analogous language in Title VII.11  My 
proposal builds on prior work that I and others have done regarding the par-
ticular challenge posed by the interpretation of “related” employment 
discrimination statutes following congressional overrides.12  Writing prior to 
Gross, commentators discussed this question as a binary choice: should 
courts apply the overridden precedent—what I have called the “shadow 
precedent”—or the interpretation endorsed in the new legislative language?  
As I have demonstrated elsewhere, the same issue arises even in the inter-
pretation of a single statute when courts are faced with substantive questions 
that are similar to the issue addressed in an overridden case but not squarely 
addressed by the text of the override.13
Gross dramatically changed the terms of debate by following neither the 
precedent nor the override.  The Court asserted that because the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 (1991 CRA), which amended Title VII to partially codify and 
partially override Price Waterhouse, did not explicitly address the causation 
standard in the ADEA, Congress must have intended that the statutes impose 
different standards.14  I believe this conclusion is unwarranted.  As a 
descriptive matter, I think it mischaracterizes the proper inference to be 
drawn from Congress’s prior actions (and inactions).  Although actual 
congressional “intent” may be impossible to verify, consideration of the 
overall structure of the 1991 CRA, as well as of legislative history, provides 
strong support for the opposite inference—i.e., that Congress expected that 
courts would apply its preferred causation standard to other 
antidiscrimination statutes that have substantive language similar to 
11. In Price Waterhouse, the plurality and concurring opinions interpreted Title VII’s 
prohibition on discrimination “because of” an individual’s sex to establish liability if a plaintiff 
proved sex was a “motivating” or “substantial” factor in a decision based on a mix of legitimate and 
illegitimate factors, unless an employer could prove that it would have taken the same action 
without considering sex.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242, 250 (1989) (plurality 
opinion); id. at 259–61 (White, J., concurring); id. at 276, 278 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice 
O’Connor interpreted Title VII to permit shifting the burden to the defendant only when a plaintiff 
had “direct evidence” of discrimination.  Id. at 276. Shortly after Price Waterhouse was decided, 
Congress amended Title VII to codify the motivating-factor standard and to replace the affirmative 
defense articulated in Price Waterhouse with a limitation on remedies.  Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075–76 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
2(m), 2000e5-(g)(B) (2006)). 
12. This prior work includes Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of 
Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511 (2009); 
Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: A Brief Updated 
View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REV. 651 (2000); Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog that Didn’t 
Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1093 (1993); Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment, supra note 9; and 
Jamie Darin Prenkert, Bizarro Statutory Stare Decisis, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 217 (2007).
13. Widiss, supra note 12, at 542–46, 551–56. 
14. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 (“We cannot ignore Congress’ decision to amend Title VII’s 
relevant provisions but not make similar changes to the ADEA.”). 
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Title VII.15  But I am not advocating use of legislative history to trump or go 
beyond the statutory language.  The text of the ADEA can comfortably be 
interpreted to adopt the same causation standard as that endorsed by 
Congress in its amendment of Title VII.16  Accordingly, the Court’s rejection 
of that standard—in the absence of any affirmative indication from Congress 
that it intended the ADEA to be governed by a different standard—
unnecessarily undermines jurisprudential values of fairness, efficiency, and 
predictability within statutory law.17  It also increases the risk of ideological 
judging by interpreting overrides to have the anomalous effect of granting 
courts freedom from the constraints typically imposed by precedent and by 
Congress.  (Notably, Gross is an employer-favoring decision issued by a 
sharply divided Court, with the five “conservative” Justices making up the 
majority.)18
Lower courts have already applied the reasoning in Gross to reinterpret 
the causation standard governing at least ten different federal statutory prohi-
bitions on employment discrimination or retaliation, as well as the standard 
governing state analogues of several federal statutes.19  Courts, however, 
have not been uniform in applying Gross to other statutes.  Some have 
continued to follow Price Waterhouse, and a few have applied the standard 
set forth by Congress in its override of Price Waterhouse.20  The one 
consistent theme in all of these decisions is that the current law is confused. 
Gross and its aftermath are illustrative of a more general problem that I 
call the “hydra problem.”  Congress tried, through enacting an override, to 
supersede a judicial interpretation with which it disagreed.  The Court inter-
preted this action—the metaphorical severing of a head—to permit the rapid 
growth of new “heads” in numerous other statutes.  In Gross, the Court 
suggested that if Congress did not intend this result, it bore the burden of 
amending not just the statute actually interpreted in a prior decision but also 
all related statutes to which the disfavored judicial interpretation might be 
applied.  I contend this is an unreasonable expectation.  Even if Congress 
15. See infra subpart III(D). 
16. See infra subpart IV(B). 
17. See infra Part V. 
18. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2346, 2352, 2358 (indicating that the majority decision was 
authored by Justice Thomas and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, and 
Scalia, while Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter dissented); see also Jeffrey Rosen, 
Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
03/16/magazine/16supreme-t.html (documenting the rise of “pro-business” decisions under the 
Roberts Court). 
19. See infra subparts V(A)–(B) (discussing court decisions applying Gross to the 
antiretaliation provisions of Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, 
§ 1981, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 
the Jury Systems Improvement Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, § 1983 claims 
raising public employees’ First Amendment rights, and state analogues of several of these federal 
statutes). 
20. See infra subparts V(A)–(B).
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could accurately identify all potentially affected statutes, it would face sig-
nificant barriers in amending them all separately.  Shortly after Gross was 
decided, Congress considered bills that would override the decision by 
inserting language into the ADEA that would not only reject the Court’s 
interpretation of the causation standard in the ADEA but also articulate a 
uniform causation standard that ostensibly would govern all other federal 
statutory or constitutional prohibitions on employment discrimination or 
retaliation; significantly, however, the bills did not propose actually 
amending any other statutes.21 In light of Gross, this kind of “blanket” 
amendment is reasonable, but it is far from ideal.  It might well be inade-
quately responsive to distinctions among statutes; it would also mean that 
language governing the causation standard of numerous statutes would be 
buried in the sections of the U.S. Code that codify the ADEA.  In part 
because of these potential costs, even if Congress amended the ADEA to 
override Gross, it is relatively unlikely that it would enact a global override 
or separately amend all other potentially affected statutes.  But this would not 
necessarily mean that Congress “chooses” or “prefers” that a standard of 
causation it affirmatively repudiated apply to other statutes; rather, I argue 
that it means that the terms by which the Gross Court requires Congress to 
signal such disagreement fail to respect adequately the institutional realities 
of Congress. 
The anomaly of statutory interpretation is that courts, which in this 
context serve putatively as agents of Congress, set the rules for the judicial–
congressional conversation through the canons of interpretation they adopt.22
If courts employ canons that place expectations on Congress that are clearly 
unrealistic, they can work to undermine the promise of legislative supremacy 
in the statutory realm.  The Gross Court justified its conclusion that Congress 
“chose” a different causation standard for the ADEA than Title VII by 
drawing a negative inference from Congressional inaction.  I argue that 
inference is unwarranted.23  I propose instead a rebuttable presumption that 
21. Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, S. 1756, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2009); Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2009).  The two bills were substantively identical. 
22. Numerous state legislatures have enacted statutes that seek to govern how courts interpret 
statutes, some with greater success than others.  See generally Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the 
Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341 (2010) (cataloguing rules of interpretation enacted 
by state legislatures and discussing the extent to which they control judicial interpretations).  
Commentators disagree about the constitutionality of comparable action by Congress.  See infra 
note 383.
23. See infra subpart VI(A).  In other contexts, courts and commentators have long recognized 
that congressional inaction is often a dubious basis for inferring Congressional intent.  See, e.g.,
United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 496 (1997) (“[W]e have frequently cautioned that it is at best 
treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law.”) 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that relying on “congressional inaction” to signal 
acquiescence to a prior judicial opinion “is a canard”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting 
Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 90–108 (1988) (discussing concerns with inferring 
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enactment of an override calls for the (re)interpretation of the preexisting 
language in the statute amended—and analogous provisions in related 
statutes—consistent with the meaning endorsed by Congress, so long as the 
preexisting text can reasonably bear that meaning.24  Importantly, the rule I 
propose only comes into play when an override endorses a plausible 
interpretation of preexisting statutory language.  Thus a textualist jurist who 
categorically refuses to consider legislative history could comfortably apply 
this rule.  It would promote the fair, efficient, and predictable development of 
statutory law, while still permitting courts to consider whether significant 
differences among statutes that are unrelated to the override merit distinct 
interpretations.  Given the challenge of amending multiple statutes, I believe 
it would also be more likely to accord with legislative intent.  That said, I 
also suggest that Congress make its intentions as clear as possible in duly 
enacted statutory language. 
Part II explores the challenge that overrides pose to the standard rule of 
precedent and defines the hydra problem.  Part III discusses in detail the 
multistep conversation between the courts and Congress regarding the stan-
dard of causation in employment discrimination statutes.  Part IV imagines 
an alternative version of the story to illustrate how the conventions courts use 
to interpret overrides improperly minimize the significance of congressional 
interventions relative to judicial interpretations.  Part V uses the rapid appli-
cation of Gross in other contexts, as well as bills Congress has considered to 
override Gross, to argue that the putative response that the Gross Court indi-
cates it expects from Congress is unreasonably difficult for Congress to 
achieve.  Moreover, even if it were viable, it could cause significant new 
problems.  Part VI argues that courts should instead adopt interpretive rules 
that more fairly respect the institutional realities of Congress; this would 
better permit overrides to play their expected role as a means for Congress to 
signal disagreement with judicial interpretations of statutes and further the 
orderly and consistent development of statutory law. 
A note about scope and audience may be helpful.  This Article identifies 
a problem of statutory interpretation that has arisen frequently in the 
employment discrimination context and posits that it is a latent tension 
inherent in the interpretation of overrides more generally.  My hope is that 
the analysis that follows will be of interest both to scholars of statutory inter-
pretation and to those who focus on employment discrimination law, as well 
as to practitioners of employment discrimination law, courts, and policy 
makers.  But as is true of any case study, richness of detail comes at the 
cost of breadth of coverage.  Moreover, as discussed more fully below, 
acquiescence from inaction, including the possibility that Congress does not know about the 
relevant decision, has higher priorities than responding to it, or cannot agree on an appropriate 
response).
24. This rule could be announced by the Supreme Court as a general canon of interpretation.  It 
is also possible that Congress could enact legislation directing courts to adopt this presumption.  See 
infra note 406 and accompanying text. 
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employment discrimination is a particularly fertile ground for exploration of 
these issues because there are numerous statutes that are typically deemed 
“related,” overrides are common, and it is a highly partisan area of the law.  
For all these reasons, employment discrimination may also be somewhat 
atypical; perhaps it is a “perfect storm” for the development of the hydra 
problem.  I believe that the approach I advocate could be applied when inter-
preting the significance of overrides in other areas of law.  However, further 
research is warranted to better understand the extent to which the hydra 
problem exists in other contexts as well as appropriate responses to it. 
II. Precedent and Overrides  
In statutory interpretation cases, courts routinely extol the importance of 
precedent and look to prior interpretations of legislative language to resolve 
the case at bar.  Scholarly commentary on the application of the rule of 
precedent in the statutory context has focused on the all-or-nothing questions 
of whether and when courts may properly overrule their own statutory 
precedents.25  Questions regarding how courts determine whether a valid 
statutory precedent controls a different case, particularly when that case arose 
under a different statute, and the related question of how congressional 
overrides fit into the standard rule of precedent, have been far less 
considered.  This part lays out the conceptual challenges that are implicit in 
the interpretation of overrides and can create the hydra problem.  It shows 
how Congress’s enactment of an override can be interpreted to have the 
counterintuitive effect of aggrandizing contemporary judicial power to 
reinterpret numerous other statutes, as illustrated by the detailed case study 
that follows.  Part VI then returns to theoretical issues discussed in this part 
to question more directly the assumptions and presumptions that underlie 
25. Compare, e.g., EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 23 (1949)
(“Therefore it seems better to say that once a decisive interpretation of legislative intent has been 
made, and in that sense a direction has been fixed within the gap of ambiguity, the court should take 
that direction as given.”), and Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an 
Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 208–09, 215 (1989) (arguing for 
absolute statutory stare decisis as a means of reducing judicial lawmaking), with WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 52–55 (1994) (arguing that when the 
assumptions of a society or culture underlying a statute are discredited, the statute may be 
interpreted dynamically in order to fulfill its original functions), T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating 
Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 46–47 (1988) (arguing that a “nautical” approach to 
statutory construction that takes into account the current legal landscape and is not bound by 
originalism is both sensible and defensible), and Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory 
Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2074–75 (2002) (arguing that courts should, at times, be 
willing to overrule statutory precedents to bring an interpretation in line with contemporary political 
preferences).  Distinct issues may arise when considering statutory stare decisis at the circuit court 
level.  See Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 317, 344–47 (2005) (arguing that heightened statutory stare decisis for circuit court decisions 
is unwarranted because Congress is less likely to know about or prioritize responding to circuit 
court decisions than to Supreme Court decisions). 
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them and to propose an alternative approach that better respects the 
separation of powers and the orderly development of statutory law. 
A. Statutory Interpretation Constrained by Precedent 
The basic workings of a rule of precedent are quite familiar.  Under 
traditional common law principles, in the absence of statutory or 
constitutional directives, judges reason from a body of prior cases to resolve 
a contemporary dispute.  In so doing, they must determine what the 
underlying rationale is for the prior decisions and whether the case at bar is 
relevantly similar to the prior cases such that it should be governed by the 
same rationale.26  This approach furthers fairness (in that similar cases are 
treated alike), efficiency, and predictability—values that are generally 
considered important in the rule of law.27  As Justice Brandeis famously 
observed, “Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it 
is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be 
settled right.”28  Still, notwithstanding respect for precedent, common law 
courts reconsider prior precedents in response to changing needs or evolving 
norms; often, this occurs gradually as prior decisions are distinguished and 
new decisions slowly accumulate until ultimately a high court announces a 
new rule.29  In the constitutional context, the Supreme Court has likewise 
permitted relatively flexible standards for overruling prior precedents, in 
large part because it is so difficult to amend the Constitution.30
In conducting statutory analysis, precedent plays a similar, but not 
identical, role.  Statutes contain gaps and ambiguities, and often there can be 
more than one “reasonable” interpretation of statutory language.31  Once a 
26. For general discussions of the system of precedent, see, for example, PRECEDENT IN LAW 
(Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987); Eric Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367 (1988); 
and Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987).  A symposium on precedent and 
the Roberts Court offers an interesting collection of more recent research on precedent from a 
variety of perspectives.  Symposium, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107 (2008). 
27. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (“Stare decisis is the preferred 
course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal 
principles, [and it] fosters reliance on judicial decisions . . . .”); Schauer, supra note 26, at 595–601 
(observing that reasons for following precedent include fairness, predictability, and efficiency). 
28. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
29. See, e.g., Bozman v. Bozman, 830 A.2d 450, 450, 470 (Md. 2003) (holding that abrogation 
of the common law rule of spousal immunity was warranted because it was a “vestige of the past 
[and] no longer suitable to our people” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
30. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361,
1362 (1988) (“The Court applies a relaxed, or weaker, form of that presumption when it reconsiders 
its constitutional precedents, because the difficulty of amending the Constitution makes the Court 
the only effective resort for changing obsolete constitutional doctrine.”). 
31. Courts are instructed to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguity in a 
statute if they determine Congress intends the agency to act with the force of law and that the 
agency in fact did so.  See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) 
(“[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron
deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules 
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in 
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court with precedential authority has issued an interpretation, that interpreta-
tion is expected to control future interpretation of that language by courts that 
are inferior in the judicial hierarchy, at least when they are faced with ques-
tions that are relevantly similar to the issue posed in the precedential case.32
The Supreme Court and circuit courts also typically consider themselves 
bound by their own prior statutory precedents, although, as discussed below, 
the Supreme Court has not adopted a rule of absolute statutory stare decisis.33
The significant respect given to prior interpretations, particularly those 
of the Supreme Court, means that judicial glosses on the meaning of statutory 
terms become functionally part of the “law,” even though they are not found 
in the actual statutory language.  Later court decisions expound upon the 
prior interpretation, frequently providing new glosses, not on the statutory 
text itself but on authoritative interpretations of that text.  This is true not just 
for statutes that the Supreme Court has designated “common law” statutes, 
such as the Sherman Antitrust Act, but for statutes more generally.34  For 
example, in the employment discrimination context, the Supreme Court 
announced a multipart test to govern whether an employee has an actionable 
harassment claim.35  The elements of the test are not found in the statutory 
language, but courts have since developed a significant body of case law that 
parses the language that the Court used and reasons by analogy from prior 
the exercise of that authority.”); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (“If 
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to 
the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.  Such legislative regulations 
are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute.”).  In practice, courts retain considerable flexibility regarding whether they will defer.  See
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1098
(2008) (“[O]ur study of the 1014 agency-interpretation cases from Chevron to Hamdan reveals that 
the Court’s deference practice functions along a continuum, ranging from an anti-deference regime 
reflected in the rule of lenity to the super-strong deference the Court sometimes announces in cases 
related to foreign affairs.”). 
32. See, e.g., Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain 
Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1161–62 (2005) 
(discussing the hierarchical application of precedent). 
33. See id. (stating that while both the Supreme Court and circuit courts typically follow their 
own precedents, they are not legally required to do so); see also infra note 45 and accompanying 
text. 
34. For an interesting exploration of how “common law” statutes differ from other statutes (if at 
all), see Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretive Methodology and Delegations to Courts: Are “Common-
Law Statutes” Different?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2012) (on file with author). 
35. The Court announced this standard in two decisions handed down on the same day that 
include the same precise language.  See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) 
(“An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile 
environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the 
employee . . . [unless an employer can establish] (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to 
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the 
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”); Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 
(1998) (repeating the test in identical language). 
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judicial decisions to determine the test’s scope.36  Although the Court stated 
that this test was an “interpretation” of the basic statutory prohibition on 
discrimination as informed in part by the consideration of principles of 
agency law,37 the actual development of the doctrine would be hard to distin-
guish from common law.  To lawyers trained in the United States, this may 
be so familiar as to seem inherent in the process of statutory interpretation.  
But in some civil code societies, at least as a formal matter, statutory inter-
pretation decisions hold no precedential value.38  Rather, the only controlling 
“law” is the statutory text itself.39
As a jurisprudential principle, the Supreme Court and lower courts 
describe the rule of precedent as an important constraint in statutory 
interpretation.40  Numerous empirical studies have tried to gauge how 
effectively precedent actually constrains judges from issuing decisions in line 
with their ideological preferences.41  (As discussed below, empirical research 
36. Courts frequently disagree about the correct interpretation of aspects of this judicially 
created standard.  Compare, e.g., Monteagudo v. Asociación de Empleados del Estado Libre 
Asociado de P.R., 554 F.3d 164, 171–72 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that it was not “unreasonable” as a 
matter of law for an employee to fail to file a sexual harassment complaint when the manager who 
handled complaints was a close friend of the alleged harasser), with Barrett v. Applied Radiant 
Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding in a similar situation that it was
unreasonable for an employee to fail to report harassment). 
37. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755 (arguing that the Court’s newly developed discrimination rule 
was not purely discretionary “common law” but rather “statutory interpretation pursuant to 
congressional direction”). 
38. See Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 225, 234 (1999)
(asserting that judges in civilian jurisdictions are “just interpreters” whose decisions are only final 
for a particular case and are not authoritative in other cases, even similar ones). For case studies on 
the use of precedent in several civil code countries, see generally INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS 
(D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997).  The editors of this volume suggest that 
increasingly in civil code countries, prior judicial interpretations of statutory language can exert 
influence, even if they are not technically binding as precedent.  See D. Neil MacCormick & 
Robert S. Summers, Further General Reflections and Conclusions, in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS,
supra, at 531, 531–33, 536 (suggesting that though significant differences remain, the treatment of 
precedent in civil and common law countries has converged in the modern era so that it is of 
increasing importance in civil law jurisdictions). 
39. See Michel Troper & Christophe Grzegorczyk, Precedent in France, in INTERPRETING
PRECEDENTS, supra note 38, at 103, 107 (stating that in France, “[t]he only legitimate source of law 
is ‘the law’, which is equated with statutory law”). 
40. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (calling stare decisis 
an “indisputable . . . self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch” that carries “special force 
in the area of statutory interpretation”). 
41. This debate is often characterized as between adherents to an “attitudinal model,” who 
argue that judges are heavily influenced by their ideological preferences, and adherents to a “legal 
model,” who argue that judges are in fact constrained by precedent, statutory language, and 
congressional intent. See Kirk A. Randozzo et al., Checking the Federal Courts: The Impact of 
Congressional Statutes on Judicial Behavior, 68 J. POL. 1006, 1008 (2006) (describing this debate 
and collecting studies that provide evidence for each theory). There is empirical work on each side 
of the debate.  For a study substantiating the attitudinal model by showing that, at least as far as the 
Supreme Court is concerned, ideological preferences play a significant role in decision making, see 
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
REVISITED (2002). For a study empirically testing the effect of regime-changing Supreme Court 
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also seeks to establish the extent to which strategic considerations, such as 
the likelihood of overrides, also play a role.)42  Results are mixed, but recent 
studies typically conclude that both ideology and rule-of-law values, such as 
adherence to precedent, play a role in judicial decisions at all levels, with the 
general consensus that the Supreme Court is less constrained by precedent 
than lower courts.43  In part, this reflects doctrinal distinctions.  The Court 
permits itself to overrule even statutory decisions if they prove “unworkable” 
or become “obsolete” due to intervening changes in the law.44  However, the 
Court typically opines that stare decisis should be observed particularly 
strictly in the statutory context because Congress may intervene to supersede 
prior judicial interpretations, and only rarely does the Court explicitly 
overturn statutory precedents.45  The more significant difference between the 
Supreme Court and lower courts is the Supreme Court’s willingness to 
distinguish precedents that many would expect to control a given case.46
decisions and finding that the Justices’ voting is at least somewhat constrained by precedent, see 
Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision 
Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305 (2002). 
42. See infra text accompanying notes 79–80. 
43. See, e.g., Lindquist & Cross, supra note 32, at 1173 (asserting that precedential power is 
weakest at the level of the U.S. Supreme Court); see also Madeline Fleisher, Judicial Decision 
Making Under the Microscope: Moving Beyond Politics Versus Precedent, 60 RUTGERS L. REV.
919, 920–21 nn.3–5 (2008) (collecting and describing studies that seek to document the constraining 
effect of precedent relative to ideology). Much of the early work in the field focused on the 
Supreme Court’s consideration of constitutional cases; more recently, lower courts and statutory 
precedents have received greater attention.  See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd & James F. Spriggs II, An
Examination of Strategic Anticipation of Appellate Court Preferences by Federal District Court 
Judges, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 37, 77 (2009) (finding that district courts’ propensity to follow 
precedent is influenced by their own ideology but not by anticipated ideology of the appellate court 
that will review their decisions); Lindquist & Cross, supra note 32, at 1195–96 (finding that 
statutory precedent exerted influence on lower court judges but that its constraining effects 
weakened over time); Chad Westerland et al., Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 891, 901–02 (2010) (finding that circuit courts are 
constrained by the expected treatment of precedent by the contemporary Supreme Court as well as 
by prior treatment of that precedent in their own circuit). 
44. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172–73 (noting that although prior statutory interpretations are 
given greater deference than constitutional ones, the Court will overrule a prior statutory precedent 
that has proven unworkable in practice). 
45. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 280–84 (1972) (adhering to precedents excluding 
professional baseball from antitrust regulation, despite widespread criticism of the prior decisions, 
on the ground that Congress had signaled agreement with the Court’s interpretation by failing to 
enact legislation overriding those decisions); see also Barrett, supra note 25, at 319–21 (discussing 
Flood as an example of the Supreme Court’s heightened deference to statutory precedent); James F. 
Spriggs II & Thomas G. Hansford, Explaining the Overruling of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent, 63 
J. POL. 1091, 1097, 1107 (2001) (providing an empirical study of cases from 1946 to 1995 and 
finding that the Court is less likely to overrule statutory precedent than constitutional precedent, 
although both statutory and constitutional precedents are more likely to be overruled when 
“ideologically incongruent” with the contemporary Court). 
46. Cf. MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 191–92 (1988) (arguing that, at least as to constitutional principles, judges can “assemble 
diverse precedents into whatever pattern” they choose).  Although lower courts also enjoy some 
flexibility regarding how broadly or narrowly they interpret Supreme Court precedent, studies 
suggest the expected preference of the contemporary Supreme Court plays a significant role in 
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Additionally, individual Justices may simply continue to adhere to their 
original position through a series of dissents.47  Notwithstanding these 
caveats, it is probably fair to say that precedent exerts control over statutory 
interpretation even at the Supreme Court level, in part because the Court also 
cares about its own institutional legitimacy.48  Thus, as Professor Lawrence 
Marshall expressed it, a court’s distinguishing of precedent must at least pass 
the “red face test.”49
B. Statutory Interpretation Constrained by Precedent Interpreting a 
“Related” Statute 
Precedent interpreting one statute can also exert influence on the 
interpretation of other statutes.  Courts often state that in “related” statutes, 
identical or similar language should maintain consistent meanings.  Thus, for 
statutes that are identified as in pari materia (in the same matter),50 courts 
will apply prior judicial interpretations not just to subsequent cases that arise 
under the statute actually interpreted but also to identical or similar language 
in other statutes addressing similar issues.51  Courts offer a variety of 
sometimes-overlapping justifications for this practice.52  These include that 
Congress intends to incorporate authoritative interpretations of statutory text 
when it uses language from one statute in a related context;53 that similar 
lower courts’ decision making.  See, e.g., Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event 
History Analysis of Lower Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. POL.
534, 546–47 (2002) (finding that the ideology of the contemporary Supreme Court is a more 
important factor than the ideology of the circuit court panel in determining whether that panel will 
comply with new Supreme Court precedent overruling prior Supreme Court precedent); Westerland 
et al., supra note 43, at 901 (finding strong empirical support for the contention that circuit courts’ 
compliance with precedent depends on their expectations regarding whether the contemporary 
Supreme Court would be constrained by the prior precedent). 
47. See HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL:
ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 38 (1999) (describing how certain 
Justices sometimes follow a pattern of “strong[ly] preferential” voting, registering their continued 
rejection of a precedent by authoring a dissent in each successor case). 
48. See Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy, 53 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 971, 972–73 (2009) (collecting studies demonstrating that “courts have preferences 
for institutional legitimacy”). 
49. Marshall, supra note 25, at 218; see also Richards & Kritzer, supra note 41, at 315 (2002) 
(“Law matters in Supreme Court decision making in ways that are specifically jurisprudential. . . .  
We theorize and observe that both the justices’ policy goals and legal considerations matter in 
Supreme Court decision making.”). 
50. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 862 (9th ed. 2009). 
51. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1066 (4th ed. 2007) (introducing the “in pari
materia” rule as one of three canons of statutory construction under which an interpreter of a statute 
may look to other statutes for interpretive guidance); CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 486–89 (2011) (discussing the canon). 
52. See NELSON, supra note 51, at 487–88 (describing purpose-based, text-based, and intent-
based rationales for interpreting statutes in pari materia consistently).
53. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) (stating, in the context of the then-
recently enacted ADEA, that “where, as here, Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of 
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language within the statutes should be interpreted consistently so as to 
achieve purposes that are shared by both statutes;54 and simply that the plain 
meaning of identical text will typically remain constant among related 
statutes.55
The intent-based rationales, in particular, rest on assumptions that are 
difficult to verify.  As a threshold matter, it can be difficult to guess ex ante
which statutes courts will determine to be “related,” particularly because 
statutes may be deemed related for some purposes but not for others.  For 
example, the Supreme Court has stated that the ADEA’s substantive provi-
sions governing private employment are derived in haec verba (verbatim)56
from Title VII, and should generally be interpreted in pari materia with that 
statute, but that its procedural and remedial provisions borrow from the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and accordingly should follow interpretations 
of FLSA.57  Confusingly, however, the Court later opined that almost identi-
cal procedural language found in a separate portion of the ADEA governing 
federal employment should be interpreted in pari materia with Title VII.58
Even if Congress would reasonably assume that statutes would be deemed in 
pari materia, legislative drafters may not be aware of relevant judicial 
interpretations of the preexisting statute.59  Assertions of “intent” are 
particularly dubious when courts borrow interpretations that postdate the 
enactment of the related statute.60  Importantly, however, sometimes when 
intent-based rationales are weak, purposivist or textualist justifications may 
offer strong support for applying a consistent interpretation.61  The opposite 
is also true.  Sometimes an assessment of statutory purpose or context can 
a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given 
to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute”). 
54. See, e.g., Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (citing the “common 
purpose” of the ADEA and Title VII as partial justification for interpreting the statutes 
consistently). 
55. See, e.g., id. (citing the almost-identical text of the ADEA and Title VII as partial 
justification for interpreting them consistently). 
56. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 853 (9th ed. 2009). 
57. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584–85. 
58. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 166–67 (1981) (stating that in addressing age 
discrimination in federal employment, “Congress deliberately prescribed a distinct statutory scheme 
applicable only to the federal sector, and one based not on the FLSA but . . . on Title VII” (footnote 
omitted)). 
59. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 72–76 (1997) (describing a study that 
found that congressional staffers were mostly unaware of how circuit courts were interpreting 
statutes).  But see infra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing studies showing that many 
Supreme Court and circuit court decisions are discussed in some manner in Congress). 
60. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 260 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(criticizing the plurality opinion for applying a 1971 interpretation of Title VII to the ADEA, 
enacted in 1967). 
61. See, e.g., id. at 235–40 (plurality opinion) (citing purpose-based, textual, and agency-
deference justifications for applying to the ADEA an interpretation of Title VII that postdated the 
ADEA’s enactment). 
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suggest strong reasons for interpreting identical text to bear different 
meanings.62
Whether or not Congress intentionally borrows judicial interpretations, 
the practice of interpreting identical or similar language in statutes in pari 
materia to bear consistent meanings will often have the independent virtue of 
advancing the values served by precedent in a true common law context.  
That is, it will often promote fairness—in the sense of treating similar issues 
alike—to interpret distinct statutes that address related subjects (e.g., age 
discrimination and race discrimination) consistently.  The practice will also 
typically promote efficiency and predictability.  This is particularly essential 
because the Supreme Court and state supreme courts rule on any given stat-
ute relatively infrequently.  For example, it has been almost fifty years since 
Title VII was enacted, and many other federal and state statutes have since 
been enacted that use similar language to prohibit discrimination in 
employment.63  In that half century, the Supreme Court has directly 
addressed the standard of causation that should be applied to claims alleging 
a mix of legitimate and illegitimate motives just twice: Price Waterhouse 
(interpreting Title VII) and Gross (interpreting the ADEA). If lower courts 
lack an authoritative construction of the statute actually at issue in a given 
case, they naturally rely on authoritative interpretations of analogous 
language in related statutes.  This is illustrated by the rapid exportation of the 
rule of causation announced in Gross, as well as the pre-Gross exportation of 
the rule of causation announced in Price Waterhouse.64 If lawyers practicing 
in a given area can reasonably expect lower courts to do so, they likewise can 
have a good sense of how statutes will be applied and can advise their clients 
accordingly. 
The “meaningful-variation” canon of statutory interpretation is the 
converse of interpreting statutes in pari materia consistently; courts assume 
that a difference between statutes that are otherwise similar is a purposeful 
signal by Congress that the statutes should bear distinctly different meanings 
on the relevant point.65  At times, this conclusion is reasonable, particularly 
when language in the statute is specific enough to establish that Congress 
intended the distinction to be significant.66  But in the absence of legislative 
62. See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 522–25 (1994) (interpreting language in 
the Copyright Act regarding attorneys’ fees differently from almost identical language in civil rights 
statutes in order to further distinct purposes).  Of course, many would argue that these statutes are 
not in pari materia at all. 
63. See infra notes 269–76 and accompanying text. 
64. See infra subparts V(A)–(B). 
65. See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88–92 (1991) (arguing that the 
existence of several statutes explicitly permitting the recovery of experts’ and attorneys’ fees 
required interpreting a statute that only explicitly referenced “attorney’s fees” to preclude recovery 
of experts’ fees). 
66. For example, Congress recently enacted the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 
2008 (GINA), Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.).  Although the basic structure of GINA’s substantive employment discrimination provisions 
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language establishing purposive distinctions, the inference of intentionality 
may often be unwarranted.  For example, the variation may be a response to 
political calculations that have salience at the time that the later statute is 
enacted but were absent when the first statute was enacted, or congressional 
drafters may not even realize that the later statute largely echoes but differs 
in some way from an earlier statute or a different section of the same statute.  
The Court has recognized this concern, stating that the inference will be 
strong when “applied . . . to contrasting statutory sections originally enacted
simultaneously in relevant respects” but should be applied more cautiously 
when there is less reason to infer that the difference is deliberate.67  As dis-
cussed more fully below, I contend that generally it is improper to infer a 
“meaningful” variation when the distinction between otherwise similar stat-
utes is created by language added to a given statute to override (or codify) 
prior judicial interpretations of that statute.68  Additionally, whether or not 
the inference of intentionality is warranted in a given situation, application of 
this canon of interpretation does far less than interpreting similar statutes in
pari materia consistently to advance predictability or uniformity in the law 
because it is often difficult for lower courts, lawyers, and the public to guess 
what significance higher courts will ascribe to variation among statutes. 
It is also essential to distinguish the canon of interpreting statutes in pari 
materia consistently from what is sometimes called the “whole code” canon 
of statutory interpretation.69  This is a more general—and far more 
controversial—proposition that statutory terms should bear consistent 
meaning across the U.S. Code as a whole.  As a descriptive matter, it is far 
less likely that this approach accords with any true congressional “intent” 
since it strains credibility to suggest that in crafting or voting on new 
legislation, congressional lawmakers consider not just interpretations of 
closely related statutes but also interpretations of similar language used in 
radically different statutory contexts.  As Judge Posner memorably observed, 
“Congressmen do not carry the statutes of the United States around in their 
heads any more than judges do.”70  Nor is it reasonable to assume that stat-
borrows from Title VII, GINA explicitly precludes interpreting that language to permit “disparate 
impact” causes of action and authorizes the creation of a commission to study whether disparate 
impact claims should be permitted in the future.  Id. § 208, 122 Stat. at 917–18. 
67. Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 75 (1995) (emphasis added). 
68. See infra subpart VI(A). 
69. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 51, at 863 (describing a “whole code rule” under which 
“interpreters must consider the provision in light of the whole code as well as the whole statute”);
see also William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 171, 221 (2000) (describing Justice Scalia’s assertions that courts should interpret statutes so 
as to “ensure some coherence across the whole body of law”); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory
Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS 
L.J. 221, 225–26 (2010) (reporting an empirical study of recent cases finding a theoretical divide 
between Justices who prioritize coherence across the legal landscape and those that aim for best 
effectuating the policy embodied in a particular statute). 
70. Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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utes addressing very different areas of law share purposes; for example, the 
objectives of an antidiscrimination law will not necessarily be furthered by 
interpreting language in the same way that similar language has been inter-
preted in a criminal statute or a securities law.  The whole code canon of 
interpretation also does very little to support predictability and uniformity 
because it is all but impossible to guess where a court will turn. 
The whole code canon is frequently invoked by jurists who ascribe to 
“textualist” modes of interpretation and claim that they constrain judicial 
activism.71  But as Professor William Buzbee argues persuasively, whole 
code interpretation can actually facilitate, rather than constrain, ends-oriented 
judging.72  The U.S. Code is so vast, and the body of judicial decisions inter-
preting it is so immense, that a determined jurist could likely find support for 
several different interpretations of a given term and could choose among 
them to advance ideological preferences.  (As discussed in more detail 
below, the majority opinion in Gross is arguably a good example of this.  
The Court draws its interpretation of the ADEA from judicial interpretations 
of language in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO) and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).73  Neither of these 
statutes is an obvious or predictable source of meaning for an employment 
discrimination statute.)  Thus, to paraphrase the oft-quoted criticism of 
reliance on legislative history, whole code interpretation can be like looking 
over a crowd and picking out your friends.74
C. Statutory Interpretation Constrained by Congressional Overrides 
As I have discussed more fully elsewhere, both courts and 
commentators routinely cite the possibility that Congress can enact overrides 
to supersede judicial interpretation of statutes as a check on the lawmaking 
inherent in statutory interpretation.75  This is deemed a crucial mechanism of 
maintaining legislative supremacy in the statutory realm.76  Legal commen-
tators frequently characterize overrides as a helpful “colloquy” between the 
courts and Congress; courts, acting as agents of Congress in this context, 
engage in a good-faith effort to interpret statutes in line with legislative intent 
71. See Buzbee, supra note 69, at 230 (“[J]ustices most frequently utilizing [the whole code 
canon] are self-avowed textualists.”). 
72. See id. at 239 (explaining that “[m]ere text-to-text comparisons . . . provide virtually no 
constraining data points that a judge must evaluate and explain in reaching a result” and arguing 
that, consequently, “[t]he universe of ostensibly similar statutory provisions—frequently a huge 
universe—is putty for judicial molding”). 
73. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009) (citing Bridge v. Phoenix 
Bond & Indem. Co., 128 S. Ct. 2131 (2008), and Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201 
(2007), cases addressing RICO and FCRA, respectively). 
74. See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (quoting Judge Harold Leventhal as 
observing that citing legislative history is like “looking over a crowd and picking out your friends”). 
75. See Widiss, supra note 12, at 518–23 (collecting and discussing commentary). 
76. Id. at 520. 
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and welcome “corrections” from Congress when appropriate.77  Public choice 
scholars, by contrast, often characterize the Supreme Court (at least) as a 
political actor in its own right but likewise suggest that the possibility of 
override serves as an important limit on courts.78  Some empirical studies 
support the contention that courts interpret statutes to effectuate their own 
policy preferences insofar as they can do so without triggering an override,79
although other studies have found little or no evidence that such strategic 
considerations determine outcomes.80
The efficacy of overrides as a tool of legislative supremacy depends on 
two assumptions.  The first is that Congress pays attention to judicial 
decisions.  Although, as noted above, studies suggest that Congress may miss 
some significant statutory interpretation decisions,81 it is also true that many 
of the Supreme Court’s statutory decisions and significant circuit court 
statutory decisions are discussed in some manner in Congress.82  In an 
influential study, Professor William Eskridge found that each Congress 
typically overrides about a dozen Supreme Court decisions and about twice 
as many lower court decisions.83  Other studies have found comparable 
results.84  The second assumption is that overrides effectively constrain 
judicial activism.  A study by political scientist Jeb Barnes found that even 
77. Id. at 521.  The term colloquy is from Professor Richard Paschal.  Richard A. Paschal, The 
Continuing Colloquy: Congress and the Finality of the Supreme Court, 8 J.L. & POL. 143, 143 
(1991).
78. See, e.g., Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court 
Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
263, 265 (1990) (arguing that “the behavior of the Court can be understood as that of a self-
interested, politically motivated actor” but that the Court is constrained by “[t]he ability of other 
political actors to take actions to reverse [it]”). 
79. See, e.g., Mario Bergara et al., Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The 
Congressional Constraint, 28 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 247, 260–63 (2003) (concluding that both ideology 
and politics seem to affect Supreme Court decision making and asserting that “the conclusion that 
the Court thinks strategically cannot be rejected”); Thomas G. Hansford & David F. Damore, 
Congressional Preferences, Perceptions of Threat, and Supreme Court Decision Making, 28 AM.
POL. Q. 490, 504–05 (2000) (finding, in certain circumstances, that the Court is constrained by 
expectations regarding whether Congress will override judicial decisions). 
80. See Clark, supra note 48, at 972 (reviewing studies and concluding that support for the 
contention that the Court acts strategically in statutory interpretation is “mixed at best”). 
81. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
82. See Widiss, supra note 12, at 525 & nn.51–54 (collecting studies showing that Congress 
frequently discusses statutory decisions made by the Supreme Court and the circuit courts). 
83. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
101 YALE L.J. 331, 335–36, 338 tbl.1 (1991) (reporting that from 1975 to 1990, each Congress 
overrode an average of twelve Supreme Court decisions and an average of between twenty-three 
and twenty-four lower court decisions). 
84. See, e.g., Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Behind the Scenes: The Supreme Court and 
Congress in Statutory Interpretation, in GREAT THEATRE: THE AMERICAN CONGRESS IN THE 
1990S, at 224, 228 (Herbert F. Weisberg & Samuel C. Patterson eds., 1998) (finding that Congress 
overrode at least 5.6% of the statutory Supreme Court decisions issued in the 1978–1989 terms); see 
also JEB BARNES, OVERRULED? LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, AND CONTEMPORARY 
COURT–CONGRESS RELATIONS 197–209 (2004) (listing overrides). 
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after an override has been enacted, there is frequently significant judicial 
dissensus—defined as either a circuit split or significant intracircuit 
disagreement—regarding its application.85  The likelihood of dissensus varies 
by subject matter.  For example, Barnes’s study found that tax overrides 
almost never generated dissensus but that civil rights overrides almost always 
did.86  This at least raises a question as to whether courts use the lack of 
clarity regarding proper interpretation of overrides as a cover for advancing 
their own policy preferences. 
In an earlier work, I developed a theoretical concept called “shadow 
precedents,” which I defined as reliance by courts on a precedent that had 
been overridden by Congress.87  Using examples from employment discrim-
ination law, I showed that courts routinely rely on such overridden 
precedents.88  This occurs when a new factual scenario arises that is 
substantially similar to the issue posed in the overridden precedent but is not 
squarely addressed by the text of the override itself.  The interpretive 
challenges posed by overrides have not received much scholarly attention.  
To the extent that the question has previously been addressed, commentators 
(including myself) assumed it posed a binary choice: should courts follow the 
shadow precedent or follow the interpretation suggested by the override?89
Gross answered “neither.” 
D. Statutory Interpretation Unconstrained: The Hydra Problem 
In Greek mythology, the Hydra was a multiheaded monster whose 
notable feature was that severance of any head resulted in the growth of a 
new head in its place.90  The reasoning employed by the Supreme Court in 
Gross suggests that the same can be true for overrides.  The enactment of an 
override—the metaphorical severing of a “head”—can result in multiple 
heads growing in many different statutes.  This is what I call the hydra 
problem. 
The hydra problem is the product of the interrelationship of the 
interpretive conventions described above.  Following the enactment of a 
statute, ambiguous terms are interpreted by courts.  Courts, using whatever 
interpretive methodology they favor, choose among the “reasonable” 
interpretations of the language (a decision that is sometimes influenced by a 
85. BARNES, supra note 84, at 84, 90. 
86. Id. at 169, 171; see also James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of 
Statutory Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law,
58 DUKE L.J. 1231, 1235 (2009) (finding significant variation between the statutory interpretation 
techniques used in tax cases and those used in employment cases). 
87. Widiss, supra note 12, at 532–33. 
88. Id. at 538–60. 
89. See sources cited supra note 12. 
90. See, e.g., INGRI PARIN D’AULAIRE & EDGAR PARIN D’AULAIRE, D’AULAIRE’S BOOK OF 
GREEK MYTHS 134 (1962).
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stated obligation to defer to reasonable agency interpretations).91  Once a 
court with precedential authority issues an authoritative interpretation of 
Statute A, that interpretation functionally becomes part of Statute A.  Second, 
courts following the in pari materia canon apply that authoritative interpre-
tation to a (unspecified and unpredictably growing) group of related statutes 
that include the same or similar language as Statute A.  Third, Congress, 
exercising its authority over the interpretation of statutory language, 
overrides the judicial interpretation by amending Statute A, but Congress 
does not simultaneously amend all of the other (unspecified and 
unpredictably growing) related statutes.  With respect to Statute A, the 
judicial gloss on the statutory language is superseded by the actual statutory 
amendment of the language by Congress.  The difficult question is what 
governs the interpretation of the related statutes. 
If the preexisting language of Statute A and the related statutes could 
reasonably bear both the interpretation the court provided and the 
interpretation endorsed by Congress in the override, there are three logically 
plausible answers to this question, although, as discussed in the parts that 
follow, I think there are significant problems with two of them.  The first is 
that the override supersedes the judicial interpretation of Statute A but not its 
exportation to the group of related statutes, leaving the preexisting statutory 
precedent controlling the interpretation of related statutes.  This is the 
approach endorsed by the dissent in Gross.92  The second is that the override 
supersedes the judicial interpretation of Statute A and its exportation to the 
group of related statutes, and that the preexisting language of the related 
statutes should be reinterpreted by courts in line with the meaning endorsed 
by Congress in its amendment of Statute A.  This is the approach I endorse.93
The third is that the override supersedes the judicial interpretation of 
Statute A and its exportation to the group of related statutes but signals only 
that the interpretation of language in related statutes should differ from that 
adopted by Congress.  The third option (which, for good reason, was not 
considered viable prior to Gross) dramatically increases contemporary 
judicial power, permitting—solely because of the override—courts to adopt a 
new judicial interpretation of the language in the related statutes, free from 
the constraint of following Congress’s preferred interpretation or the need to 
justify a departure from the standard rule of stare decisis. 
The basic contours of the hydra problem predated Gross.  It can emerge 
any time Congress amends a statute to override a judicial interpretation but 
does not amend all related statutes to which the disfavored precedent might 
plausibly be applied.  Employment discrimination law is particularly fertile 
ground for the hydra problem because it is a field that contains numerous 
statutes with similar language and because it is a field in which overrides are 
91. See supra note 31. 
92. See infra text accompanying notes 189–94. 
93. See infra subpart VI(B). 
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quite common.  My previous exploration of this issue was published before 
Gross was decided, but it briefly discussed confusion over the application of 
Price Waterhouse to other statutes, including the ADEA, as an illustration of 
shadow precedents.94  Courts have also disagreed about whether amendments 
to Title VII overriding the standard for disparate impact liability95 and the 
statute of limitations applied to seniority systems96 should affect the 
interpretation of related statutes.  Similar questions were at play in back-and-
forths between the courts and Congress regarding extraterritorial application 
of discrimination laws97 and the availability of attorneys’ fees and experts’ 
fees in a variety of statutes.98  But Gross makes the hydra problem far more 
serious by holding that neither the prior precedent (which was not explicitly 
overruled) nor the override govern the interpretation of the related statutes.  It 
also addresses the issue more directly than prior decisions and in a context 
94. Widiss, supra note 12, at 546–51. 
95. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (concluding that Congress’s 
override of the pre-1991 judicial interpretation of the disparate impact standard in Title VII did not 
preclude its application to the ADEA).  The relationship of these statutory provisions is complicated 
by an affirmative defense found in the ADEA but not in Title VII.  See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic 
Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2405 (2008) (concluding that the disparate impact standard courts had 
developed interpreting Title VII needed to be modified as applied to the ADEA because the ADEA 
contains a statutory affirmative defense permitting decisions based on a reasonable factor other than 
age).  Before Smith was decided, there was a significant circuit split regarding whether disparate 
impact claims were cognizable under the ADEA at all, fueled in part by the fact that Congress did 
not amend the ADEA when it amended Title VII to override the prior judicial interpretation of that 
statute.  See, e.g., Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 701, 703–04 (1st Cir. 1999) (collecting 
cases demonstrating the split and discussing the significance of the 1991 amendments). 
96. Compare Casteel v. Exec. Bd. of Local 703, 272 F.3d 463, 467 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
despite Congress’s override of Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989), 
Lorance’s reasoning remained persuasive when interpreting the ADEA), and Huels v. Exxon Coal 
USA, Inc., 121 F.3d 1047, 1050 n.1 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying Lorance in interpreting the ADA), 
with Casillas v. Fed. Express Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 875, 884–85 (W.D. Tenn. 2001) (finding that 
Lorance did not apply “because the ADEA provisions were generally derived from Title VII, [and] 
when Congress clarified what it originally meant in § 2000e-2(h), this clarification also applied to 
its ADEA counterpart, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)”). 
97. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 258–59 (1991) (holding that 
Title VII did not apply extraterritorially in part because it lacked language added to override judicial 
decisions interpreting the ADEA); see also infra text accompanying notes 226–35 (discussing this 
case and Congress’s response in greater detail). 
98. For the key steps in the conversation, see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 
421 U.S. 240, 269–71 (1975) (interpreting the absence of explicit fee-shifting language in an 
environmental statute to preclude awards of attorneys’ fees), Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards 
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006)) 
(authorizing awards of attorneys’ fees in several civil rights statutes), Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 
992, 1012–21 (1984) (holding that the Education of the Handicapped Act, which was not amended 
by the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, did not authorize an award of fees and 
precluding companion claims under statutes that did permit fees), Handicapped Children’s 
Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (explicitly authorizing attorneys’ fees 
under the Education of the Handicapped Act), W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 102 
(1991) (interpreting § 1988 to preclude shifting of experts’ fees as part of attorneys’ fees); and Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 113, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (explicitly authorizing 
experts’ fees for cases brought pursuant to Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as 
incorporated by reference through the amendment of 42 U.S.C. § 1988). 
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that is of central importance in employment discrimination litigation.99  As 
the next parts illustrate, Gross has quickly caused widespread upheaval and 
confusion, thus making it a particularly rich case study. 
My preliminary research in other areas of statutory law suggests that the 
prevalence of the hydra problem in employment discrimination law may be 
atypical.  Employment discrimination is an area of the law with an unusual 
abundance of distinct statutes that are typically interpreted in pari materia. It 
is also a politically charged area of the law.  The Supreme Court is often 
sharply divided in employment discrimination cases, and Congress 
frequently overrides the Court’s decisions.100  Courts in turn demonstrate 
unusually high levels of disagreement about the meaning of civil rights 
overrides as compared to less partisan areas of the law.101  These factors have 
significance in two respects.  First, it could be that the hydra problem has 
emerged as a common problem in employment discrimination law precisely 
because it is such a contentious area of the law.  Courts may seek to cabin the 
significance of an override because they disagree with the approach adopted 
by Congress or because they resent the fact that Congress has superseded 
their prior interpretation.  Second, the partisan nature of the subject matter 
also suggests that the aggrandizement of contemporary judicial power 
implicit in the approach that the Court endorses in Gross is particular cause 
for concern.  If overrides are interpreted to free judges from constraints of 
precedent and congressional directives, there is a real risk that judges will use 
that interpretive freedom to advance their own ideological preferences.  
Further study of the interpretation of overrides in other contexts is warranted 
99. The actual significance of the difference between the causation standard applied in Title VII 
and the standard now applied in ADEA cases can be difficult to measure, but at least one simulated 
jury study found it influenced case outcomes.  See David Sherwyn & Michael Heise, The Gross
Beast of Burden of Proof: Experimental Evidence on How the Burden of Proof Influences 
Employment Discrimination Case Outcomes, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 901, 903 (2010) (“Findings from our 
study suggest that while the outcomes (involving employer liability) are comparable, plaintiffs in 
cases with a motivating factor jury instruction were significantly more likely to receive litigation 
costs and attorney fees than plaintiffs in cases with the pretext jury instruction.”).
100. As discussed more fully below, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 overrode numerous Supreme 
Court decisions. See infra notes 201–12 and accompanying text.  More recent statutory overrides of 
employment discrimination decisions include, for example, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 626, 794a (Supp. III 
2010) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, e-5 (Supp. III 2010)) (overriding Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)), and the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 
122 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 705 (Supp. III 2010) and in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.) (overriding Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), and Toyota Motor 
Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002)).  Many of the Supreme Court decisions that these 
acts overrode were 5–4 decisions.  E.g., Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 620; see 136 CONG. REC. 1657 
(1990) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) (criticizing a series of 5–4 decisions from the 1988 term as 
“revers[ing] longstanding precedents” and “den[ying] protection to the victims of employment 
discrimination,” and describing the then-proposed bill that became the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as 
“a direct response to those decisions”). 
101. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
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to determine how widespread the hydra problem is in other areas of statutory 
law and to assess potential responses. 
III. Causation in Employment Discrimination Law: The Real Story 
The interpretive conundrum posed by overrides emerges over time; 
judicial interpretations of statutory language slowly accumulate, Congress 
responds, and then courts are called upon to interpret the significance of that 
response.  This part illustrates the complexity of this interaction by providing 
a detailed discussion of the ongoing conversation between the courts and 
Congress regarding the standard of causation in employment discrimination 
law.  It then identifies weaknesses in the Court’s analysis in Gross to 
substantiate my claim that the Court’s assertion that Congress “chose” that 
the ADEA and Title VII bear different causation standards is unwarranted.  It 
demonstrates that consideration of the 1991 CRA as a whole, as well as of 
legislative history, offers strong support for the opposite conclusion—that is, 
that Congress intended and expected that its preferred causation standard 
would apply not only to Title VII but also to other similar statutes. 
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals 
“because of” their race, color, sex, national origin, or religion; numerous 
other employment statutes likewise prohibit discrimination against 
individuals “because of” other protected factors or conduct.102  The first 
significant Supreme Court case analyzing this language in the context of 
alleged intentional discrimination assumed that the challenged employment 
action—in that case, failure to hire—was either “because of” an illegitimate 
factor or “because of” legitimate criteria.103  In a series of decisions, the 
Court developed a framework of shifting burdens of production designed to 
ferret out whether any claimed nondiscriminatory rationale was pretextual, 
reasoning that such a finding supports an inference that the “true” (presumed 
sole, or at least clearly primary) motivation was discriminatory.104  Courts 
applying this framework—typically called “pretext analysis”—soon found 
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006); see infra notes 267–81 and accompanying text (discussing 
other statutes). 
103. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973) (setting forth a 
burden-shifting evidentiary framework to determine whether a challenged determination was 
because of race or because of an employee’s alleged unlawful conduct). 
104. This standard evolved in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 
248, 252–56 (1981); St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506–11 (1993); and Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142–43 (2000).  In Reeves, the Court assumed, 
without deciding, that this burden-shifting structure applied to the ADEA.  See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 
142 (“This Court has not squarely addressed whether the McDonnell Douglas framework . . . also 
applies to ADEA actions.  Because the parties do not dispute the issue, we shall assume, arguendo,
that the McDonnell Douglas framework is fully applicable here.”).  In Gross, the Court once again 
mentioned that it had not yet squarely decided this question.  Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. 
Ct. 2343, 2349 n.2 (“[T]he Court has not definitively decided whether the evidentiary framework of 
McDonnell Douglas . . . utilized in Title VII cases is appropriate in the ADEA context.” (citation 
omitted)). 
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that it was ill suited to assess the legality of employment decisions based on a 
mix of permissible and impermissible considerations because a claimed 
nondiscriminatory rationale could be part of the true justification for an 
action but not the primary or sole justification.105  Courts therefore needed to 
determine whether in such “mixed-motive” cases a plaintiff bears the burden 
of showing that sex, race, or another proscribed factor simply played a role in 
the decision?  A motivating role?  A decisive role?  In common speech, 
“because of” can bear all of these meanings.  The issue in Gross, like the 
issue in Price Waterhouse and the issue that Congress addressed in its partial 
override and partial codification of Price Waterhouse, was what meaning the 
words held in antidiscrimination statutes. 
A. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 
Ann Hopkins worked as a senior manager at the accounting firm Price 
Waterhouse.106  After she had worked for the company for five years, the 
partners in her office proposed her as a candidate for partner.107  Her 
candidacy was denied.108  Evidence from the partners’ deliberations 
suggested that this decision was based on a combination of concerns that she 
had weak interpersonal skills (a legitimate criterion) and concerns that she 
was insufficiently “ladylike” (an illegitimate criterion).109  The Supreme 
Court splintered badly over whether this violated Title VII’s prohibition on 
discrimination “because of . . . sex.”110  There were four opinions, none of 
which garnered a majority—a fact that becomes important in the subsequent 
story.111
A plurality opinion authored by Justice Brennan, on behalf of himself 
and Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens, began from the premise that 
Title VII seeks to balance “employee rights” to be judged without regard to 
sex or other prohibited criteria, with “employer prerogatives” to rely on any 
105. See, e.g., Lewis v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 916 (3d Cir. 1983) (interpreting 
Title VII to require a showing that race was the determining factor or but-for cause of the adverse 
action rather than merely a substantial or motivating factor in that action); id. at 921–22 (Adams, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the but-for standard would not adequately protect plaintiffs when race is 
one factor, but not the only factor, in an employment decision); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 
1003, 1019 (1st Cir. 1979) (considering a mixed-motive situation and holding that the jury should 
have been instructed that age must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence to be the 
determining or the but-for factor in the plaintiff’s discharge). 
106. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
107. Id. at 233. 
108. See id. at 231–32 (stating that Hopkins’s bid for partnership was held over for a year, at 
which point the partners in her office refused to repropose her for partnership). 
109. Id. at 234–36. 
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
111. For a fascinating exposé of the discussions among the Justices regarding the appropriate 
causation standard and their struggle to find an approach that could garner five votes, see Struve, 
supra note 9, at 299–304. 
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qualities or characteristics not specifically prohibited.112  The plurality 
opinion flatly states that “[t]o construe the words ‘because of’ as colloquial 
shorthand for ‘but-for causation,’ . . . is to misunderstand them.”113  Relying 
on textual arguments, legislative history, its understanding of Title VII’s 
underlying policies, and prior precedent interpreting Title VII, labor statutes, 
and constitutional provisions, the plurality announced that a plaintiff would 
instead bear the burden of showing that an illegitimate factor played a 
“motivating part” in the challenged decision.114  If a plaintiff proved this, the 
burden would then shift to the defendant to prove that it would have made 
the “same decision” even if the illegitimate factor had not played a role.115  A 
defendant who made this showing defeated liability entirely.116
Justice White concurred.117  He agreed with the plurality that liability 
could be established if a plaintiff proved that sex or another illegitimate 
criterion was a motivating factor in an employment decision, relying almost 
exclusively on a prior First Amendment public-employee-retaliation case that 
had required a showing that protected speech was a “substantial . . . or . . . 
motivating factor” in an employment decision.118  Justice White also agreed 
with the plurality that an affirmative defense should be available to 
defendants who could prove that they would have taken the same action, but 
he took issue with the plurality’s assertion that an employer generally would 
need to provide “objective evidence” to support this defense.119
Justice O’Connor also concurred.120  She stated that the standard should 
be whether sex or another prohibited criteria “[was] the ‘but-for’ cause of an 
adverse employment action,” but like the plurality and Justice White, she 
endorsed a burden-shifting scheme that placed the ultimate burden of 
showing the absence of but-for causation on the defendant.121  In Justice 
O’Connor’s formulation, a plaintiff would need to show by “direct evidence” 
that sex, race, or another prohibited criteria “was a substantial factor in the 
decision”;122 this showing would justify the “strong medicine” of shifting the 
burden to the defendant to demonstrate it would have taken the same 
action.123  Justice O’Connor drew an analogy to multiple-causation tort cases, 
where courts have recognized that “leaving the burden of persuasion on the 
plaintiff to prove ‘but-for’ causation would be both unfair and destructive of 
112. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239 (plurality opinion). 
113. Id. at 240. 
114. Id. at 250. 
115. Id. at 242. 
116. Id.
117. Id. at 258 (White, J., concurring). 
118. Id. at 259 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
119. Id. at 260–61. 
120. Id. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
121. Id. at 261–62. 
122. Id. at 276. 
123. Id. at 262. 
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the deterrent purposes embodied in the concept of duty of care.”124  She 
opined that, similarly in this context, a showing that sex or another 
illegitimate factor was a “substantial” factor in an employment action was 
sufficient to “trigger[]” “the deterrent purpose of the statute” and place a 
burden on the employer to prove that reliance on the factor did not actually 
“cause[]” the challenged employment practice.125
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, 
dissented.126  The dissent argued that “because of” naturally means “but-for” 
causation.127  It also argued that the burden shifting endorsed by the plurality 
and concurring opinions would engender widespread confusion, particularly 
because the Court had already interpreted employment discrimination 
statutes to require shifting the burden of production (rather than that of 
persuasion) in cases alleging a single discriminatory motive, in order to 
determine whether any legitimate rationales offered by a defendant were 
pretextual.128
Because none of the opinions garnered five votes, lower courts have 
struggled to determine which opinion states the holding of the case.  Most 
have applied Justice O’Connor’s concurrence on the ground that it presents 
the narrowest holding supporting the outcome.129  As discussed below, in 
Gross, the petitioner argued that Justice White’s concurrence should be 
considered the controlling opinion, a position subsequently endorsed by the 
Gross dissenters.130
B. 1991 Civil Rights Act and Desert Palace v. Costa
In 1991, Congress enacted the 1991 CRA, a major civil rights law that 
addressed Price Waterhouse and several other then-recent and wildly 
unpopular employment discrimination decisions by the Supreme Court.131
Congress responded to Price Waterhouse in two ways.  First, as described 
above, the primary operative language of Title VII, § 703(a), prohibits 
124. Id. at 263. 
125. Id. at 265. 
126. Id. at 279 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
127. Id. at 281. 
128. Id. at 290–91. 
129. See, e.g., Erickson v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 271 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying 
the “direct evidence” and “substantial factor” standards from what it called Justice O’Connor’s 
“controlling concurrence”); see also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a 
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of 
five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
130. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2357 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see 
Brief for Petitioner at 52–55, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441), 2009 WL 208116 (arguing that 
because Justice White agreed with the plurality in endorsing a motivating-factor standard without a 
direct-evidence requirement, that standard should control).
131. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
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discrimination “because of” an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.132  The 1991 CRA added to § 703 a new subsection, 
subsection (m), which states that “an unlawful employment practice is 
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment 
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”133  This new 
provision codified the motivating-factor language endorsed as an interpreta-
tion of Title VII by the Price Waterhouse plurality opinion and Justice 
White’s concurring opinion.  Second, the 1991 CRA added a section to the 
remedial provisions that specifies that “[o]n a claim in which an individual 
proves a violation under § 703(m) and a respondent [employer] demonstrates 
that [it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the 
impermissible motivating factor,” the court may grant declaratory relief, 
certain injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs “directly attributable 
only to the pursuit of [that] claim,” but not damages or an order requiring 
reinstatement, hiring, or promotion.134  This provision overrides the plurality 
and concurrences in Price Waterhouse, replacing the absolute defense on 
liability with a limitation on remedies. 
The House Education and Labor Committee Report accompanying the 
bill characterizes these changes as necessary because Price Waterhouse
“sen[t] a message that a little overt sexism or racism is okay, as long as it was 
not the only basis for the employer’s action.”135  The report continues: “If 
Title VII’s ban on discrimination in employment is to be meaningful, victims 
of proven discrimination must be able to obtain relief, and perpetrators of 
discrimination must be held liable for their actions.  Price Waterhouse 
jeopardizes that fundamental principle.”136  The House Judiciary Committee 
Report includes similar language.137  In other words, at least as understood by 
the authors of the committee reports, the 1991 CRA was necessary to 
override aspects of Price Waterhouse because the Court’s interpretation 
undermined Congress’s antidiscrimination objectives. 
The House Judiciary Committee Report also indicates some awareness 
of the related-statute problem and signals that committee members, at least, 
thought that amending Title VII would be sufficient to end reliance on Price
Waterhouse and other overridden precedents.  The report specifies: 
132. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 214, 255 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006)). 
133. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). 
134. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(b) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)). 
135. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 47 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 585. 
136. Id.
137. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 17 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 710 
(“Price Waterhouse . . . threaten[ed] to undermine Title VII’s twin objectives of deterring 
employers from discriminatory conduct and redressing the injuries suffered by victims of 
discrimination.”). 
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  A number of other laws banning discrimination, including the 
[ADA] and the [ADEA] are modeled after, and have been interpreted 
in a manner consistent with, Title VII.  The Committee intends that 
these other laws . . . be interpreted consistently in a manner consistent 
with Title VII as amended by this Act.  For example, . . . mixed 
motive cases involving disability under the ADA should be interpreted 
consistent with [the motivating factor and limitations on damages 
provisions].138
The 1991 CRA, however, did not amend these other statutes to include the 
motivating-factor language.  As discussed more fully below, it did make an 
unrelated minor change to the ADEA and a different unrelated minor change 
to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).139
Shortly after the 1991 CRA was enacted, courts began to struggle with 
three related questions regarding causation standards, all of which stem from 
the interpretative challenges posed by overrides.  First, in substantive 
Title VII cases, did a plaintiff need to provide direct evidence of 
discrimination to obtain the benefit of the motivating-factor standard now set 
forth in § 703(m)?  There was nothing in the text of the statute that refer-
enced direct evidence.  This potential requirement came from Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence in Price Waterhouse.  In other words, this question 
really boiled down to whether, at least as applied to Title VII substantive 
claims, the 1991 CRA entirely superseded Price Waterhouse’s causation 
standard.  The circuits split on the issue, as well as on what constituted direct 
evidence if it was required.140  The Supreme Court ultimately resolved the 
matter in Desert Palace v. Costa.141  In a unanimous decision, the Court 
began by noting that the new provisions in the 1991 CRA were a “respon[se] 
to Price Waterhouse.”142 The Court then treated the question as a 
straightforward matter of statutory interpretation, holding that § 703(m) 
requires a plaintiff to “demonstrate” that an illegitimate factor was a 
“motivating” factor and that a separate provision of the 1991 CRA defined 
“demonstrates” as “mee[ts] the burdens of production and persuasion.”143
Reasoning that Congress knows how to specify heightened proof standards 
when it wants to and that it had failed to in this instance, the Court concluded 
that direct evidence was not required.144
138. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 696–97. 
139. See infra subpart III(D). 
140. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95 (2003) (collecting cases demonstrating 
the circuit split on whether direct evidence was required); Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 
199 F.3d 572, 582–83 (1st Cir. 1999) (discussing different approaches taken in the circuit split on 
what counted as direct evidence). 
141. 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
142. Id. at 94. 
143. Id. at 98–99, 101 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) (2000) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) 
(2000)).
144. Id. at 99. 
2012] Undermining Congressional Overrides 887 
The second question regarding causation that lower courts faced was 
what relevance, if any, the 1991 CRA’s amendment of Title VII’s substantive 
provisions had for cases arising under other employment discrimination 
statutes—such as the ADEA and the ADA—and under the retaliation 
provisions of Title VII, which are located in a separate subsection from the 
antidiscrimination provisions.145 This question likewise engendered 
widespread disagreement.  The majority of courts reasoned that Congress’s 
“failure” to amend these other statutes and Title VII’s retaliation subsection 
should be understood as an indication by Congress that it expected Price 
Waterhouse to continue to control the interpretation of these statutes.146  In 
other words, they applied Price Waterhouse as a shadow precedent.  A 
minority of courts, by contrast, held that the approach endorsed by the 1991 
CRA could be applied to other statutory provisions.147  This was most 
common with respect to the antiretaliation provisions in Title VII (because 
they are part of the same statute) and the ADA, which explicitly adopts the 
remedial structure of Title VII and thus the remedial limitation set forth in 
§ 706(g), as amended by the 1991 CRA. 
The third question regarding causation that lower courts faced after the 
1991 CRA, and particularly after Desert Palace was decided, was, with 
respect to mixed-motive cases brought under employment discrimination 
statutes other than Title VII in circuits that held that Price Waterhouse 
provided the controlling precedent, did a plaintiff need to have direct 
evidence of discrimination to obtain a mixed-motive instruction that could 
shift the burden to the defendant to prove it would have taken the same 
action?148  This third question actually required answering two subsidiary 
questions.  One is common to all Supreme Court decisions that fail to yield a 
majority decision: Which opinion provided the holding for Price 
Waterhouse?  If Justice White’s opinion, rather than Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion, was deemed controlling, there would be no direct-evidence 
requirement.  But since the general consensus was that Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion controlled,149 the second—crucial—question was particular to the 
145. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 361 (8th Cir. 2008) (describing the 
quandary regarding the ADEA), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009); Parker v. Columbia Pictures 
Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 337 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing the quandary regarding ADA claims); 
Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 934 (3d Cir. 1997) (describing the quandary regarding 
Title VII retaliation claims). 
146. See Widiss, supra note 12, at 549–51 (collecting cases applying Price Waterhouse to other 
statutes). 
147. See id. at 550 & n.176 (collecting cases applying the motivating-factor standard in the 
1991 CRA to other statutes). 
148. This was the question addressed in the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Gross, which was 
vacated by the Supreme Court.  See Gross, 526 F.3d at 361–62 (holding that the rationale of Justice 
O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse opinion requiring direct evidence of discrimination was not 
undermined by Desert Place and thus that direct evidence should be required in ADEA claims). 
149. See, e.g., id. at 362 (“[O]ur court adopted Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion as the 
controlling rule.”); Erickson v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 271 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that 
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interpretive challenges implicit in overrides and the complex interaction 
between Title VII and other statutes: Did the Court’s analysis in Desert 
Palace (which interpreted the new language added to Title VII to override 
Price Waterhouse and other decisions) hold any relevance to the application 
of the rule announced in Price Waterhouse as applied to other statutes?  This 
was the question on which the Court granted certiorari in Gross.150  The 
question the Court answered, however, was quite different. 
C. Gross v. FBL Financial Services 
Jack Gross began working for FBL Financial Group, Inc. (FBL) in 
1971.151  Thirty years later, he held the position of “claims administrator 
director.”152  In 2003, when Gross was fifty-four years old, FBL restructured 
positions; it gave many of Gross’s responsibilities to a younger employee in 
a newly created position and changed Gross’s title to “claims project 
coordinator.”153  Gross claimed that this was a demotion, and he presented 
what the trial court characterized as “ample” circumstantial evidence that it 
was motivated by his age.154  He did not, however, have any direct evidence 
that age played a role in the decision.155
Gross filed a claim under the ADEA and the Iowa Civil Rights Act.156
Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence, the district court’s charge to 
the jury specified that if they found that “age was a motivating factor” in the 
decision to demote Gross, they must issue a verdict for him unless FBL 
proved that it “would have demoted [Gross] regardless of his age.”157  The 
district court thus answered the second question in the previous subpart by 
concluding that, in most respects, Price Waterhouse governed causation 
under the ADEA but answered the third question above by determining that, 
after Desert Palace, a mixed-motive instruction could issue even in the 
absence of direct evidence.  The jury entered a verdict for Gross and awarded 
him $46,945.158  The Eighth Circuit reversed.159  It held that Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence in Price Waterhouse controlled the interpretation of 
the ADEA and that Desert Palace was irrelevant because it relied primarily 
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence was controlling).  But see supra note 130 and accompanying text 
(discussing the argument that Justice White’s concurrence should be deemed controlling). 
150. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009) 
(No. 08-441), 2008 WL 4462099. 
151. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2346. 
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Gross v. FBL Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 4:04-CV-60209-TJS, 2006 WL 6151670, at *5 (S.D. 
Iowa June 23, 2006), rev’d, 526 F.3d 356 (8th Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). 
155. Id.
156. Id. at *1. 
157. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2347 (2009) (alteration in original). 
158. Gross, 2006 WL 6151670, at *1. 
159. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2343 
(2009).
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on textual language added to Title VII by the 1991 CRA and “did not speak 
directly to the vitality” of Price Waterhouse.160
The petition for certiorari asked, “Must a plaintiff present direct 
evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction in a 
non-Title VII discrimination case?”161  The opposition to the petition (filed 
by FBL’s counsel in Iowa, who had litigated the case below) argued that 
there was not a significant circuit split regarding application of Price
Waterhouse to mixed-motive cases under statutes other than Title VII and 
that the uncertainty created by Desert Palace regarding the necessity of 
direct evidence had “faded.”162  In other words, it was expected that the case 
would resolve the second and third questions set forth above.  But after 
certiorari was granted, FBL retained an experienced Supreme Court litigator 
as its lead counsel;163 a significant portion of its opposition brief on the 
merits was devoted to an argument that the Supreme Court should overrule 
Price Waterhouse, at least as applied to the ADEA.164  The Court, in a 5–4 
decision, ultimately did so.165
Purely as a matter of procedure, this was shocking.  Generally, the 
Court will only answer questions raised in the petition or opposition to the 
petition for certiorari.166  This ensures that all parties and amici know what 
issues are under consideration and can develop their arguments 
160. Id. at 359, 362. 
161. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 150, at i. 
162. Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5 & n.5, 9, 17–18, Gross, 129 S. 
Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441), 2008 WL 4824079.
163. Compare id. at 25 (listing Frank Harty as counsel of record), with Brief for Respondent at 
56, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441), 2009 WL 507026 (listing Carter G. Phillips as the counsel 
of record).  Carter G. Phillips was counsel of record for FBL on the merits brief.  Brief for 
Respondent, supra, at 56.  Phillips is the Managing Partner of the Washington, D.C. office of Sidley 
Austin LLP; he is a former Supreme Court clerk and a former Assistant to the Solicitor General, and 
his professional biography asserts that he has argued more Supreme Court cases than any other 
lawyer currently in private practice.  Our People—Carter G. Phillips, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP,
http://www.sidley.com/carter-phillips/. 
164. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 163, at 26–40 (dedicating roughly one half of the 
argument portion of the brief to arguing that the Court should overrule Price Waterhouse as applied 
to the ADEA). 
165. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2346, 2351–52 (2009). 
166. See id. at 2353 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“We would normally expect notice of an intent to 
make so far-reaching an argument in the respondent’s opposition to a petition for certiorari, cf. this
Court’s Rule 15.2, thereby assuring adequate preparation time for those likely affected and wishing 
to participate.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The majority justified its actions on the grounds 
that “[t]he statement of any question presented is deemed to comprise every subsidiary question 
fairly included therein.”  Id. at 2348 n.1 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  For commentary about this move by the majority, see Hart, supra note 9, 
at 269 (calling the Court’s action “remarkable” and “contrary to regular Court procedure for good 
reason”); Margaret L. Moses, Beyond Judicial Activism: When the Supreme Court Is No Longer a 
Court, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 29), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1781243 (“In Gross yet again, in order to make new law, the Court decided 
a question not put before it by the parties.”). 
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accordingly.167 The dissenters in Gross characterized it as particularly 
“irresponsible” to preclude the United States, which participated in the case 
as amicus curiae, from addressing in its brief questions regarding whether 
Price Waterhouse should be overruled.168  Tellingly, when asked a question 
during oral argument about the advisability of “ditch[ing]” Price 
Waterhouse, the Assistant to the Solicitor General arguing on behalf of the 
government opposed the idea and said it would create “massive confusion, 
not only under the Age Act, but under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
the Family Medical Leave Act, a variety of labor statutes, [and] disciplinary 
statutes.”169
The Court’s decision was equally surprising substantively.  The legal 
analysis in the majority opinion begins with a proclamation that “[b]ecause 
Title VII is materially different [from the ADEA] with respect to the relevant 
burden of persuasion,” the Court’s prior decisions regarding Title VII “do not 
control our construction of the ADEA.”170  It then proceeds to recount the 
story set forth in the previous two subparts, but in a way that rhetorically 
erases the intricate web of connections between Title VII, the ADEA, Price 
Waterhouse, the 1991 CRA, and Desert Palace which had led to the question 
presented to the Court.  The majority opinion relegates to a footnote the 
starting premise, well-established in prior Supreme Court precedent, that the 
substantive provisions of Title VII and the ADEA are generally interpreted 
identically because the ADEA was derived in haec verba from Title VII.171
The Gross majority does, however, summarize the various holdings of Price
Waterhouse before stating that “Congress has since amended Title VII.”172
This is factually correct—but it fails to acknowledge that the amendment was 
a direct response to Price Waterhouse’s interpretation of “because of” in 
Title VII (a fact the unanimous Court had admitted forthrightly in Desert 
167. This may have been quite significant in Gross.  In his opening brief, Gross argued at 
length that the direct-evidence requirement should be abandoned because it had been very 
confusing; the brief even quoted Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Price Waterhouse on this point.  See 
Brief for Petitioner at 30–42, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441), 2009 WL 208116 (explaining 
the problems that followed from the direct-evidence requirement). Viewed against a backdrop that 
presumed Price Waterhouse applied, with an open question of whether direct evidence was 
required, this was probably good strategy.  But if it had been apparent that the Court might abandon 
Price Waterhouse entirely, Gross’s counsel might well have eschewed focusing on how “confusing” 
the current regime was.  The amici likewise simply assumed that Price Waterhouse would apply.  
See Brief for the United States Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 20, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 
(No. 08-441), 2009 WL 253859 (arguing that “Price Waterhouse does not require that [the] Court 
impose a direct evidence requirement under the ADEA”).
168. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2353 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
169. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27–28, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441), 2009 WL 
832958. 
170. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2348. 
171. See id. at 2349 n.2 (answering the dissent’s argument that the Court “must incorporate its 
past interpretations of Title VII into the ADEA” in this case by pointing out that “the Court’s 
approach to interpreting the ADEA in light of Title VII has not been uniform”). 
172. Id. at 2349. 
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Palace)173 and accordingly might have bearing on the interpretation of the 
“because of” language in the ADEA. 
The Court then states that it “cannot ignore Congress’[s] decision to 
amend Title VII’s relevant provisions but not make similar changes to the 
ADEA,” particularly because the 1991 CRA included a different amendment 
to the ADEA.174  Having thus putatively severed the connection between 
Title VII and the ADEA, the Gross Court proceeds to interpret the “because 
of” language in the ADEA as if it were working on a blank slate.  Its analysis 
begins with dictionary definitions of “because of” as meaning “by reason of” 
or “on account of.”175  These dictionary definitions might arguably describe a 
motivating-factor standard as readily as a but-for causation standard.  But the 
Court does not just reject the causation standard enacted by Congress for 
Title VII.  It also ignores a large body of precedent—both predating and 
postdating Price Waterhouse—interpreting several other employment and 
labor statutes and constitutional provisions to likewise impose a motivating-
factor causation standard.176  Instead, the Gross Court supports its conclusion 
that “because of” in the ADEA means but-for causation by citing a pair of 
recent decisions interpreting the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO)177 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)178 to 
require but-for causation.179  The language interpreted in these statutes was 
173. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003) (stating that § 107 of the 1991 
Civil Rights Act “‘respond[ed]’ to Price Waterhouse” (alteration in original)). 
174. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349. 
175. Id. at 2350 (citing and quoting largely identical definitions found in 1 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 746 (1933), THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 132
(1966), and 1 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 194 (1966)). 
176. As noted above, Price Waterhouse relied in part on earlier Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting both constitutional and statutory provisions.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228, 249–50 (1989) (plurality opinion). Following Price Waterhouse, lower courts applied the 
Court’s “motivating factor” causation standard to numerous other employment statutes.  Widiss, 
supra note 12, at 549–51.  The Gross Court does support its assertion that the ADEA requires a 
showing of but-for causation by quoting a passage in a prior ADEA decision stating that a claim 
“‘cannot succeed unless the employee’s protected trait actually played a role in [the employer’s 
decision-making] process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.’”  Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 
2350 (alteration in original) (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)).  This 
statement is inapposite because Hazen Paper was litigated as a pretext case where the sole issue 
before the Court was whether reliance on an employee’s pension status—which correlated with 
age—constituted a violation of the statute.  Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 608–09.  Moreover, to the 
extent it is deemed to have any relevance in the mixed-motive context, the quoted statement, which 
does not identify which party bears the burden for this showing, could just as readily be describing 
the standard announced in Price Waterhouse as the standard that the Court adopts in Gross.
Additionally, as the Gross dissent points out, there are other passages in Hazen Paper that seem to 
endorse the motivating-factor test.  Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2355 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
177. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006). 
178. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a–1681x (2006). 
179. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350 (citing Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 128 S. Ct. 2131 
(2008) and Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007)).  The Court also includes a “cf.”
citation to a general torts treatise.  Id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS 265 (5th ed. 1984)). 
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not even “because of”; the RICO case interpreted “by reason of,”180 and the 
FCRA case interpreted “based on.”181  Having ostensibly justified a but-for 
standard, the Court relies on prior ADEA pretext cases that hold that the 
plaintiff retains the burden of proof to make this showing.182  The sleight of 
hand is thus complete.  Without explicitly overruling Price Waterhouse, the 
majority in Gross adopts the precise but-for standard that the dissenters in 
Price Waterhouse had unsuccessfully advocated and that Congress had 
clearly repudiated. 
After this analysis, the Court returns to petitioners’ claim that Price
Waterhouse should control.  Rather than addressing the claim head on, the 
Court merely states that “it is far from clear that the Court would have the 
same approach [as stated in Price Waterhouse] were it to consider the ques-
tion today in the first instance.”183  This might well be correct, but it should 
be entirely irrelevant.  The whole point of a rule of precedent is that it gener-
ally binds future courts, even if they might resolve a given question 
differently than the prior court had.  The Court ultimately makes a gesture to 
the standards typically employed by courts to justify overruling prior statu-
tory precedent—which include whether a standard has proven 
“unworkable”184—by stating that “courts have found it particularly difficult 
to craft an instruction to explain [Price Waterhouse’s] burden-shifting 
framework.”185  As Catherine Struve documents, the support cited for this 
proposition entirely failed to prove the Court’s contention.186  Additionally, 
because Title VII’s causation standard now differs from that of the ADEA, 
and because the Court failed to explicitly overrule (whatever is left of) Price
Waterhouse, its decision actually engenders widespread new confusion.187
Justice Stevens authored a dissent, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, 
and Souter.188  Stevens’s dissent argued that Price Waterhouse’s 
interpretation of “because of” in Title VII should control the interpretation of 
the analogous language in the ADEA.189  The dissent characterized the 
180. See Bridge, 128 S. Ct. at 2141 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)’s provision providing 
remedies for “any person injured . . . by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter”). 
181. See Safeco, 127 S. Ct. at 2205 (interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a)’s provision prohibiting 
“adverse action[s] . . . based in whole or in part on any information contained in a consumer [credit] 
report” (second alteration in original)). 
182. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351 (citing Ky. Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 128 S. Ct. 2361, 2363–66 
(2008) and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141, 143 (2000)). 
183. Id. at 2351–52. 
184. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989) (explaining that a 
“traditional justification for overruling a prior case” is when “inherent confusion [has been] created 
by an unworkable decision”). 
185. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352. 
186. See Struve, supra note 9, at 293–97 (arguing that the authorities cited in support of the 
proposition that the burden-shifting instruction would be unduly confusing to juries do not actually 
substantiate that assertion). 
187. See infra subparts V(A)–(B). 
188. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
189. Id. at 2353–57. 
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majority’s decision to eschew the standard in Title VII as amended by the 
1991 CRA as “reasonabl[e],” although it referenced, in a footnote, the legis-
lative history suggesting that Congress may have expected that its approach 
would govern these other statutes.190  Nonetheless, it deemed Congress’s 
actions an important part of the analysis, arguing that Congress “substantially 
endorsed” Price Waterhouse’s motivating-factor analysis, “provid[ing] all 
the more reason to adhere to that decision’s motivating-factor test” rather 
than the but-for standard “repudiated” by Price Waterhouse twenty years 
before.191  And it pointed out, in response to the majority’s stated concerns 
about workability, that the approach in Gross will complicate “every case in 
which a plaintiff raises both ADEA and Title VII claims.”192  The dissent 
then went on to answer the question on which certiorari was granted.  Justice 
Stevens contended that in Price Waterhouse, Justice White’s opinion, rather 
than Justice O’Connor’s opinion, was controlling and thus that Price
Waterhouse did not actually require direct evidence.193  He further contended 
that any uncertainty regarding this point should be resolved by Desert 
Palace’s holding that heightened evidentiary standards should not be inferred 
without a clear statutory basis.194
Justice Breyer filed a separate dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and 
Souter, which argued on policy grounds that since the “employee likely 
knows less than . . . the employer about what the employer was thinking” 
when making an employment decision, the burden to show that the employer 
would have made the same decision absent consideration of an impermissible 
factor should rest with the defendant.195
D. An Almost Irrelevant Fact: The 1991 Civil Rights Act’s Separate 
Amendment of the ADEA 
The Gross Court placed great emphasis on the fact that Congress 
responded to Price Waterhouse by adding the motivating-factor language to 
Title VII but did not add that language to the ADEA, particularly since 
Congress simultaneously made a different amendment to the ADEA.196  The 
190. Id. at 2356 & n.6. 
191. Id. at 2356. 
192. Id. at 2356–57. 
193. See id. at 2357 (arguing that Justice White’s concurrence is controlling because Justice 
White agreed with the plurality on the motivating-factor test and the lack of need for direct 
evidence, and thus provided a fifth vote for the rationale explaining the result of Price Waterhouse); 
see also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a 
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of 
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments 
on the narrowest grounds.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
194. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2357–58. 
195. Id. at 2358–59 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
196. Id. at 2349, 2350 & n.3 (majority opinion) (“We cannot ignore Congress’ decision to 
amend Title VII’s relevant provisions but not make similar changes to the ADEA.”). 
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Gross dissent likewise deemed this quite significant.197  So have other 
commentators.198  Simply put, I think this a serious mistake. 
First, the Gross Court mischaracterized the facts.  The Gross Court 
stated that Congress “contemporaneously amended the ADEA in several 
ways.”199  This is incorrect.  The 1991 CRA explicitly amended the ADEA in 
just one respect: it added language to require the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to notify plaintiffs in ADEA cases—as it 
notified plaintiffs in Title VII cases—regarding the disposition of adminis-
trative complaints.200  Second, and more importantly, consideration of the 
1991 CRA as a whole provides strong support for the opposite inference—
that is, that Congress intended and expected that the ADEA would be 
interpreted in line with the amendments to Title VII. 
To see this, it is first necessary to describe in somewhat greater detail 
the 1991 CRA.  As is true of much legislation, the 1991 CRA does many 
things.  One of its primary purposes was to respond to numerous Supreme 
Court decisions interpreting employment discrimination statutes.201  As 
discussed above, in response to Price Waterhouse, the 1991 CRA amended 
Title VII but did not add comparable motivating-factor language to the 
ADEA, the ADA, or other statutes.202  In response to Supreme Court 
decisions concerning the standard of proof in disparate impact cases,203 the 
applicability of consent decrees,204 and the statute of limitations in cases 
challenging seniority provisions205—all decisions arising under Title VII—
the 1991 CRA similarly amended Title VII but not the ADEA, the ADA, or 
other statutes (although one of the provisions added to Title VII incorporates 
by reference claims arising under other employment discrimination 
197. See id. at 2356 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Because the 1991 Act amended only Title VII 
and not the ADEA with respect to mixed-motives claims, the Court reasonably declines to apply the 
amended provisions to the ADEA.”). 
198. See, e.g., Harper, supra note 8, at 100–01 (“Section 107, however, amended only Title VII, 
not the ADEA or any other federal law.”). 
199. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).  The Court supports this 
statement by citing to § 115 of the Act—which contains the revisions regarding EEOC 
notification—and § 302 of the Act, which is not an amendment to the ADEA but rather a reference 
within newly created antidiscrimination protections for certain government employees to the 
definition of age contained within the ADEA.  Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 
§ 115, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (2006)); Civil Rights Act of 
1991 § 302 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 1202 (2006)). 
200. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 115 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (2006)). 
201. Id. § 3. 
202. Id. § 107(a). 
203. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989) (holding that a 
defendant could defeat a claim of disparate impact by showing merely that the “challenged practice 
serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer”). 
204. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762–68 (1989) (holding that third parties affected by a 
consent decree could challenge the agreement even when they had known about the litigation and 
failed to intervene in the prior action). 
205. See Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 911 (1989) (holding that the statute of 
limitations on challenging a seniority system ran from the time of the system’s adoption). 
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statutes).206  In response to a decision regarding the possibility of bringing 
harassment claims under § 1981,207 the 1991 CRA amended only § 1981.208
In response to a decision considering the availability of expert fees under 
§ 1988,209 the 1991 CRA amended only § 1988.210  In all of these overrides, 
Congress amended only the statute actually interpreted in the prior judicial 
interpretation.  There was one departure from this pattern.  In response to a 
decision interpreting Title VII to preclude extraterritorial jurisdiction,211
Congress added language to Title VII and the ADA that it had previously 
added to the ADEA—but, as discussed below, this is likely explained by the 
fact that in this instance Congress was responding to a hydra problem that 
had already developed.212
206. Civil Rights Act of 1991 §§ 104–105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006), 
and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006)) (establishing a disparate impact standard that requires a 
defendant to prove that a challenged practice is “job related” and a “business necessity”); id. § 108 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) (2006)) (precluding third parties from challenging 
consent decrees if they had actual notice and a reasonable opportunity to object to the proposed 
order or if their interests were adequately represented in prior challenges); id. § 112 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2006)) (providing that the statute of limitations for challenging 
an intentionally discriminatory seniority system runs from when it is adopted, when an individual 
becomes subject to it, or when a person is injured by its application).  The override of Martin v. 
Wilks, concerning consent decrees, differs from the other overrides in that the amendment codified 
within Title VII specifies that it applies to all claims “of employment discrimination under the 
Constitution or Federal civil rights laws.”  Id. § 108 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) 
(2006)).  In other words, this adopts a “blanket amendment” approach similar to that which 
Congress considered in the bills proposed to override Gross—and with it concerns regarding notice 
and overbreadth.  See infra text accompanying notes 370–77.  The difference between the structure 
of the Martin override and the other overrides interpreting substantive language in Title VII may 
well be explained by the fact that Martin v. Wilks, although arising under Title VII, did not interpret 
specific language in Title VII; rather it relied on general principles of procedural law.  Martin, 490 
U.S. at 762–69; see also infra note 223 (discussing commentary on the significance of this 
difference and its implications for assessing the significance of the other overrides on interpretation 
of the ADEA). 
207. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171 (1989) (holding that racial 
harassment claims were not actionable under § 1981 because that section does not apply to conduct 
occurring after the formation of a contract). 
208. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 101 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)) 
(expanding the prohibition on discrimination in § 1981 to include discrimination occurring in the 
terms and conditions of employment). 
209. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 102 (1991) (interpreting § 1988 to 
preclude shifting of experts’ fees as part the allowed shifting of attorneys’ fees). 
210. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 113 (authorizing the court to award expert fees in its 
discretion for cases brought to enforce § 1981a, which addresses claims pursuant to various civil 
rights statutes, including Title VII and the ADA).  This is probably appropriately characterized as a 
“partial” override, in that the amendments only explicitly made experts’ fees available in certain 
employment discrimination contexts, and the prior decisions had concerned the availability of these 
fees in other, additional contexts.  See supra note 98 and accompanying text.  This may be because 
the 1991 CRA focused on employment, or it may be that Congress purposefully chose to simply 
carve out a limited exception from the interpretation previously announced by the Court. 
211. See Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 259 (1991) (holding that Title VII did not apply 
extraterritorially). 
212. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 109 (adding language expanding the definition of employee 
to include a United States citizen in a foreign country and inserting a new subsection relating to 
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The 1991 CRA also included substantive amendments and expansions 
of various employment discrimination laws that were not directly responsive 
to Supreme Court interpretations.  Most of these reduced disparities among 
the various federal employment discrimination statutes, although they did not 
make them identical.  For example, Congress permitted plaintiffs in Title VII 
and ADA suits to recover compensatory and punitive damages, up to statu-
tory caps,213 making the remedial structure of these statutes more comparable 
to that of § 1981 (which permitted uncapped damages)214 and the ADEA 
(which permitted double damages for willful violations).215  Congress also 
explicitly permitted jury trials in Title VII cases (and, by reference, in ADA 
cases),216 again making Title VII and the ADA more similar to the ADEA 
and § 1981, which had already been interpreted to permit jury trials.217  And, 
as noted above, Congress amended the ADEA to make the EEOC’s notice 
requirements more similar to those it followed when enforcing Title VII.218
The 1991 CRA also created a Glass Ceiling Commission to study barriers to 
advancement faced by women and minorities,219 enacted a separate statute 
that prohibits discrimination against certain government employees,220 and 
covered entities in foreign countries).  For a discussion of the hydra problem at issue, see infra text
accompanying notes 226–37.  Congress may also have thought it important to add specific language 
to both statutes regarding potential conflicts with foreign jurisdictions’ laws, although this arguably 
could have also been addressed through interpretation of the preexisting language.  See Aramco, 499 
U.S. at 275 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the text of Title VII prior to the 1991 CRA 
provided support for applying the law extraterritorially to U.S. employers employing U.S. citizens 
abroad while avoiding conflicts with foreign law). 
213. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006)). 
214. See Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1975) (holding that 
compensatory and punitive damages are available under § 1981 and that backpay awards under 
§ 1981 are not restricted to the two years specified for backpay recovery under Title VII). 
215. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006) (incorporating § 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 216(b), which, in cases involving willful violations, provides for the payment of an equal 
amount of liquidated damages in addition to unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime). 
216. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006)) 
(permitting jury trials under Title VII and the ADA). 
217. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 585 (1978) (holding that the ADEA permits jury 
trials); Lewis v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1983) (describing a case in which 
the plaintiff had a jury trial on race discrimination claims brought pursuant to § 1981 and § 1983 
and a bench trial for race discrimination claims brought pursuant to Title VII). 
218. Compare Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 115 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) 
(2006)) (“If a charge filed with the Commission under [the ADEA] is dismissed or the proceedings 
of the Commission are otherwise terminated by the Commission, the Commission shall notify the 
person aggrieved.  A civil action may be brought . . . against the respondent named in the charge 
within 90 days after the date of the receipt of such notice.”), with Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 103, 105–06 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006)) (“If a charge filed with the Commission [under Title VII] . . . is dismissed 
by the Commission, . . . the Commission . . . shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety 
days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in 
the charge . . . by the person claiming to be aggrieved.”). 
219. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 203. 
220. Id. § 302. 
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authorized the EEOC to establish a Technical Assistance Training Institute 
and to carry out educational and outreach activities.221
The Court in Gross asserts that it is important to consider the 1991 CRA 
as a whole when determining what inference to draw from Congress’s 
“neglect[ing]” to amend the ADEA when it added the motivating-factor 
language to Title VII.222  As a general principle, I agree that this could have 
relevance.  As noted above, the 1991 CRA responded to several different 
decisions interpreting Title VII by enacting overrides.  If, with respect to 
some of these overrides, Congress had amended both Title VII and the 
ADEA, and if, with respect to the override of Price Waterhouse, it had 
amended just Title VII, there would be far stronger support for the inference 
that Congress affirmatively chose to have the ADEA interpreted differently 
from Title VII with respect to mixed-motive claims.  But that was not the 
case.  Rather, the only change that the 1991 CRA made to the ADEA was the 
small technical revision concerning EEOC procedures.  Looked at in context, 
I assert that this is almost entirely irrelevant to resolving the question posed 
by Gross.  Moreover, even if Congress had amended both the ADEA and 
Title VII with respect to some of the other overrides, it would still be 
essential to carefully consider context before concluding that Congress’s 
“neglect[ing]” to add motivating-factor language to the ADEA was a 
purposeful and meaningful choice to impose different causation standards 
under the two statutes.223
The Court in Gross cites a single case, EEOC v. Arabian American Oil 
Co.224 (Aramco), in support of its pivotal assertion that “[w]hen Congress 
221. Id. § 110 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(j) (2006)); id. § 111 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(h) (2006)). 
222. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349–50  (2009) (asserting that 
Congress’s “contemporaneous[] amend[ment] of the ADEA” was an important factor in its 
analysis).
223. Id. at 2349.  It is important to note that Congress’s override of Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 
755 (1989), specified that the new language added to Title VII applied to any consent decree 
“resolv[ing] a claim of employment discrimination under the Constitution or Federal civil rights 
laws,” thus implicitly reaching claims that arise under the ADEA although not specifically 
identifying the ADEA.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) (2006).  For an argument that this distinction is 
significant and supports a conclusion that the overrides of interpretations of Title VII’s substantive 
language, including the modification of the causation standard in Price Waterhouse, should not be 
applied to the ADEA, see Eglit, supra note 12, at 1118–20, 1172–202.  For an argument that the 
issue addressed in Martin and its override differed significantly from the other overrides because 
Martin involved a “principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence” rather than 
“the direct interpretation of statutory language” in Title VII, and that it accordingly has little 
relevance for assessing the appropriateness of applying the other overrides to the ADEA, see 
Prenkert, supra note 12, at 248 n.212.  I find Professor Prenkert’s analysis persuasive on this point.  
For reasons explained more fully in the text, I think that since the preexisting statutory language in 
the ADEA and other statutes could reasonably be interpreted consistently with the meaning 
Congress endorsed in the other overrides, it would be appropriate to do so.  The provision 
overriding the holding of Martin is different because it was not interpreting preexisting text at all, 
and accordingly, there is no comparable preexisting text in the ADEA, ADA, or other statutes. 
224. 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
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amends one statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to have acted 
intentionally.”225  Ironically, Aramco was also the result of a hydra problem 
concerning the relationship of Title VII and the ADEA, and the decision and 
its subsequent history illustrate the risks in assuming that selective amend-
ment is evidence of purposeful distinctions.  Because the interpretive 
question in Aramco is so similar to that posed by Gross, a brief description is 
warranted.  The question in the case was whether Title VII applied 
extraterritorially to citizens.226  Title VII, as initially enacted in 1964, stated 
that it would not apply to employers with respect to “employment of aliens 
outside any State”;227 the ADEA, as initially enacted in 1967, lacked any 
explicit reference to aliens and incorporated by reference228 language in the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) that excluded “any employee whose 
services . . . are performed in a workplace in a foreign country.”229 In the 
early 1980s, some lower courts (reasonably) relied upon this distinction to 
hold that Title VII did apply to citizens extraterritorially but that the ADEA 
did not.230  In 1983, Congress held a hearing on the issue in which these 
decisions were discussed,231 and in 1984, Congress amended the ADEA to 
add explicit language applying the statute extraterritorially to citizens.232
Given this background, it is not surprising that Congress did not make 
225. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 (citing Aramco, 499 U.S. at 256).  In the same general 
discussion, the Gross Court also cites Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330 (1997).  Gross, 129 S. 
Ct. at 2349.  Although the Court in Lindh likewise determined that a variation was meaningful, the 
decision contains a far more nuanced consideration of factors in the negotiation process that should 
be considered before reaching such a conclusion.  See Lindh, 521 U.S. at 329–30 (stating that the 
difference might not be indicative of congressional intent if “the two chapters had evolved 
separately in the congressional process”). 
226. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 246. 
227. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2006)). 
228. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 7, 81 Stat. 
602, 604 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006)) (incorporating FLSA’s procedural and 
enforcement mechanisms). 
229. See Cleary v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607, 608 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[FLSA § 13(f)] provides 
that the acts covered by it shall not apply ‘to any employee whose services during the workweek are 
performed in a workplace within a foreign country . . . .’” (alteration in original)). 
230. See, e.g., Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co., 567 F. Supp. 1453, 1456–57 (D. Colo. 1983) 
(holding that the ADEA does not apply extraterritorially), aff’d, 750 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1984); 
Cleary v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1251, 1263 (D.N.J. 1983) (dismissing the case on the 
grounds that the ADEA does not apply extraterritorially), aff’d, 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984); Bryant 
v. Int’l Schs. Servs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472, 482 (D.N.J. 1980) (holding that Title VII did apply 
extraterritorially), rev’d on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982). 
231. Age Discrimination and Overseas Americans, 1983: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Aging of the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 98th Cong. 1–2 (1983) (statement of Sen. Charles 
E. Grassley, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Aging). 
232. See Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, § 802(a), 98 Stat. 
1767, 1792 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630 (2006)) (adding to the ADEA: “[t]he term 
‘employee’ includes any individual who is a citizen of the United States employed by an employer 
in a workplace in a foreign country,” subject to limited exceptions to facilitate compliance with 
foreign law). 
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analogous changes to Title VII.233  In Aramco, decided in 1991, the Supreme 
Court ignored this context completely and held that Title VII did not apply 
extraterritorially in part because it lacked specific language comparable to 
that that had been added to the ADEA in 1984.234  Congress swiftly 
disagreed, overriding the decision seven months later in the 1991 CRA.235
Aramco is, in my terminology, a shadow precedent.  I contend that its state-
ments regarding the presumed significance of variation between statutes 
should have no persuasive value.  Rather, Aramco should perhaps be cited in 
conjunction with the override for the contrary proposition that distinctions 
between statutes frequently are not intentional.236  The Gross Court, however, 
cited Aramco without qualification or acknowledgement that its holding had 
been superseded.237
In Gross, the Court took a similarly blinkered approach to the 
relationship between the ADEA and Title VII, once again ignoring the 
significance of context when interpreting an override.  The Court asserted 
that because Congress “neglect[ed]” to add motivating-factor language to the 
ADEA, it “cho[se]” to have the ADEA interpreted differently from 
Title VII.238  Stated more generally, the Court’s reasoning implies the 
counterintuitive conclusion that Congress disagreed with multiple judicial 
interpretations of Title VII strongly enough to enact overrides superseding 
them but “chose” to grant courts total freedom regarding how to interpret the 
same language in the ADEA, ADA, and other employment statutes.  I assert 
that considering the 1991 CRA as a whole supports a different, and I think 
233. It may also have been significant that the amendment to the ADEA regarding 
extraterritoriality was an addition to a bill that primarily amended a different statute concerning 
older Americans, making any potential amendment of Title VII particularly unlikely. 
234. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 258–59 (1991). 
235. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f) (2006)) (explicitly stating in the definition of 
employee that “[w]ith respect to employment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual 
who is a citizen of the United States,” subject to limited exceptions to facilitate compliance with 
foreign law). 
236. The fact that the 1991 Congress overrode the decision does not resolve definitively 
whether the 1964 Congress that enacted Title VII or the 1984 Congress that amended the ADEA 
intended Title VII to apply extraterritorially.  It does, however, suggest that the inference of 
meaningful variation may well be unwarranted. 
237. In a further odd twist, in 1983, Justice Thomas (the author of the Gross majority opinion) 
was Chairman of the EEOC.  Clarence Thomas, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/
bios/clarencethomas.html (listing Clarence Thomas as the EEOC’s eighth Chairman, and stating 
that he served from May 6, 1982, to March 8, 1990).  In that capacity, he testified to the 
subcommittee considering amending the ADEA, arguing that Title VII already permitted 
extraterritorial application—in other words, he disagreed with the conclusion subsequently reached 
by the Supreme Court in Aramco. Age Discrimination and Overseas Americans, 1983: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Aging of the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 98th Cong. 3 (1983) 
(statement of Clarence Thomas, Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).  At the 
time then-Chairman Thomas testified, the analysis differed from the precise question faced by the 
Court in Aramco because it predated Congress’s addition of explicit language regarding the 
ADEA’s extraterritoriality; nonetheless, the implicit flip in position is still striking. 
238. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349, 2350 n.3 (2009). 
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far more plausible, conclusion: Congress consistently assumed that amending 
Title VII would be sufficient to end reliance on disfavored judicial interpre-
tations of language in Title VII and to signal that analogous provisions in 
other statutes should be interpreted in line with the meaning accorded to the 
relevant language by Congress.  This latter proposition accords well with the 
1991 CRA’s other substantive amendments (those not made in response to 
specific judicial interpretations), which increased consistency in the remedial 
and procedural rules applied to the various employment discrimination 
statutes.239  It also is exactly what the committee report asserts—that is, that 
the committee “intends that these other laws [banning discrimination and] 
modeled after Title VII be interpreted consistently in a manner consistent 
with Title VII as amended by this Act.”240
Of course, it is impossible to know whether this sentence in the 
committee report accurately represents the intention of a majority of the 1991 
Congress.  It could be that proponents of the overrides were able to muster 
sufficient votes to amend Title VII but that they lacked support to amend 
even the most obvious other potentially-affected laws.  I contend, however, 
that it is likely they simply thought it was unnecessary.  In 1991, as opposed 
to today, it was probably reasonable for congressional drafters to assume that 
statements in committee reports would be deemed significant by courts.  
Now that would be far less true.241  But in arguing that “because of” in the 
ADEA should be interpreted consistently with the meaning that Congress 
afforded that language in Title VII—i.e., that it prescribes a motivating-factor 
test—I am not urging that legislative history be used to trump statutory text 
or to go beyond the language of the statute.  That is not necessary because, as 
the next part demonstrates, the preexisting text can easily bear the meaning 
Congress signaled it preferred.  Even jurists who categorically reject any 
consideration of legislative history could reach the result that I advocate 
simply by interpreting the plain text of the ADEA and recognizing the 
independent value of promoting the consistent and coherent development of 
statutory law. 
IV. Causation in Employment Discrimination Law: An (Imaginary) 
Alternative Story 
The path from Price Waterhouse to the 1991 CRA to Desert Palace to 
Gross, including the surprising U-turn in Gross, illustrates the peculiar 
challenges implicit in the interpretation of statutory overrides.  Judicial and 
academic commentary regarding overrides consistently characterizes them as 
a means for Congress to “correct” judicial interpretations with which it 
239. See supra notes 213–18 and accompanying text. 
240. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 697. 
241. Cf. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 51, at 990 n.j (collecting scholarly commentary both 
skeptical of and sympathetic to the Supreme Court’s more cautious use of legislative history during 
the past two decades). 
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disagrees.242  Implicit in such statements is the fundamental recognition that 
there are often two or more plausible interpretations of statutory language.  If 
an override “clarifies” statutory language by adopting a meaning that the 
preexisting statutory language could comfortably bear, it arguably functions 
as an interpretation of a statute by a higher “court”—except that it is not a 
court at all but, instead, the legislature.  In this respect, overrides differ 
significantly from new legislation or other kinds of amendments that correct 
mistakes in statutes or respond to new or unanticipated problems.  When 
interpreting such overrides, the conclusions and inferences drawn by courts 
should reflect these realities (as I contend the approach taken by the Supreme 
Court in Gross did not).  Part VI proposes an alternative approach.  But first, 
it is helpful to illustrate just how significant these distinctions are by 
considering how the issue in Gross would have been resolved if it had been a 
subsequent Supreme Court decision, rather than Congress, that superseded 
Price Waterhouse’s interpretation of Title VII. 
A. A Judicial Interpretation of Title VII Establishing a Motivating-Factor 
Causation Standard with a Limitation on Remedies
Imagine that Congress did not respond to Price Waterhouse in the 1991 
Civil Rights Act.  Imagine instead that a different case arises, maybe ten 
years after Price Waterhouse, in which a different woman, call her Beth, 
claims that she was denied a promotion at least in part because of her sex.  
Unlike Ann Hopkins, however, there is no direct evidence that sex played a 
role in the decision; rather, there is simply extensive circumstantial evidence. 
Beth sues her employer under Title VII.  The trial court refuses to issue 
a motivating-factor instruction on the grounds that Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence provides the controlling opinion in Price Waterhouse.243  Beth 
appeals.  The circuit court reverses on the ground that Justice White’s 
concurrence was controlling.  Imagine that by now there is a significant 
circuit split regarding whether direct evidence is required to shift the burden 
in a mixed-motive case.  Beth’s employer appeals, and the Supreme Court 
grants certiorari.  As in Price Waterhouse, the Court understands that 
resolution of the matter turns on the interpretation of “because of” in 
242. See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 576 (1982) (“The remedy for 
any dissatisfaction with the results in particular cases lies with Congress and not with this Court.”); 
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284 (1972) (“If there is any inconsistency or illogic in all this, it is an 
inconsistency and illogic of long standing that is to be remedied by the Congress and not by this 
Court.”); ESKRIDGE, supra note 25, at 151 (“[D]ynamic statutory interpretation, even against 
legislative expectations, is subject to override by the legislature and in fact may even be a stimulus 
to legislative deliberation.”); Marshall, supra note 25, at 208–15 (arguing for absolute statutory 
stare decisis so that Congress will know it is responsible for correcting interpretations with which it 
disagrees).
243. This assumes that sometime between Price Waterhouse and Beth’s case Congress acted 
(as it did in 1991) to permit jury trials under Title VII.  See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006)) 
(permitting jury trials).  If it had not, the reasoning discussed above could apply in a bench trial. 
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Title VII.  The Court deems the plurality and concurring opinions in Price
Waterhouse to be highly instructive.  But, as is typical after a fractured 
opinion, the Court returns to the matter determined to establish a clear rule 
that can garner majority support and with the benefit of having seen how the 
approaches articulated in the prior opinion played out in the real world. 
Recall that in Price Waterhouse, the plurality and Justice White’s 
concurrence held that showing that sex played a “motivating” role in an 
employment decision was sufficient to shift the burden to the defendant to 
prove that it would have taken the same action anyway, and that neither 
opinion required direct evidence.244  It is fair to assume, as well, that in the 
years between Price Waterhouse and Beth’s (hypothetical) case, lower courts 
that tried to apply Justice O’Connor’s direct-evidence standard had found it 
unwieldy (as indeed they did).245  In Beth’s case, a majority of the Court 
clarifies that a plaintiff can establish liability by showing that sex, race, or 
another impermissible criterion was a “motivating” factor in a decision and 
that a plaintiff may use any kind of evidence to do so.  Thus, so far the 
Court’s holding in Beth’s case merely ratifies a fair reading of Price 
Waterhouse if one deems Justice White’s concurrence controlling because it 
provides a fifth vote for the motivating-factor standard.246
The majority in Beth’s case then goes beyond Price Waterhouse to hold 
that a showing by the employer that it would have taken the same action in 
any event does not avoid liability; rather, it only reduces remedies.  This is a 
change from Price Waterhouse.  Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Price
Waterhouse argued that the causation standard articulated by the plurality 
was internally inconsistent in that it explicitly rejected a but-for causation 
standard but then implicitly adopted that standard by permitting employers to 
escape liability entirely if they could show that they would have taken the 
same action.247  The new majority in Beth’s case decides there is merit in this 
argument.  But rather than adopting the consistent but-for standard Justice 
Kennedy had advocated, the majority in Beth’s case decides it is essential 
that “because of” consistently means “motivating factor.”  Accordingly, it 
holds that the plurality in Price Waterhouse was mistaken in interpreting 
Title VII to permit an affirmative defense to liability once a plaintiff has 
proven that an illegitimate criterion was a motivating factor in a decision. 
Nonetheless, the majority wants to avoid providing a windfall to 
plaintiffs and unfairly penalizing defendants who would have taken the same 
action even if they had not considered the illegitimate factor.  The majority 
244. See supra notes 112–19 and accompanying text. 
245. See Harper, supra note 8, at 102–04 (documenting disagreement among lower courts on 
how to apply the “direct-evidence” standard). 
246. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (explaining that the dissenting justices in Gross
held Justice White’s concurrence controlling). 
247. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 285 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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realizes that Title VII’s remedial provisions adequately address this concern.  
Even prior to the 1991 CRA, Title VII stated, 
No order of the court shall require the . . . hiring, reinstatement, or 
promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of 
any back pay, if such individual was . . . refused employment or 
advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other 
than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) [the antiretaliation 
provision] of this title.248
Before Price Waterhouse was decided, several circuits had relied on this 
remedial language in mixed-motive contexts to hold that a showing that sex, 
race, or another prohibited factor played a role in an employment decision 
was sufficient to establish liability, but that backpay and reinstatement would 
not be available if an employer could prove it would have taken the same 
action absent discrimination.249 The plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse 
rejected this interpretation, holding that this limitation on remedies was not 
applicable in individual mixed-motive cases because prior Supreme Court 
precedent had interpreted it as pertaining to class actions or pattern-or-
practice cases.250
The majority in Beth’s case, however, reconsiders this determination.  It 
notes that the plain language of the provision seems quite apt for balancing 
the competing objectives at stake in mixed-motive cases.  This interpretation 
would permit a court to order injunctive relief, such as a prohibition on 
considering an applicant’s femininity, if a plaintiff establishes that sex was a 
motivating factor in a decision.251  But if a defendant established that the 
plaintiff would not have been promoted anyway, she would not receive back 
pay or front pay or be promoted.  The majority determines that it is 
appropriate to place the burden on making this “same action” showing on the 
248. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988) (emphasis added). 
249. See, e.g., Fadhl v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166–67 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that litigants can establish liability by showing sex was a “significant factor” in a decision 
but that back pay and reinstatement are not available if an employer proves it would have made the 
same decision absent discrimination); Patterson v. Greenwood Sch. Dist. 50, 696 F.2d 293, 295 (4th 
Cir. 1982) (holding that a victim of discrimination is not eligible for back pay or reinstatement if the 
employer can prove “by clear and convincing evidence” it would have taken the same action absent 
discrimination (internal quotation marks omitted)); Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1085 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976) (same); King v. Laborers Int’l Union of N. Am., 443 F.2d 273, 278–79 (6th Cir. 1971) 
(holding that a victim of discrimination is not eligible for back pay or reinstatement if the employer 
can prove it had a lawful nondiscriminatory motivation for its actions that “considered by itself” 
would have resulted in the same action).  In her brief to the Supreme Court, Ann Hopkins relied on 
this statutory language and some of these decisions to argue that an employer’s showing it would 
have taken the same action should limit remedies rather than serve as an affirmative defense.  See 
Brief for Respondent at 31–43, Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (No. 87-1167), 1988 WL 1025872. 
250. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244–45 n.10 (plurality opinion). 
251. Section 2000e-5(g)(1) does not explicitly reference “declaratory relief,” but this could be 
included within the general authorization of “any other equitable relief as the court deems 
appropriate.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006). 
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defendant, since it can most readily present evidence concerning its decision-
making process.  This interpretation achieves Title VII’s dual remedial 
objectives of making plaintiffs whole (but not providing unwarranted relief) 
and deterring future discrimination.252  Finally, citing Title VII’s attorneys’ 
fees provision, which also preexisted the 1991 CRA,253 the majority specifies 
that a plaintiff who succeeds on showing that the employment practice was 
motivated at least in part by a prohibited factor may recover attorneys’ fees 
and costs related to that claim, even if she ultimately is not eligible for hiring, 
promotion, reinstatement, or back pay. 
Thus, the Court in Beth’s case ultimately concludes that a plaintiff can 
succeed in a mixed-motive claim under Title VII by proving (using either 
direct or circumstantial evidence) that race, color, sex, religion, or national 
origin was a motivating factor in an employment decision, but her remedies 
will be limited if an employer proves it would have taken the same action 
anyway.  In other words, the interpretation of Title VII announced by the 
majority in Beth’s case—based entirely on the text of Title VII as it existed 
prior to the enactment of the 1991 CRA—is precisely the standard adopted 
by Congress in the 1991 CRA.254  Of course, the story imagined above is not 
the only way that the Supreme Court, faced with a case like Beth’s, could 
rule—but it is at least an entirely plausible interpretation of Title VII’s 
preexisting statutory language. 
B. Application of the Judicial Interpretation of Title VII to the ADEA 
Now imagine that some years after Beth’s case is decided, Jack Gross 
brings his suit under the ADEA contending that he was demoted at least in 
part because of his age.  He presents circumstantial evidence of 
discrimination but no direct evidence.  Assume that the Supreme Court 
grants certiorari. The Supreme Court in this imaginary story, like the actual 
Supreme Court in Gross, would need to determine whether the standard of 
causation applicable in mixed-motive claims under Title VII also applies to 
the ADEA. This analysis would differ considerably from that actually 
252. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–19 (1975) (explaining that the 
purpose of Title VII is to force companies to eliminate discriminatory employment practices and to 
“make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination”). 
253. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988). 
254. There is actually one subtle difference.  The remedial provision as it existed prior to the 
1991 CRA, now subsection (g)(2)(A), refers not only to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, 
but also to the antiretaliation provisions.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988) (precluding certain 
remedies if action was taken “for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this title”); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988) (prohibiting retaliation).  Accordingly, the decision issued by the 
majority in Beth’s case would naturally have applied to the antiretaliation provisions as well as the 
substantive provisions of Title VII.  Even prior to Gross, lower courts were divided over whether 
the language added by the 1991 CRA to respond to Price Waterhouse applies to the antiretaliation 
provisions. See, e.g., Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 933 & n.23 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(providing examples of lower court decisions reaching opposite conclusions on this issue). 
2012] Undermining Congressional Overrides 905 
applied by the Court in Gross because there would be no congressional 
action with respect to Title VII, and no “failure” of congressional action with 
respect to the ADEA, to justify departing from the judicial interpretation of 
analogous language in Title VII. 
As discussed above, the ADEA’s substantive language was derived in
haec verba from Title VII.255  This is a strong argument for interpreting 
“because of” in the ADEA the same way that the (hypothetical) Court in 
Beth’s case interpreted the language in Title VII—i.e., to prescribe the 
motivating-factor test with a limitation on remedies if the employer proved it 
would have taken the same action anyway.  The Court might also note that 
the policies of the statutes are also quite similar256 and that there is an 
independent virtue in interpreting the ADEA consistently with Title VII 
because it is relatively common for an individual to challenge a single 
employment action under both statutes.257
The Court, however, might be given pause by two arguably relevant 
differences between the statutes.  First, although the ADEA’s substantive 
provisions are largely derived from Title VII, its remedial provisions 
incorporate by reference the FLSA rather than Title VII.258  Thus, the Court 
deciding the ADEA case would not be interpreting language that was 
precisely the same as the remedial language in Title VII.  The relevant 
remedial language that applies to the ADEA, however, is quite flexible, 
providing that employers “shall be liable for such legal or equitable relief as 
may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the relevant] section,” as 
well as for attorneys’ fees.259  This flexible language would permit the Court 
to adopt a standard, like that adopted with respect to Title VII in Beth’s case, 
limiting a defendant’s exposure on remedies if it could show that it would 
have taken the same action regardless of consideration of age. 
The second relevant textual difference between Title VII and the ADEA 
is more significant—and it is one that arguably should have factored into the 
Court’s analysis in Gross itself, although neither the majority opinion nor the 
dissents addressed it.  The ADEA’s prohibition on discrimination “because 
of [an] individual’s age” parallels Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination 
“because of [an] individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”260
A separate section of the ADEA provides that “[i]t shall not be unlawful” for 
any employer “to take any action otherwise prohibited” by the key substan-
255. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (“In fact, the prohibitions of the ADEA were 
derived in haec verba from Title VII.”). 
256. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (stating that the ADEA and 
Title VII “share a common purpose”). 
257. See infra text accompanying notes 332–36 (describing the confusion regarding the 
standard of proof following Gross in cases where plaintiffs bring cases under both the ADEA and 
Title VII). 
258. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006). 
259. Id. § 216(b). 
260. Id. § 623(a)(1). 
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tive provisions “where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other 
than age” (typically known as the RFOA defense).261  Title VII does not 
include analogous language.  It could be argued that adopting the standard 
articulated by the majority in Beth’s case—that a decision based on age is 
unlawful when age was a motivating factor in the decision even if the 
defendant proves it would have taken the same action anyway—would be in 
tension with this provision.  An appropriate means of reconciling these 
provisions might be to state that in the ADEA, as opposed to in Title VII, a 
showing by an employer that it would have taken the same action regardless 
of any consideration of age would be a complete defense rather than simply a 
limitation on remedies—in other words, that the ADEA would be governed 
by the standard announced in Price Waterhouse.
This would be a relatively small difference between the causation 
standard under Title VII and that of the ADEA.  Additionally, even if 
Congress disagreed with this interpretation of the ADEA, it could readily 
modify the ADEA to signal that it should be interpreted consistently with 
Title VII.  (This assumes that the interpretive conventions that I propose in 
Part VI were adopted in place of the rule announced in Gross.  Otherwise, 
amending the ADEA to address this issue could cause a hydra problem, just 
as Congress’s actual amendment of Title VII to address Price Waterhouse 
caused a hydra problem.)  Notably, whether or not the ADEA was interpreted 
slightly differently from Title VII, interpretation of other related statutes 
261. Id. § 623(f)(1).  The Supreme Court has interpreted the RFOA provision as narrowing 
disparate impact liability under the ADEA.  See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 
2395, 2404 (2008) (replacing the “business necessity” test applicable in disparate impact cases 
under Title VII with a requirement that a defendant must prove only that a challenged action was 
based on a “reasonable factor other than age”); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S 228, 239 (2005) 
(“It is, accordingly, in cases involving disparate impact claims that the RFOA provision plays its 
principal role by precluding liability if the adverse impact was attributable to a nonage factor that 
was ‘reasonable.’”).  Justice Thomas disagreed with this analysis, contending that disparate impact 
liability was not available under the ADEA at all.  See Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2407 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I write separately to note that I continue to believe that 
disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the [ADEA].”); Smith, 544 U.S. at 248 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas) (“I would . . . 
affirm the judgment below on the ground that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the 
ADEA.”).  In Smith, Justice Thomas (and also Justice Kennedy) joined a concurrence authored by 
Justice O’Connor that adopts the interpretation of the RFOA that I imagine above.  The concurrence 
answers the majority’s contention that absent disparate impact liability, the RFOA would be 
unnecessary, id. at 238–39 (majority opinion), by explaining that 
the RFOA provision . . . plays a distinct (and clearly nonredunant) role in “mixed 
motive” cases.  In such cases, an adverse action taken in substantial part because of an 
employee’s age may be “otherwise prohibited” by § 4(a). The RFOA exemption makes 
clear that such conduct is nevertheless lawful so long as it is “based on” a reasonable 
factor other than age. 
Id. at 253 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (citations omitted).  This interpretation of the 
RFOA exemption is obviously hard to square with Justice Thomas’s subsequent opinion (joined by 
Justice Kennedy) in Gross that mixed-motive claims are not available under the ADEA at all.  
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009). 
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would almost certainly start from the Court’s interpretation of Title VII (that 
is, Beth’s case) rather than the modified standard applied in the ADEA. 
C. The Significance of This Alternative Story 
This thought experiment demonstrates two important principles.  First, 
the causation standard governing Title VII adopted by Congress in the 1991 
CRA was a perfectly plausible interpretation of the language of Title VII as it 
preexisted the 1991 CRA. This is not surprising, since in many respects the 
1991 CRA simply codifies the judicial interpretation of Title VII in Price
Waterhouse.262  For this reason, as discussed more fully in Part VI, I assert 
that the override should be understood as a clarifying gloss on the meaning of 
the preexisting language—that is, “because of”—rather than a substantive 
addition to Title VII that creates a meaningful variation between Title VII 
and other employment statutes that lack this language. 
The second important principle demonstrated by this thought 
experiment is the asymmetry implicit in the Court’s treatment of 
congressional interpretations versus its own interpretations.  If Congress had 
not overridden Price Waterhouse but instead a later Supreme Court had 
interpreted the language of Title VII analogously to how Congress amended 
it in 1991, the later Court interpretation of Title VII would almost certainly 
govern the interpretation of the ADEA (possibly as modified by the RFOA 
provision).  This would be true even if the Court interpreted just the language 
of Title VII.  In fact, a judicial holding that affirmatively reached the ADEA 
in a Title VII case might be castigated as improperly going beyond the case 
presented to the Court.  Additionally, if neither Congress nor the Supreme 
Court had returned to the standard governing mixed-motive cases under 
Title VII (that is, if the hypothetical Beth’s case had never been decided), it 
is likely that Price Waterhouse would have been deemed controlling on the 
interpretation of analogous language in the ADEA. 
It is important to note explicitly that this analysis assumes that the Court 
disinterestedly applies its precedents and general principles of statutory 
interpretation.  As discussed above, a large body of empirical literature 
suggests, by contrast, that ideology often plays a significant role in 
determining the outcome of Supreme Court decisions.263  If the hypothetical 
Supreme Court deciding the hypothetical Jack Gross’s case had a pro-
employer preference, it theoretically could point to the small differences in 
statutory language discussed above to distinguish Beth’s hypothetical case
and interpret the ADEA to require but-for causation.  Alternatively, it could 
explicitly overrule Beth’s hypothetical case.  But I assert that it would be 
relatively unlikely to either distinguish or overrule Beth’s case (or, if Beth’s 
case had not been decided, Price Waterhouse) because it would be difficult 
262. See discussion supra subpart III(B). 
263. See supra notes 41, 43 and accompanying text. 
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to provide a credible justification for doing so.  In Price Waterhouse itself, 
the dissent by Justice Kennedy assumed that the judicial interpretation of 
Title VII would also apply to the ADEA.264  It is the fact that Congress 
intervened that permitted the Supreme Court in Gross to interpret language in 
the ADEA quite differently from analogous language in Title VII without 
blatantly violating standard principles of statutory interpretation and stare 
decisis. 
The difference in outcomes between the real story and this alternative 
imaginary story is not inappropriate if the Gross Court’s assertion that 
Congress affirmatively “chose” to have the ADEA interpreted differently 
from Title VII is correct, or at least if it is unproblematic to interpret a failure 
to amend the ADEA as an implicit choice by Congress to have the ADEA 
interpreted differently.  If it were relatively easy for Congress to indicate—in 
a manner that would control future judicial interpretations without creating 
new problems—that similar language in other statutes should be interpreted 
in line with the amendments it made to Title VII, the onus the Gross Court
places on Congress to do so might be reasonable.  The problem, as the next 
part shows, is that these assumptions are deeply flawed. 
V. The Hydra Problem Illustrated 
In Gross, the Supreme Court suggested that the only way Congress 
could have ensured that its preferred interpretation of “because of” in 
Title VII was applied to other statutes was to amend all other statutes that 
include comparable language.265  This part demonstrates how difficult this 
would be by showing how quickly Gross has been applied to numerous other 
statutes.  Recognizing the difficulty in separately amending all of these 
statutes, Congress has considered bills that would override Gross and use a 
blanket amendment to govern the causation standard in “any” federal law 
forbidding employment discrimination or retaliation.266  This approach is 
probably reasonable in light of the reasoning in Gross, but it would create a 
host of new problems.  This part explores the messy aftermath of Gross;
Part VI proposes a different approach. 
264. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 292 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(“Confusion in the application of dual burden-shifting mechanisms will be most acute in cases 
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), where 
courts borrow the Title VII order of proof for the conduct of jury trials.”).  Justice Stevens makes 
this very point in his dissenting opinion in Gross.  Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 
2354 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Price Waterhouse assumed the 
plurality’s [Title VII] mixed-motives framework extended to the ADEA . . . .”). 
265. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 (“We cannot ignore Congress’ decision to amend Title VII’s 
relevant provisions but not make similar changes to the ADEA. When Congress amends one 
statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to have acted intentionally.”); cf. Katz, supra note 
8, at 884 (arguing that due to the Court’s antiunification stance in Gross, it will likely “reject 
burden-shifting in any statute that does not expressly require it”). 
266. E.g., Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. § 3 
(1st Sess. 2009); see also discussion infra subpart V(C). 
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A. Application of Gross to Non-ADEA Federal Statutes 
The root of the hydra problem in employment discrimination is a web of 
similar federal and state statutes prohibiting certain conduct by employers.  
As discussed above, Title VII prohibits discrimination “because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,”267 and a separate 
provision prohibits discrimination against an individual “because” she 
opposes or complains about discriminatory actions.268  The ADEA prohibits 
employment discrimination “because of such individual’s age,”269 and a 
separate provision prohibits discrimination “because” she has sought to 
enforce rights under the ADEA.270  The ADA, as originally enacted, 
prohibited discrimination against an individual “because of the disability of 
such individual,”271 and a separate provision prohibits discrimination 
“because” an individual has sought to enforce her rights under the statute.272
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act,273 the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act,274 the Occupational Safety and Health Act,275 and the 
Energy Reorganization Act276 are examples of the wide range of additional 
federal statutes that use “because” or “because of” as the operative causal 
language to prohibit discrimination.  Numerous other federal statutes, 
including § 1981,277 § 1983,278 the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA),279 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),280 and 
267. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
268. Id. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added). 
269. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
270. Id. § 623(d) (emphasis added). 
271. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 102(a), 104 Stat. 327, 
331 (emphasis added).  This was the original language of the ADA.  In 2008, the ADA was 
amended and this operative language was changed to prohibit discrimination “on the basis of 
disability,” probably for reasons unrelated to the issue of mixed motives that is a focus here.  ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 5, 122 Stat. 3553, 3557 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. II 2009)). 
272. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
273. Id. § 2000ff-1(a) (Supp. III 2010) (prohibiting discrimination against an employee 
“because of genetic information with respect to the employee”). 
274. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination against an employee 
“because of such individual’s national origin, or . . . because of such individual’s citizenship 
status”).
275. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination against an employee “because” 
such employee files a complaint). 
276. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(1)(D) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination against an employee 
“because” such employee is participating in a proceeding under this chapter of the Atomic Energy 
Act). 
277. Id. § 1981(a) (providing equal rights “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, 
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
persons and property”). 
278. Id. § 1983 (providing redress for deprivations of federal rights under color of state law). 
279. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination against an individual “for” 
opposing practices made unlawful under the Act). 
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the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act,281 do 
not use the words “because of” in their operative language but likewise 
prohibit discrimination against an individual, in what could colloquially be 
referred to as “because of” certain factors or conduct.
As discussed in Part II, statutory provisions that are identical or similar 
to each other in related areas are typically interpreted consistently.282  Prior to 
Gross, lower courts were already split regarding whether to apply Price
Waterhouse or Title VII’s motivating-factor standard to employment 
discrimination statutes other than Title VII.283 Gross complicates this picture 
even more.  Gross is a definitive statement by a true majority of the Supreme 
Court that “because of” in the ADEA means that the plaintiff bears the 
burden of proving through direct or circumstantial evidence that age was the 
“but-for” cause of a challenged employment decision.284  Under standard 
principles of statutory interpretation, lower courts must deem this 
interpretation to be highly relevant when interpreting identical language in 
other similar statutes.  And the Gross Court’s reasoning—that this interpre-
tation was appropriate because Congress failed to amend the ADEA when it 
amended Title VII—can likewise be applied to all other statutes that were not 
amended when Congress enacted the 1991 CRA.  But because the Gross 
Court did not explicitly overrule Price Waterhouse and because there are 
small variations among the statutory provisions at issue, many lower courts 
have been confused about how to proceed.  There is a burgeoning split 
among the circuits. 
Immediately after Gross was decided, the Seventh Circuit took an 
extremely aggressive approach to applying Gross to other federal statutes.  It 
first addressed the issue in a First Amendment retaliation claim.  The court 
rejected prior Supreme Court and circuit precedent that held that a plaintiff 
needed to show only that protected speech was a motivating factor in a 
decision285 and held instead, citing Gross, that the plaintiff needed to prove 
but-for causation.286  The court went beyond this particular context, however, 
to characterize Gross as establishing that “unless a statute (such as the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991) provides otherwise, demonstrating but-for causation is 
280. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (prohibiting discrimination against participants in or beneficiaries of 
employee benefit plans “for exercising” rights under covered plans or “for the purpose of 
interfering” with an individual’s benefit rights). 
281. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a)–(b) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination “on the basis of” uniformed 
service or “because” an individual sought to enforce rights under the Act). 
282. See supra subpart II(B). 
283. See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text. 
284. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350–51 (2009) (“[T]he plaintiff 
retains the burden of persuasion to establish that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s 
adverse action.”). 
285. See Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that decisions so 
holding “do not survive Gross”). 
286. Id.
2012] Undermining Congressional Overrides 911 
part of the plaintiff’s burden in all suits under federal law.”287  In a 
subsequent ADA case, the circuit relied on this more general proposition to 
hold that the standard there was also but-for causation; the court noted that, 
unlike the ADEA, the ADA incorporates Title VII’s remedial provisions—
including § 706(g)(2)(B), the limitation on remedies in mixed-motive 
cases—but held that since it did not similarly incorporate § 703(m), the 
mixed-motive liability standard, or include “comparable stand-alone 
language,” Gross’s interpretation of “because of” controlled.288  The Seventh 
Circuit likewise applied Gross to the Labor Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act, which prohibits discrimination against employees “for
exercising any right,” on the ground that dictionary definitions equate “for” 
with “by reason of” and “because of.”289  These cases at least had the virtue 
of establishing a clear rule (albeit one I contend is unwarranted).  But just as 
this Article was being finalized for publication, a Seventh Circuit decision 
held that the first case in this chain was unjustified in concluding that Gross 
overruled the motivating-factor standard previously applied to First 
Amendment retaliation cases and reinstated the old standard for First 
Amendment claims.290  The latest decision, however, did not disavow the 
ADA or LMRDA precedents; rather, it cited them in support of a statement 
(probably appropriately characterized as dicta) that although Gross did not 
change the causation standard for First Amendment retaliation claims, 
“Gross may have implications for suits under other statutes as well” as the 
ADEA.291
Other circuits have been more measured in their initial responses to 
Gross.  The Fifth Circuit, for example, held that retaliation claims under 
Title VII were governed by Price Waterhouse rather than Gross.292  The 
court acknowledged that Gross’s reasoning might suggest that retaliation 
claims under Title VII, which similarly arise from discrimination “because 
of” protected acts293 and which were not addressed explicitly in the provi-
sions added by the 1991 CRA, likewise require a showing of but-for 
causation.294  But the court relied instead on Gross’s admonition that courts 
287. Id. at 525–26 (emphasis added). 
288. Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff 
. . . must show that his or her employer would not have fired him but for his . . . disability.”). 
289. Serafinn v. Local 722, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 597 F.3d 908, 914–15 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 529 (2006) and 6 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 25 (1989)). 
290. Greene v. Doruff, 660 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that if a plaintiff in a First 
Amendment retaliation case shows his speech was a motivating factor in the adverse action, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to show it would have taken the same action anyway); see also 
Brown v. Cnty. of Cook, 661 F.3d 333, 335 (7th Cir. 2011) (same).  The Greene court also collected 
several post-Gross decisions from other circuits that likewise continue to apply the motivating-
factor standard to First Amendment claims.  Greene, 660 F.3d at 977–78. 
291. Greene, 660 F.3d at 977. 
292. Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 329 (5th Cir. 2010). 
293. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
294. Xerox, 602 F.3d at 328. 
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“must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute to a different 
statute without careful and critical examination.”295  Prior Fifth Circuit prece-
dent held that Price Waterhouse, including Justice O’Connor’s direct-
evidence requirement, was applicable to retaliation claims under Title VII.296
Citing a rule that it could not overrule prior circuit precedent “unless such 
overruling is unequivocally directed by controlling Supreme Court 
precedent,” the court distinguished Gross, which had not explicitly overruled 
Price Waterhouse’s construction of “because of” in Title VII, from Desert 
Palace, which it construed as having unequivocally overruled the direct-
evidence requirement, to hold that retaliation claims under Title VII could 
proceed under a mixed-motive framework as articulated in Price Waterhouse 
but without the direct-evidence requirement.297  One member of the panel 
filed a dissent, citing the Seventh Circuit precedent discussed above and 
calling the majority’s distinguishing of Gross “lame.”298
Some district courts in other circuits have followed the Fifth Circuit’s 
approach,299 while others have applied the reasoning in Gross to preclude 
mixed-motive analysis in Title VII retaliation claims.300  And at least one 
district court suggested that, even after Gross, mixed-motive Title VII retali-
ation claims are properly assessed using the motivating-factor language 
added to Title VII by the 1991 CRA.301
The interpretive challenges posed by the ADA are similar to those at 
play in the Title VII retaliation context, with the added wrinkle, noted above, 
that the ADA incorporates by reference Title VII’s remedial provisions, 
including the limitation on remedies applicable to mixed-motive claims 
under Title VII.302  As initially enacted, the ADA prohibited discrimination 
“because of” an individual’s disability or “because” an individual sought to 
295. Id. at 329 (internal quotation marks omitted).
296. See id. at 330 (citing Fabela v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 
2003) and Fierros v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 274 F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 2001)).
297. Id. at 329–32 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
298. Id. at 337 (Jolly, J., dissenting).  A more recent Fifth Circuit decision, with a far more 
cursory analysis of the issue, reaffirmed Xerox but stated that the burden subsequently shifts back to 
the employee to prove but-for causation.  See Nunley v. City of Waco, No. 11-50119, 2011 WL 
3861678, *5 (5th Cir. Sept. 1, 2011) (“Thus, our decision in Xerox did not dispense with this final 
‘but for’ requirement for avoiding summary judgment.”).  The court supported this assertion with a 
cite to a retaliation claim analyzed under the pretext framework rather than the mixed-motive 
framework.  See id. (quoting Manaway v. Med. Ctr., 430 F. App’x 317 (5th Cir. 2011)); Manaway,
430 F. App’x at 325 n.4 (holding that the plaintiff waived her mixed-motive theory because she 
failed to assert it prior to appeal).  This suggests that the Nunley court perhaps did not appreciate the 
extent to which these causation standards differ.  See supra subpart III(A). 
299. See, e.g., Nuskey v. Hochberg, 730 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2010) (announcing that the 
court would follow the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Smith v. Xerox Corp.). 
300. See, e.g., Beckford v. Geithner, 661 F. Supp. 2d 17, 25 n.3 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that a 
mixed-motive theory could not be used in a suit involving the antiretaliation provision of Title VII). 
301. Beckham v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 736 F. Supp. 2d 130, 145 (D.D.C. 2010). 
302. 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2006) (incorporating Title VII’s remedies). 
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enforce rights under the Act;303 it was amended shortly before Gross was 
decided (to override different Supreme Court cases limiting the scope of 
qualifying disabilities) and now prohibits discrimination “on the basis of” 
disability.304  Prior to Gross, most circuits had held that the ADA permitted 
mixed-motive claims, with most applying the 1991 CRA’s motivating-factor 
standard with a limitation on remedies but others applying Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence in Price Waterhouse.305  But since Gross, the trend 
seems to be to hold that mixed-motive claims are no longer cognizable under 
the ADA.  As noted above, the Seventh Circuit held this explicitly,306 and the 
Second Circuit, without deciding the issue, characterized it as “questionable” 
whether mixed-motive claims remain permissible.307  Several district courts 
have likewise held that the ADA now requires plaintiffs to prove but-for 
causation,308 although a few continue to apply pre-Gross circuit precedent 
permitting mixed-motive claims.309  Few of these decisions analyze the 
amended ADA (because it became effective relatively shortly before this 
Article was published), but an administrative decision from the Merit 
Systems Protection Board concludes that the amendment does not 
substantively change the analysis and the ADA no longer permits mixed-
motive claims.310
A related but somewhat different set of issues arises with respect to 
§ 1981.  Section 1981 was enacted shortly after the Civil War, and it pro-
vides that “all persons . . . shall have the same right, in every State and 
303. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 102, 104 Stat. 327, 331–
33 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006)) (prohibiting discrimination “against a 
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual”); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12203(a) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination “because” an individual opposes or participates in a 
challenge to discriminatory acts). 
304. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. II 2009) (prohibiting discrimination against a qualified 
individual “on the basis of disability”). 
305. See, e.g., Head v. Glacier Nw., Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1063–65 (9th Cir. 2005) (interpreting 
“because of” to require proof that disability was a “motivating factor” in a decision and collecting 
cases from seven other circuits also permitting mixed-motive claims under similar standards); cf. 
Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 112 (2d Cir. 2001) (suggesting, without clearly 
deciding, that Price Waterhouse might govern the analysis).  By contrast, the Sixth and Tenth 
Circuits never permitted mixed-motive claims under the ADA, reasoning that the statute was 
partially modeled on the Rehabilitation Act, which precludes mixed-motive claims.  See Macy v. 
Hopkins Cnty. Sch. Bd., 484 F.3d 357, 363 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining the circuit split on this 
point).
306. See Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 960–62 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(imposing a but-for standard). 
307. Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 2010). 
308. See, e.g., Saviano v. Town of Westport, No. 3:04-CV-522 RNC, 2001 WL 4561184, at *6 
(D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2011); Warshaw v. Concentra Health Servs., 719 F. Supp. 2d 484, 503 (E.D. Pa. 
2010); Ross v. Indep. Living Res. of Contra Costa Cnty., No. C08-00854 TEH, 2010 WL 2898773, 
at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2010) (all adopting a but-for standard). 
309. See, e.g., Doe v. Deer Mountain Day Camp, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 2d 324, 343 & n.40 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying a motivating-factor standard but noting that the plaintiff’s proof would 
satisfy a but-for standard as well). 
310. Southerland v. DOD, 2011 M.S.P.B. 92, at *16–17 (2011). 
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Territory . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white 
citizens.”311  Although it does not explicitly mention employment, this 
language has long been interpreted to protect against race-based employment 
discrimination.312  In general, courts have interpreted § 1981’s substantive 
reach to be largely coterminous with Title VII’s, although its procedural 
requirements and remedies differ.313  Courts have generally applied Price
Waterhouse to permit mixed-motive claims under § 1981 and most continued 
to apply Price Waterhouse even after the 1991 CRA, reasoning that Congress 
had failed to amend § 1981 in this respect.314  This reasoning could suggest 
that Gross’s reasoning is now applicable instead.  But the Third Circuit 
suggested (without formally deciding) that it might well continue to apply 
Price Waterhouse on the ground that § 1981 does not include the “because 
of” language interpreted in Gross.315  The court explained that burden 
shifting is appropriate, reasoning that if race played “any role” in a 
challenged decision, the plaintiff has not enjoyed “the same right” as other 
similarly situated persons, but if the defendant proves the same decision 
would have been made regardless, “then the plaintiff has, in effect, enjoyed 
‘the same right’ as similarly situated persons.”316
It is not even clear what causation standard to apply to claims brought 
by federal employees under the ADEA itself.  These claims are not governed 
by the language governing private employers interpreted by the Court in 
Gross but instead by a separate provision of the ADEA, § 633a(a), which 
provides that all personnel decisions affecting federal employees “shall be 
311. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)). 
312. See, e.g., CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 448 (2008) (citing cases back to 
1977 in which federal appeals courts concluded that the language of § 1981 encompassed 
employment retaliation claims); id. at 457 (holding that § 1981 encompasses retaliation claims); 
McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287 (1976) (holding that § 1981, like Title VII, 
“is applicable to racial discrimination in private employment against white persons”). 
313. See CBOCS, 553 U.S. at 455 (stating that there is a “necessary overlap” between Title VII 
and § 1981 but that “the remedies available [under the two statutes], although related, and although 
directed to most of the same ends, are separate, distinct, and independent” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  The key substantive difference between the statutes is that disparate impact claims are 
not cognizable under § 1981.  See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 
(1982) (“We conclude, therefore, that § 1981 . . . can be violated only by purposeful 
discrimination.”). 
314. See Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment, supra note 12, at 647 n.22 (collecting cases in 
which courts refused to apply the 1991 CRA framework to § 1981 claims); see also Brown v. 
J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 182 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009) (applying the Price Waterhouse framework 
instead of the 1991 Title VII amendments to a § 1981 claim); Aquino v. Honda of Am., Inc., 158 F. 
App’x 667, 676 (6th Cir. 2005) (refusing to extend the 1991 Title VII amendments to § 1981 
claims); Mabra v. United Food & Commercial Workers, 176 F.3d 1357, 1358 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that the 1991 mixed-motive amendments do not apply to § 1981 claims); Hardy v. Town of 
Greenwich, 629 F. Supp. 2d 192, 199 (D. Conn. 2009) (citing Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 
933–34 (9th Cir. 2007)) (noting that while the Second Circuit has not directly addressed whether the 
1991 mixed-motive amendments apply to § 1981 claims, other circuits have addressed the issue, 
and only the Ninth Circuit has held that the 1991 amendments apply to § 1981). 
315. Brown, 581 F.3d at 182 n.5. 
316. Id.
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made free from any discrimination based on age.”317  Citing prior Supreme 
Court precedent that had referred to the “sharp” differences between these 
provisions, the D.C. Circuit held that reading § 633a to require “but-for” 
causation would “divorce” the phrase from its plain meaning and that a 
federal employee could establish liability simply by “proving that age was a
factor in the employer’s decision.”318  The court further stated that “‘[a]ny,’ 
after all, means any” and that accordingly there was no requirement that age 
be a substantial factor in the decision.319  Relying on the First Amendment 
retaliation decision that was significant in Price Waterhouse’s analysis rather 
than Price Waterhouse itself, the court then held that to avoid unwarranted 
windfalls, a plaintiff could only recover back pay or reinstatement if but-for 
causation were established, but the court declined to resolve which party 
would bear the burden of proving the same action would, or would not, have 
occurred.320  By contrast to this careful analysis, several district courts have 
applied Gross to claims under § 633a without noting the difference in 
language at all or have noted it but held it makes no difference.321  Similar 
questions have also arisen under the Rehabilitation Act (which prohibits 
discrimination “solely by reason of” a disability and retaliation “because of” 
protected acts),322 the Jury Systems Improvement Act (which prohibits 
discrimination “by reason of” jury service),323 and ERISA (which prohibits 
discrimination “for” exercising rights under benefits plans).324
317. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
318. Ford v. Mabus, 629 F.3d 198, 205–06 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
319. Id. at 206. 
320. Id. at 207 (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285 
(1977)). See supra text accompanying notes 249–50 (discussing a similar interpretation of remedies 
under Title VII prior to Price Waterhouse).
321. See, e.g., Frankel v. Peake, Civ. No. 07-3539 (WJM), 2009 WL 3417448, at *4 (D.N.J. 
Oct. 20, 2009) (citing Gross to hold that, in a summary judgment motion, a plaintiff needed to 
“show a disputed material fact, which would allow a reasonable jury to determine that age was the 
‘but for’ cause of the employment action at issue”); Wagner v. Geren, No. 8:08 CV 208, 2009 WL 
2105680, at *4 (D. Neb. July 9, 2009) (stating that it is the plaintiff’s “burden to present evidence 
. . . that . . . the adverse action would not have occurred ‘but for’ [the plaintiff’s] age”); Glenn v. 
Bair, 643 F. Supp. 2d 23, 29 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that “[a]t all times . . . the plaintiff retains the 
burden of persuasion to prove . . . that age was the but-for cause of the challenged employer 
decision” (internal quotations omitted)). 
322. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006); 34 C.F.R. 100.7(e) (2011); see, e.g., Gard v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 
752 F. Supp. 2d 30, 36 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Gross for the proposition that a “plaintiff seeking 
vindication under the Rehabilitation Act must prove that his disability was the ‘sole’ or ‘but-for’ 
reason for the employer’s actions or inactions, regardless of whether the plaintiff advances a claim 
of discrimination based on disparate treatment, mixed-motive, or retaliation”). 
323. 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (2006); see, e.g., Williams v. District of Columbia, 646 F. Supp. 2d 103, 
109 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Gross for the rule that a plaintiff must demonstrate that jury service was 
the but-for cause of the challenged adverse employment action). 
324. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006); see, e.g., Cameron v. Idearc Media Corp., No. 08-12010-LTS, 
2011 WL 4054864, at *5, *9 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2011) (citing Gross to hold that mixed-motive 
claims are not cognizable under the ADEA and then stating “[t]he framework for analysis of the 
Plaintiffs’ ERISA claim is essentially the same as that discussed . . . with regard to the ADEA 
claim”).
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Agency interpretations can further complicate matters.  For example, 
the FMLA makes it unlawful to discriminate against any individual 
“because” such individual files or participates in a proceeding relating to her 
substantive rights and, in a separate provision, “for opposing any practice” 
made illegal.325  These provisions substantively parallel the antiretaliation 
provisions in Title VII but use slightly different wording.326  A Department of 
Labor regulation that predates Gross interprets these provisions to mean that 
employers “cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in 
employment actions.”327  The Sixth Circuit, after Gross, reasoned that the 
regulation’s language suggested that mixed-motive analysis was appropriate 
and therefore applied Price Waterhouse.328  The Tenth Circuit, by contrast, 
recently stated (without deciding) that after Gross “there is a substantial 
question whether a mixed-motive analysis would apply in a retaliation claim 
under the FMLA.”329  District courts in various other circuits have similarly 
applied pre-Gross circuit precedent that applies Price Waterhouse to FMLA 
retaliation claims but have noted that there are strong arguments that Gross
should apply instead.330
Time, or subsequent Supreme Court decisions, will gradually resolve 
some of the confusion regarding the analysis of these statutes, but the sheer 
number of different statutes involved, and the small differences in language 
among them and even within them, ensure that clarity will not be quickly 
forthcoming.  Notably, even if courts uniformly applied Gross to all statutes 
other than Title VII, Gross and its quickly multiplying progeny will also pose 
a challenge any time a plaintiff seeks to bring a claim under both Title VII 
and any of these other statutes.  It is common practice to bring race-
discrimination claims under Title VII and § 1981 because § 1981 provides a 
325. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), (b)(1) (2006). 
326. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), (b) (2006) (specifying that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any 
employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any 
practice made unlawful by this subchapter” or “because such individual has filed any charge, or has 
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding, under or related to this subchapter”), with 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an 
unlawful employment practice . . . or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing . . . .”). 
327. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2008). 
328. See Hunter v. Valley View Local Schs., 579 F.3d 688, 691–92 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that the FMLA “authorizes claims in which an employer bases an employment decision on both 
permissible and impermissible factors”); cf. Wilson v. Noble Drilling Servs., Inc., 405 F. App’x 
909, 912 n.1 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting uncertainty as to whether the mixed-motive framework applies 
in FMLA cases but declining to resolve the issue). 
329. Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 987, 1004 (10th Cir. 2011). 
330. See Burgess v. JHM Hotels, LLC, C.A. No. 6:08-3919-HMH-BHH, 2010 WL 1493132, at 
*6 (D.S.C. Apr. 13, 2010) (noting that there was a “serious question” as to whether the Price 
Waterhouse mixed-motive framework survived Gross); Rasic v. City of Northlake, No. 08 C 104, 
2009 WL 3150428, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2009) (“[T]here is a serious question as to whether the 
mixed-motive theory of FMLA retaliation survives the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Gross . . . .”). 
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more generous remedial scheme in certain respects.331  If § 1981 is 
interpreted in line with Gross, these two claims will be assessed under 
different causation standards.  Plaintiffs also often bring claims under both 
the ADEA and Title VII.332  Even prior to Gross, these kinds of 
“intersectional” claims posed challenges because they required proceeding 
under two distinct statutes and raised complex challenges regarding appro-
priate comparators, often a key element of proving an employment 
discrimination claim.333 Gross, and the enhanced pleading standards 
imposed by the Iqbal334 and Twombly335 decisions, make such compound 
cases far more difficult.  A plaintiff now may be required to plead facts 
sufficient to support causal standards that are in tension (e.g., that a given 
decision was based in part on sex and that age was the but-for cause of the 
decision); some courts have responded by dismissing the ADEA claims 
immediately.336  Even if a court permits both claims to go forward, the jury 
would need to be charged on two different causal standards.337  The same is 
true for a myriad of potential statutory combinations.  This tension is not 
simply a matter of clarification; it is the necessary result of Gross’s rejection 
of the standard endorsed by Congress in the 1991 CRA.  It will remain a 
problem unless and until Congress overrides, or the Court overrules, Gross or
unless and until Congress amends Title VII. 
331. See DIANNE AVERY ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 316 (8th ed. 2010) 
(stating that “as a practical matter, discrimination claims based on race or ancestry should be 
brought under both § 1981 and Title VII” because under § 1981 compensatory and punitive 
damages are uncapped and back-pay awards are not limited to two years). 
332. See, e.g., Cathy Ventrell-Monsees, President, Workplace Fairness, Statement at the EEOC 
Meeting: Age Discrimination in the 21st Century—Barriers to the Employment of Older Workers 
(July 15, 2009), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/7-15-09/ventrell-monsees.cfm 
(remarking that an “increasing number of older women and older minorities . . . pursue claims under 
the ADEA and Title VII”). 
333. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Sex Plus Age Discrimination: Protecting Older Women 
Workers, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 79, 103–06 (2003) (describing how older women face challenges in 
proving prima facie disparate treatment on account of age or sex in situations where discrimination 
is occurring because of both age and sex, and neither their older male nor their younger female 
coworkers are being discriminated against).  Courts disagree about how to analyze these claims.  
For a case permitting age to be considered as a “plus” factor relevant in the Title VII analysis, see 
Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1240 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
334. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
335. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
336. See Brian S. Clarke, Grossly Restricted Pleading: Twombly/Iqbal, Gross, and 
Cannibalistic Facts in Compound Employment Discrimination Claims, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 1101, 
1103–04 & n.22 (giving examples of post-Gross cases in which courts have dismissed cases due to 
pleadings of inconsistent facts for different theories of discrimination, as well as examples of courts 
allowing cases to proceed despite inconsistent alternative theories). 
337. Cf. Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 99, at 903 (finding differences in outcomes depending on 
whether juries received a mixed-motive instruction or a pretext instruction). 
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B. Application of Gross to State Employment Discrimination Statutes 
State courts, and federal courts applying state employment 
discrimination law, face a different challenge.  Many states and localities 
have enacted employment discrimination laws that prohibit age 
discrimination in the same statute—often the same sentence—as they 
prohibit race, color, sex, religion, and national-origin discrimination.338  State 
statutes also often prohibit, again in a single statute, discrimination on the 
basis of disability, veteran status, and various other factors that are addressed 
in distinct federal laws, as well as additional factors, such as sexual 
orientation or marital status that are not addressed in federal law at all.339
As a general matter, most states borrow liberally from federal 
interpretations of employment discrimination law when interpreting their 
own statutes.340  In cases brought in federal court that include both federal 
and state claims, it is quite common for courts to analyze the claims in detail 
under federal law utilizing precedents interpreting those laws and then 
declare in a single sentence that state law claims are resolved identically.341
This is not to say that there cannot be significant differences between the two 
bodies of law; for example, especially prior to the recent amendments to the 
ADA, state protections against disability discrimination were sometimes far 
338. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12920 (West Supp. 2012) (“It is hereby declared as the 
public policy of this state that it is necessary to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all 
persons to seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination or abridgment on account of 
race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical 
condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, 
or sexual orientation.”); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 2012) (“It shall be an unlawful 
discriminatory practice: (a) For an employer or licensing agency, because of an individual’s age, 
race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, disability, predisposing 
genetic characteristics, marital status, or domestic violence victim status, to refuse to hire or employ 
or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual 
in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.”); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659A.006(2) (2009) (“The opportunity to obtain employment or housing or to use and enjoy 
places of public accommodation without unlawful discrimination because of race, color, religion, 
sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital status, age or disability hereby is recognized as and 
declared to be a civil right.”). 
339. See supra note 338. 
340. NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 76:9 n.45 (7th ed. 2011) (listing state court cases which refer to federal case law 
in interpreting state antidiscrimination statutes); see also, e.g., AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes, 272 S.W.3d 
588, 592 (Tex. 2008) (“By adopting the [Texas Commission on Human Rights Act], the [Texas] 
Legislature intended to correlate state law with federal law in employment discrimination cases . . . .
Therefore, we look to federal law to interpret the Act’s provisions.” (quotations and citations 
omitted)). 
341. See, e.g., Ames v. Cartier, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 762, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“As an initial 
matter, the court notes that analysis of claims of discrimination under [New York State law and 
New York City law] proceeds under the same analytical framework as Title VII claims. . . .  
Therefore, the following discussion of plaintiff’s Title VII claims applies equally to his state and 
local law claims.” (citation omitted)). 
2012] Undermining Congressional Overrides 919 
more robust than the ADA.342  Even when the substantive standards are simi-
lar or identical, it can be quite important to the parties how claims under state 
or local statutes are resolved, because the remedial provisions of some state 
or local statutes are more generous than those under federal law.343
Interpretation of mixed-motive claims under state statutes was messy 
even before Gross.  Because many state statutes had not been amended after 
the 1991 CRA, some courts applying state law have applied Price
Waterhouse to claims of discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or 
national origin rather than the motivating-factor test and the remedies 
limitation of the 1991 CRA.344  Others have applied the 1991 CRA standard, 
often without separate discussion.345 Gross adds another layer of uncertainty.  
In a case decided after Gross, the Supreme Court of Alaska recently 
permitted mixed-motive claims on the basis of age, even though none of its 
prior decisions had done so explicitly.346  The defendant argued Gross should 
apply.347  The court disagreed.  It acknowledged that it “look[ed] to federal 
discrimination law jurisprudence generally” but reasoned that the Supreme 
Court’s analysis in Gross relied on distinctions between the ADEA and 
Title VII that did not exist in Alaskan law and that applying Gross would 
“result in a different analytical framework for age discrimination claims than 
for other discrimination claims . . . prohibited by the same sentence in the 
same statute.”348
342. See Claudia Center & Andrew J. Imparato, Redefining “Disability” Discrimination: A 
Proposal to Restore Civil Rights Protections for All Workers, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 334–
35 (2003) (stating that although the vast majority of states had adopted antidiscrimination laws that 
tracked the ADA, several states rejected federal case law that narrowed the scope of qualifying 
disabilities and instead interpreted their identically worded state statutes to provide broader 
protections).  For a specific instance of a state court interpreting a state statute to provide more 
robust protections than federal law, see State Div. of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp., 480 N.E.2d 
695, 698 (N.Y. 1985). 
343. For example, the New York Human Rights Law permits uncapped punitive damages.  See 
Greenbaum v. Handelsbanken, 67 F. Supp. 2d 228, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that a state law 
capping damages awards did not apply to punitive damages). Title VII, by contrast, caps such 
damages on a sliding scale (based on the size of the defendant) that ranges from $50,000 to 
$300,000.  42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2006). 
344. See, e.g., Harrison v. Olde Fin. Corp., 572 N.W.2d 679, 684 n.15 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) 
(noting that because Michigan’s Civil Rights Act was patterned after the 1964 federal Civil Rights 
Act, the 1991 amendments to Title VII overriding Price Waterhouse did not affect the court’s 
reasoning).
345. See, e.g., Ames, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 767 (stating, in a case applying Title VII’s mixed-
motive framework, that “analysis of claims of discrimination under the New York State Human 
Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law proceeds under the same analytical 
framework as Title VII claims”); see also Mittl v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 794 N.E.2d 
660, 662 (N.Y. 2003) (“The standards for establishing unlawful discrimination under [New York 
law] are the same as those governing title VII cases under the Federal Civil Rights Act of 
1964 . . . .”). 
346. Smith v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 240 P.3d 834, 842 (Alaska 2010). 
347. Id.
348. Id.
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Similar reasoning has been applied (primarily by federal courts) to 
permit, notwithstanding Gross, mixed-motive claims of discrimination on the 
basis of age under state statutes in (at least) Michigan,349 Missouri,350 Iowa,351
Puerto Rico,352 and Massachusetts.353  By contrast, the Second Circuit 
flagged the issue and assumed, without deciding, that Gross would apply to 
claims under the New York Human Rights Law.354  There are also numerous 
cases post-Gross that simply state, without more analysis, that state law 
follows federal ADEA law;355 it is unclear whether these decisions are 
deciding that mixed-motive claims are not available at all or are arising in 
cases in which pretext analysis would be applicable anyway.  This issue 
arose on remand after the Supreme Court decision in Gross itself.  The 
Eighth Circuit permitted Jack Gross’s mixed-motive claim to advance under 
the Iowa Civil Rights Act.356
C. The Problem with Potential Congressional Responses to the Hydra 
Problem
Shortly after Gross was decided, Congress began considering bills to 
override it and restore the possibility of mixed-motive claims under the 
349. See Schmitz v. Village of Breckenridge, No. 08-14599-BC, 2009 WL 3273255, at *11–13 
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 9, 2009) (concluding that Gross did not apply to age discrimination claims under 
state law because the distinctions between the ADEA and Title VII were not present in the 
Michigan statute). 
350. See Baker v. Silver Oak Senior Living Mgmt. Co., 581 F.3d 684, 689–90 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(stating that the Missouri Human Rights Act “is less demanding than the ADEA” as interpreted in 
Gross and requires only a showing that “age was a contributing factor in the [employer’s] 
termination decision” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
351. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 588 F.3d 614, 617–21 (8th Cir. 2009) (allowing the 
plaintiff’s mixed-motive age-discrimination claim under the Iowa Civil Rights Act to go to a jury). 
352. See Vélez v. Thermo King de P.R., Inc., 585 F.3d 441, 452 n.7 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining 
that plaintiff’s burden to establish age discrimination under Puerto Rican law was “lighter” than 
under the ADEA as interpreted in Gross and that plaintiff’s prima facie case shifts a burden of 
persuasion to the defendant to prove that the challenged action “was not motivated by 
discriminatory age animus” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
353. See Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Mgmt., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 2d 319, 339 n.15 (D. Mass. 2011) 
(suggesting that a mixed-motive jury instruction could be appropriate for an age discrimination 
claim under Massachusetts law even while recognizing that “[m]ixed-motive instructions are no 
longer appropriate under the ADEA after Gross”).
354. Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 105 n.6 (2d Cir. 2010). 
355. See, e.g., Holt v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 4:09CV00818 JLH, 2010 WL 3614135, at *3 
& n.5 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 8, 2010) (stating that claims under Arkansas law are analyzed using the same 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework as are ADEA claims); Puckett v. McPhillips 
Shinbaum, No. 2:06-CV-1148-ID, 2010 WL 1729104, at *5 & n.3 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 30, 2010) 
(delivering a recommendation from the magistrate judge to the district court that the plaintiff’s 
success or failure under the ADEA also determines the outcome of the plaintiff’s state claims); 
Horan v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 3:07cv1582 (WWE), 2009 WL 3820654, at *1 n.1 (D. Conn. 
Sept. 28, 2009) (stating that Connecticut courts look to ADEA precedent in analyzing claims under 
the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act). 
356. Gross, 588 F.3d at 617, 621. 
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ADEA and other non-Title VII statutes.357  When introduced in 2009, it was 
expected that these bills might pass relatively easily,358 but ultimately they 
failed to progress after hearings were held.359  There is far less likelihood that 
the more conservative 112th Congress will pass comparable legislation.  
Nonetheless, close examination of the bills is warranted to illustrate how the 
broad reach of the Court’s reasoning in Gross caused Congress to at least 
consider enacting bills with a similarly unmoored approach.  The bills were 
substantively identical; for convenience, I will quote from the House bill in 
the discussion that follows. 
The findings in the bill explicitly repudiate the Court’s reasoning in 
Gross:
  Congress has relied on a long line of court cases holding that 
language in the [ADEA], and similar antidiscrimination and 
antiretaliation laws, that is nearly identical to language in title VII . . . 
would be interpreted consistently with judicial interpretations of 
title VII . . . including amendments made by the Civil Rights Act of 
1991.  The Supreme Court’s decision in [Gross] . . . has eroded this 
long-held understanding of consistent interpretation and circumvented 
well-established precedents.360
This statement of Congress’s reliance and expectations not only differs from 
the approach taken by the majority in Gross; it also differs from the approach 
taken by the dissenters in Gross, who would have applied Price Waterhouse,
rather than the 1991 CRA’s standards.361  Instead, the bill asserts that 
Congress expected precisely what was stated in the committee report that 
accompanied the 1991 CRA: the override of Price Waterhouse would govern 
the interpretation of related statutes.362
The bill states its purpose as ensuring the standard for proving disparate 
treatment is “no different” under the ADEA than under Title VII as amended 
by the 1991 CRA, and it would amend the ADEA to insert motivating-factor 
357. For the proposed law, which was introduced in substantively identical form in both 
chambers of Congress, see Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, S. 1756, 111th 
Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) and Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 3721, 111th 
Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). 
358. See Judy Greenwald, Age-Bias Bill Would Ease Burden for Plaintiffs, BUS. INS. (Oct. 18, 
2009), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20091018/ISSUE01/310189980 (“Legislation that 
seeks to make it easier for employees to prevail in age discrimination cases looks likely to win 
approval, observers say.”). 
359. Jacqueline Go, Comment, Another Move Away From Title VII: Why Gross Got It Right, 51 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1025, 1027 n.18 (2011). 
360. H.R. 3721 § 2(a)(3). 
361. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2356 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating 
that rejecting the 1991 CRA’s standard was “reasonabl[e]” but that the Court should have 
“adhere[d] to [Price Waterhouse’s] motivating-factor test”). 
362. See supra text accompanying note 138.  Of course, it is impossible to know definitively 
whether the committee report that accompanied the 1991 CRA was a correct statement of that 
Congress’s legislative intent.  Justice Scalia and others would be quick to point out that a statement 
in a committee report has not garnered a majority vote in both houses. 
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language as well as a limitation on remedies that is almost identical to the 
changes in Title VII made by the 1991 CRA.363  But it would actually go 
beyond existing Title VII law to respond to interpretative questions that have 
arisen since 1991.  First, it would amend the text of the ADEA to state 
explicitly that a plaintiff may rely on “any type or form of admissible 
circumstantial or direct evidence.”364  This would codify the holding of 
Desert Palace.  Second, it would add language—language that lacks a 
specific textual analogue in Title VII—indicating that a plaintiff may also 
succeed by showing that “the practice complained of would not have 
occurred in the absence of an impermissible factor.”365  This language would 
codify the but-for standard that typically governs pretext cases.  And third, 
probably most importantly, it would address the ongoing confusion regarding 
when and how courts determine whether to issue a mixed-motive instruction 
by providing explicitly that “[e]very method for proving either such 
violation” (that is, either a motivating-factor test or but-for causation) “shall 
be available to the plaintiff.”366
Amending only the ADEA with this language would invite a new hydra 
problem: courts, following the reasoning in Gross, might continue to apply 
the but-for causation standard announced in Gross to other statutes or choose 
to adopt yet a different causation standard.  The bill, not surprisingly, seeks 
to avoid this.  The bill goes far beyond simply a statement in a committee 
report, or even statutory language setting forth congressional findings and 
purposes, regarding expectations about how courts would interpret 
Congress’s actions.  Instead, the bill’s substantive language provides that the 
causation standard it announces would apply to: 
  (A) this Act [the ADEA], including subsection (d) [concerning 
retaliation]; 
  (B) any Federal law forbidding employment discrimination; 
  (C) any law forbidding discrimination of the type described in 
subsection (d) [concerning retaliation] or forbidding other retaliation 
against an individual for engaging in, or interference with, any 
federally protected activity including the exercise of any right 
established by Federal law (including a whistleblower law); or 
  (D) any provision of the Constitution that protects against 
discrimination or retaliation.367
The breadth of these provisions is striking.  The bill seeks to avoid the hydra 
problem—and the challenge of identifying which particular statutes Gross 
might be applied to—by reaching (almost) any and all statutes that it ever 
363. H.R. 3721 §§ 2(b), 3. 
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might affect.  The bill does, however, provide an exception for retaliation 
claims to the extent that any particular law has “an express provision 
regarding the legal burdens of proof applicable to that claim.”368
Given the Court’s refusal in Gross to consider amendments to Title VII 
to hold any relevance to the interpretation of the ADEA, the “blanket 
amendment” approach is a reasonable response on the part of Congress.  The 
number of different laws to which Gross has already been applied (e.g., 
Title VII’s retaliation provisions, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, ERISA, 
the Juror Act, the FMLA, § 1981, § 1983 First Amendment retaliation 
claims369) makes clear that it would be quite onerous for Congress to 
separately amend each of these statutes to end reliance on Gross.  This is 
particularly true because every law has champions and opponents, and there 
can be large political obstacles to opening up a given statute to amendment.  
While enactment of the Gross override bill would be equivalent to amending 
these other statutes, it might not trigger the same political concerns because 
its effects would be far less obvious.  It also might be referred only to the 
committees with jurisdiction over the ADEA, rather than the far larger group 
of committees with jurisdiction over any of the relevant statutes 
implicated.370  Moreover, even if Congress separately amended all of the 
statutes to which Gross has already been applied, Gross could still be applied 
to statutes in other contexts that Congress had not considered.371
But to say that a blanket amendment is a reasonable response to Gross 
is not to say that it is ideal.  Far from it.  If this bill were enacted as written, it 
would mean that language codified with the substantive provisions of the 
ADEA would govern the standard of proof applied in statutes scattered 
across the Code.  This would include not only employment discrimination 
statutes but also any other federal statute that addresses retaliation in any 
context.  There would be no indication in the codification of those other stat-
utes that causation was governed by language found in the codification of the 
ADEA.  (The bill protects plaintiffs who might be unaware of these provi-
sions at the outset of a lawsuit by stating explicitly that “the plaintiff need not 
368. Id.
369. See supra subpart V(A). 
370. This relates to a notice problem discussed more fully below.  See infra note 372 and 
accompanying text. 
371. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5, overrode 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), a decision regarding the statute of 
limitations in Title VII cases alleging pay discrimination.  In that statute, Congress addressed the 
hydra problem in a more modest fashion: it explicitly amended the text of Title VII, the ADEA, the 
ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act, the acts where the issue might be expected to arise most 
frequently.  Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 §§ 3–5. This was insufficient to end reliance on 
Ledbetter as a shadow precedent.  In a recent case arising under the FMLA, the district court held 
Ledbetter controlling because Congress had not amended the FMLA when it amended these other 
statutes.  Maher v. Int’l Paper Co., 600 F. Supp. 2d 940, 950 n.5 (W.D. Mich. 2009). 
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plead the existence of this subsection.”)372  Indeed, although its stated 
purpose is to make interpretation of the ADEA “no different than the 
standard” under Title VII,373 the bill, if enacted, would by its terms supersede 
the language in Title VII itself.  Title VII would no longer be governed by its 
own motivating-factor language; it would be governed by the new language 
in the ADEA.  Courts would then need to determine whether the precedents 
interpreting these provisions in Title VII would have relevance to the 
Title VII-derived provisions of the ADEA, which would by their terms circle 
back to apply to Title VII. 
Beyond mere notice problems, the blanket amendment approach would 
create difficult situations where the standards it imposes conflict with 
preexisting substantive provisions of law.  The statute creates an exception 
for retaliation claims that explicitly include a different standard of proof,374
but it has no analogous exception for substantive employment discrimination 
claims.  This would likely create confusion and conflicts (that would need to 
be resolved by the courts) in statutes that do have explicit conflicting 
language.  For example, the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination 
“solely by reason of” disability.375  This language reasonably has been 
interpreted (long prior to Gross) to prohibit mixed-motive claims.376  If the 
proposed bill were enacted, a provision buried in the ADEA would supersede 
the clear language of the Rehabilitation Act and a significant body of 
precedent interpreting that language.377
At the same time, notwithstanding the striking breadth of this draft 
language (and the notice and substantive conflict problems it engenders), the 
bill would still be insufficient to end entirely the hydra problem.  Courts 
interpreting antidiscrimination mandates in other areas of statutory law—e.g., 
372. H.R. 3721 § 3.  Obviously, Congress could identify all relevant provisions and indicate 
that they should be amended separately, but this draft bill does not do so, and any attempt to do so 
would lose the advantages that the blanket amendment provides in terms of not forcing Congress to 
attempt to identify all relevant laws to which Gross might be applied and muster the political will to 
amend them all.
373. Id. § 2(b). 
374. Id. § 3. 
375. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006). 
376. See Davenport v. Idaho Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, No. CV 05-054-E-LMB, 2008 WL 
5061678, at *1–2 (D. Idaho May 20, 2008) (applying Ninth Circuit precedent to conclude that 
because of the use of the phrase “‘solely by reason of,’ . . . a mixed motive analysis is not 
appropriate when applying the Rehabilitation Act”); see also Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 
204 F.3d 326, 337 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The elimination of the word ‘solely’ from the causation 
provision of the ADA suggests forcefully that Congress intended the statute to reach beyond the 
Rehabilitation Act to cover situations in which discrimination on the basis of disability is one factor, 
but not the only factor, motivating an adverse employment action.”). 
377. On the other hand, a general rule of statutory interpretation governs against repeals or 
modifications of statutes by implication.  See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) 
(holding that in the absence of expressed intent to repeal, repeal by implication is only appropriate 
when there is an irreconcilable difference between earlier and later statutes).  It is thus possible that 
courts would apply this canon and refuse to enforce the causation standard announced in the Gross
override if language in other statutes was clearly inconsistent. 
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housing or education—frequently look to Title VII case law because the lan-
guage of these other acts largely parallels that of Title VII and there is 
dramatically more case law under Title VII than these other laws.378  The 
Gross override would not reach these laws.  Courts might reinterpret the 
“because of” language of these other statutes consistently with the amended 
ADEA-now-superseding-Title VII standard, but they could also apply 
Gross’s reasoning and refuse to do so.  Nor would this language (or any 
congressional directive) address the hydra problem as it plays out in the state 
courts, although enforcing a uniform federal standard would avoid the 
particular challenge now faced in the interpretation of state laws that prohibit 
age discrimination in the same sentence as they do race, sex, religion, or 
national-origin discrimination.  Additionally, despite language that purports 
to reach interpretation of constitutional claims, it is not clear whether 
Congress would have the power to dictate a causation standard to the courts 
in that context.  Congress is the ultimate arbiter of statutory law, but the 
courts decide the meaning of constitutional law. 
In sum, in light of Gross, the blanket-amendment approach of these bills 
is a reasonable, and maybe the best, way for Congress to supersede Gross 
without creating (much of) a new hydra problem.  But there are real 
disadvantages to forcing Congress to take such action to end reliance on a 
disfavored interpretation.  It is also quite possible that some combination of 
these concerns would mean that Congress—even if it ultimately enacts a 
Gross override—would pass a bill that did not include language applying the 
amendments to all other employment discrimination and retaliation statutes.  
Courts would then likely continue to rely on Gross as a shadow precedent in
interpreting other employment discrimination or retaliation statutes, despite 
Congress’s clear repudiation of the but-for standard as applied to the ADEA 
and its equally clear previous repudiation of that standard as applied to 
Title VII. 
Further, assume for a moment that Congress does not muster the 
political will to pass the proposed Gross override bills.  For reasons I discuss 
in Part VI, I do not think that this would necessarily indicate that Congress 
agrees with the Court’s interpretation in Gross or the application of the 
standard announced in Gross to other statutes, but rather that the test imposed 
by the Court is unreasonable.  If this is correct, Congress also faces 
something close to a catch-22 with respect to any future legislation.  Gross 
establishes clear Supreme Court precedent that in the ADEA, and arguably in 
all other employment discrimination statutes, “because of”—in the absence 
of explicit motivating-factor language—means but-for causation.  If 
378. See, e.g., Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 744–45 (2d Cir. 2003) (borrowing 
from Title VII “hostile environment” case law to determine whether plaintiff presented sufficient 
evidence to support a claim under § 1983 regarding harassment in the education context); 
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir. 1988) (drawing 
upon the parallel between Title VII and the Fair Housing Act and holding that because Title VII 
does not require a plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent, neither does the Fair Housing Act). 
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Congress were to enact a new employment discrimination statute (e.g., the 
proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act, which would prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity379), and if 
it wanted to permit mixed-motive claims, it certainly would be wise to 
include motivating-factor language like that found in Title VII.380  A choice 
to do so, however, could be deemed by courts as further confirmation that 
Congress intends statutes that lack such language (e.g., the ADA, § 1981, 
GINA) to be interpreted differently.  On the other hand, a failure on 
Congress’s part to include explicit motivating-factor language in any post-
Gross employment discrimination statute would almost certainly be 
interpreted by courts as a conscious choice to preclude mixed-motive claims. 
VI. Realizing Congress’s Role in Creating Statutory Meaning 
The foundational premise of legislative supremacy grants Congress the 
ultimate authority to shape statutory law, as expressed by Congress’s 
unquestioned prerogative to supersede judicial interpretations of statutes with 
which it disagrees by enacting overrides.381  This power stands in sharp 
contrast to constitutional adjudication, where the courts have final authority 
to declare the meaning of constitutional principles and thus can strike down 
statutes as unconstitutional.382  But the anomaly of statutory interpretation is 
that, at least in the federal system, courts, though ostensibly serving as 
“agents” of Congress in this context, set the rules by which the 
congressional–judicial conversation is conducted.383  Thus, for the promise of 
legislative supremacy to be realized, the rules developed by courts—that is, 
the conventions of statutory interpretation—must themselves respect the 
separation of powers and Congress’s authority to create statutory meaning.  
379. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2011, S. 811, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, H.R. 1397, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011). 
380. I credit Jamie Prenkert for this point. 
381. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J.
281, 281–82 (1989) (arguing that the principle of legislative supremacy precludes judicial policy 
making when statutory directives are clear). 
382. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
383. I thank Peter Strauss for making this observation.  Many state legislatures have enacted 
rules that seek to govern statutory interpretation by courts, typically codifying some, but not all, 
standard canons of statutory interpretation.  See generally Scott, supra note 22, at 343–44 (2010).
Commentators disagree regarding the extent to which such codes should bind state courts and about 
the constitutionality of comparable directives by Congress to the federal courts.  Compare id. at 344 
(arguing that state courts should follow state legislative directives), and Nicholas Quinn 
Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2140, 2143–47 
(2002) (arguing that Congress could impose such rules and discussing the benefits of its doing so), 
with Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory Prospective Rules 
of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 99–100 (2003) (arguing that Congress does 
not have the power to prospectively control judicial interpretation), and Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is 
to Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of 
Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 841 (2009) (arguing that many such directives would be 
unconstitutional violations of the separation of powers doctrine). 
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Numerous conventions of statutory interpretation rely on assertions regarding 
Congress and congressional intent that are impossible to verify.  In many 
instances, this is relatively unproblematic and often serves to promote 
predictability, efficiency, and fairness.  But when the fictions of statutory 
interpretation make assumptions about what Congress does—and what 
Congress may reasonably be expected to do—that clearly fail to accord with 
reality, they may work to undermine legislative supremacy.  I contend that 
the interpretive principle announced by the Court in Gross falls into this 
category.  It also has created widespread confusion among lower courts and 
resulted in similar cases being treated quite differently without any affirma-
tive indication by Congress that it intends these differences.  I propose an 
alternative approach that can better permit overrides to play their expected 
role in securing the separation of powers and that also advances independent 
interests in the fair, predictable, and efficient interpretation of statutes. 
A. The Fictions of Statutory Interpretation as Applied to Overrides 
In Gross, the Court placed great significance on a difference between 
Title VII and the ADEA: Title VII, subsequent to the 1991 CRA, includes 
language stating explicitly that an unlawful act is established by showing that 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin is a “motivating factor” in an 
employment decision, while the ADEA lacks this language.384  The Court 
does not merely note these differences.  It states that they must be understood 
to mean that Congress “cho[se]” to have the identical “because of” language 
in the statutes interpreted differently.385  This claim rests on unverified, and 
largely unverifiable, assumptions by the Court about what Congress “meant” 
by its prior actions and what Congress could or should do in the future if this 
was not in fact what Congress meant.  The fact that these assumptions 
resulted in the Court adopting a causation standard for the ADEA—and its 
quickly being applied to numerous other statutes—that Congress had clearly 
repudiated for Title VII should at least make one pause to consider whether 
these assumptions are warranted.  I contend they are not. 
I am not claiming that I (or anyone else) know definitively what 
causation standard the 1964 Congress that enacted Title VII, or the 1967 
Congress that enacted the ADEA, intended for mixed-motive claims.  I think 
it is probably accurate to say that neither Congress had a specific intent 
regarding this particular issue.386  Nor am I claiming to know definitively that 
384. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2348 (2009) (rejecting the petitioner’s 
argument that decisions construing Title VII should control the Court’s decision on the ground that 
“Title VII is materially different with respect to the relevant burden of persuasion”). 
385. Id. at 2349, 2350 & n.3. 
386. As a threshold matter, some would take issue with the basic premise that Congress, a 
collection of 535 voting members with individual objectives and agendas, can have any unified 
intent at all.  Others argue, I think convincingly, that one can nonetheless ascribe “group intent” to 
Congress.  See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR
INTERPRETATION 82–83 (2010) (arguing in favor of attributing group intent to Congress because 
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the 1991 Congress intended the causation under the ADEA to be interpreted 
consistently with the motivating-factor standard it explicitly adopted for 
Title VII.  As demonstrated in subpart III(D) above, I think that consideration 
of the 1991 CRA as a whole, as well as the explicit statement in the 
committee report that the committee expected the motivating-factor standard 
to be applied to statutes similar to Title VII,387 provides compelling support 
for this inference.  And Part V demonstrates that it would be quite onerous 
for Congress to identify and amend all statutes that use causation language 
similar to Title VII. 
But whether or not one agrees with my analysis regarding legislative 
intent and the potential barriers to the congressional action that the Gross
Court expects, it should be obvious that Congress did not affirmatively indi-
cate in statutory language (or in any other way) that it did not intend the 
causation standard under the ADEA to be the same as that of Title VII.  At 
most, one can draw a negative inference from Congress’s “neglect[ing]” to 
amend the ADEA and all other potentially applicable statutes when it 
amended Title VII.388  It is also essential to recognize the Court in Gross does 
not categorically refuse to consider legislative intent.  Although the Court 
asserts that it simply interprets the “ordinary meaning” of the text, it justifies 
its failure to apply either Price Waterhouse or the standard endorsed by the 
1991 CRA on the explicit ground that the Court “must give effect to 
Congress’ choice.”389  Moreover, since, as discussed in Parts III and IV, 
either “but for” or “motivating factor” is a plausible interpretation of 
“because of,” plain meaning analysis does not provide a definitive resolution.  
A key issue in the case, therefore, is how the Court determines congressional 
intent.  The Gross majority ignores a clear statement in the committee report 
(generally considered the most reliable source of legislative history390) that is 
directly on point in favor of a negative inference derived from Congress’s 
“we routinely attribute intent to a group of people based on the intent of a subset of that group, 
provided that there is agreement in advance about what role the subgroup will play”); Stephen 
Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 864–65 
(1992) (reviewing critiques of ascribing group intent to Congress but concluding that while “[a]ll 
this is to say that ascribing purposes to groups and institutions is a complex business, and one that is 
often difficult to describe abstractly[,] . . . that fact does not make such ascriptions improper”). 
387. See supra text accompanying note 138. 
388. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349. 
389. Id. at 2350 & n.3 (citation omitted). 
390. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 171 (2009) (referring to committee reports as “a relatively reliable indicator of 
legislative intent” as compared with sponsor statements and other sources of legislative history); 
ESKRIDGE, supra note 25, at 222 fig.7.1 (depicting committee reports as the “most authoritative” in 
the hierarchy of legislative-history sources used by the Supreme Court); see also George A. 
Costello, Average Voting Members and Other “Benign Fictions”: The Relative Reliability of 
Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 
43 (“Committee reports are well-regarded because, in the words of Justice Harlan, they represent 
the ‘considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and 
studying proposed legislation.’” (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969))). 
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inaction.  It is accordingly appropriate to probe the validity of this inference, 
just as courts and commentators have long probed the validity of legislative 
history as a source from which to infer congressional intent.391
As discussed in subpart II(B), courts typically assume that identical or 
similar language in “related” statutes should be interpreted consistently, and 
accordingly, courts borrow authoritative interpretations of one statute when 
interpreting another.  Courts offer a variety of intent, purpose-based, and 
textual justifications for this practice.  In the discussion above, I suggested 
that even if not grounded in a verifiable congressional intent, consistent 
interpretation of identical or similar language in statutes in pari materia will 
often be justified by other rationales that undergird statutory interpretation.392
Moreover—and of crucial importance—in the absence of a reaction by 
Congress to a given judicial interpretation, there are rarely grounds to 
question the underlying premise that the Court’s interpretation determines 
what the relevant language in the primary statute means.  And interpreting 
related statutes consistently has the separate virtue of making statutory law 
develop in a relatively uniform manner, thus promoting efficiency, 
predictability, and fairness. 
Subpart II(B) described the inference that variation among otherwise 
similar statutes is “meaningful” as the converse of interpreting statutes in
pari materia consistently.  As discussed in subpart I(B), in contrast to appli-
cation of the in pari materia canon, the application of the meaningful-
variation canon of interpretation does little to promote fairness, efficiency, or 
predictability.  Accordingly, application of this canon is primarily justified 
by inferences based on assumptions about congressional intent.  In decisions 
prior to Gross, the Court has emphasized that context can be important in 
assessing whether this inference reflects actual purposive action by 
Congress; for example, the Court has stated that the inference is at its 
strongest when applied to “contrasting statutory sections originally enacted
simultaneously in relevant respects.”393  Even in this situation, the 
assumption is more likely to be valid when applied to a bill that addresses a 
single subject and progresses in an orderly fashion through the committee 
process.  By contrast, “variation” in sections that are enacted simultaneously 
may be more likely to be inadvertent when the sections are part of an 
omnibus bill that addresses multiple subjects, or when there are significant 
amendments made on the House or Senate floor or in conference 
committee.394  Some might argue, however, that even if this rule sometimes 
391. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 51, at 990 n.j (collecting scholarly commentary debating 
the reliability of legislative history as a means of inferring congressional intent). 
392. See supra subpart II(B). 
393. Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 75 (1995) (emphasis added). 
394. Cf. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 329 (1997) (observing that where provisions “evolve[] 
separately in the congressional process, only to be passed together at the last minute,” there is a risk 
that, “in the rough-and-tumble,” no one considers the significance of differences between the texts 
of the different provisions passed). 
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is applied in the absence of true congressional intent, it can help “discipline” 
Congress into taking greater care in drafting.395  This is at least plausible, in 
that it is not clearly beyond the capability of congressional drafters to read 
carefully a bill before enactment and consider whether variation of otherwise 
similar provisions is meaningful.  Although undoubtedly some mistakes 
would slip through, consistent application of this canon to provisions enacted 
simultaneously might result in greater care and clarity in drafting, a signifi-
cant benefit that could outweigh the possibility that it would sometimes be 
applied when the inference is unwarranted. 
But as applied to overrides, the inference of a meaningful variation is 
far more attenuated—and I assert that it will often operate to undermine 
actual congressional intent.  This is true for two primary reasons.  First, the 
so-called meaningful variation is not the result of independent drafting 
decisions made by Congress; rather, it is a response to a judicial 
interpretation with which Congress disagreed.  Often (as Part IV demon-
strated was true in the case of Congress’s response to Price Waterhouse) the 
preexisting language of a statute could reasonably be interpreted consistently 
with the meaning Congress endorses in an override.  If this is the case, the 
preexisting language of other similar statutes can also reasonably be 
interpreted to bear the meaning that Congress endorses in the override.  If, 
rather than enacting an override, Congress was expected to signal its 
disagreement with a judicial interpretation by issuing a special committee 
report396 or enacting a joint resolution397—and if courts consistently 
respected such signals and overruled their prior precedents accordingly—
then Congress could effectively supersede a judicial interpretation without 
creating variation in statutory language among otherwise similar statutes.  
But instead, Congress is expected to signal disagreement with prior judicial 
395. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory 
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 636 (1995) (describing canons that Schacter characterizes as 
“disciplinarian” as justified by a belief that “politics easily runs amok, and the court must 
‘discipline’ the political process through deliberately crafted interpretive rules” and observing that 
“[t]he principal form of discipline is narrow, text-based interpretation that limits the reach of 
legislation by requiring exacting specificity in statutory language”). 
396. I am not suggesting that this would be an ideal approach.  It would be quite hard to 
determine whether such a report represented the interests of a true majority of Congress.  See 
generally James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: 
Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1994) (discussing risks posed by reliance 
upon post-enactment legislative history, although ultimately arguing that it should be considered at 
times and proposing factors that courts should consider when assessing its reliability). 
397. A joint resolution, unlike a committee report, is passed by both houses of Congress and 
signed by the President, thereby eliminating concerns that it did not represent the desires of a true 
majority of Congress or satisfy the Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements.  See 
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 3 (“Every . . . Resolution . . . to which the Concurrence of the Senate and 
House of Representatives may be necessary . . . shall be presented to the President of the United 
States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him . . . .”). 
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interpretations by substantively amending statutory text.398  This creates a 
variation among otherwise similar statutes, but it is quite different from 
distinctions made by Congress within a statute when initially enacted.  And, 
at least at the time when Congress passed the 1991 CRA, there was little 
reason for Congress to assume that courts would interpret a failure to amend 
all potentially related statutes as a “choice” to endorse a different 
interpretation.
Second, as Part V demonstrated, there are significant barriers to 
expecting Congress to identify and then amend the uncertain and unspecified 
group of statutes to which a disfavored interpretation might be applied.  
Courts and commentators have long questioned the validity of inferring 
congressional approval of prior judicial interpretations from congressional 
inaction because it is quite difficult to enact legislation and because Congress 
must juggle many competing priorities.399  In this context, likewise, the rules 
of interpretation adopted by courts should be cognizant of the institutional 
realities of Congress.  It makes no sense to infer purpose to congressional 
inaction when the expected action would be prohibitively difficult.  
Moreover, as demonstrated in Part V, the kind of blanket amendment 
override that the Gross rule invites would cause its own problems.  
Accordingly, as described more fully in the next subpart, I conclude that a 
variation among otherwise-similar statutes that is the result of a 
congressional override of a prior judicial interpretation generally should not 
be presumed to be “meaningful”; in other words, such variation generally 
should not be read as signaling congressional intent that the preexisting 
language common to both statutes bear different interpretations. 
Note too that the interpretive approach adopted by Gross causes similar 
problems if Congress codifies, rather than overrides, a judicial interpretation.  
Codification is relatively common, permitting Congress to signal its approval 
of a judicial opinion and thus solidify the outcome, expand the reasoning to 
applications not addressed by the Court, or incorporate the interpretation into 
398. Cf. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 275, 285 (1972) (holding that Congress’s failure to enact 
an override of prior judicial opinions excluding professional baseball from antitrust regulation 
should be understood as approval of those prior decisions). 
399. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 496 (1997) (“[W]e have frequently 
cautioned that it is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a 
controlling rule of law.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Johnson v. Transp. 
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s reasoning 
that because Congress had not amended Title VII to override a prior Court decision interpreting 
Title VII to permit affirmative action, the Court could assume that its prior interpretation was 
correct and stating that “congressional inaction is a canard”); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 
n.21 (1969) (“Congressional inaction frequently betokens unawareness, preoccupation, or 
paralysis.”); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942) (“The search for 
significance in the silence of Congress is too often the pursuit of a mirage.”); Eskridge, supra note 
23, at 94 (citing formalist, realist, and systemic problems with inferring legislative intent from 
legislative inaction and concluding that “legislative inaction rarely tells us much about relevant 
legislative intent”). 
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a larger law reform.400  In this context as well, if Congress only amended the 
statute actually interpreted by the courts—even if only to emphasize its 
agreement with the prior judicial interpretation—it would create a variation 
among otherwise similar statutes.  The reasoning announced in Gross would
interpret this as granting courts license to depart from an interpretation 
endorsed both by prior judicial opinions and by Congress.  In fact, recall that 
Congress’s response to Price Waterhouse in the 1991 CRA could be charac-
terized as largely codifying the interpretation of Title VII endorsed by five 
Justices in that case, in that it adopted the same “motivating factor” standard 
and simply replaced the affirmative defense on liability with a limitation on 
remedies.401  This illustrates a different reason for codification: Price 
Waterhouse was a splintered decision and it was unclear whether Justice 
White’s or Justice O’Connor’s concurrence should be deemed to provide the 
holding of the case.  Thus, the 1991 CRA’s response to Price Waterhouse 
could be characterized as a statement that the Price Waterhouse Court 
interpreted the meaning of “because of,” the preexisting language shared by 
Title VII and the ADEA, almost, but not precisely, right.  Despite this 
endorsement, the Court in Gross deems Congress’s failure to amend the 
ADEA grounds to interpret “because of” in the ADEA quite differently.402
At root, the interpretive questions posed by overrides call into question 
the separate interpretive fiction, implicit in the judicial hierarchy, that a 
declaration by the Supreme Court is an “authoritative statement of what [a] 
statute mean[s] before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to 
that construction.”403  Citing this principle, the Supreme Court has reasoned 
that even a decision by the Court that is counter to the unanimous interpreta-
tions of the courts of appeals does not “change[]” the law but rather “finally 
decide[s]” what it has “always meant and explain[s] why the Courts of 
Appeals had misinterpreted the will of the enacting Congress.”404  With 
respect to lower federal courts, this premise is necessary to permit precedent 
to function effectively.  But when Congress intervenes to supersede the prior 
judicial interpretation, it raises the question of whether the prior judicial 
interpretation really should be an “authoritative statement” of what a statute 
400. See, e.g., Nancy C. Staudt et al., Judicial Decisions as Legislation: Congressional 
Oversight of Supreme Court Tax Cases, 1954–2005, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1340, 1354, 1386–87 
(2007) (discussing an empirical study finding that Congress codified 7% of Supreme Court tax 
cases and exploring reasons for codification). 
401. See supra text accompanying notes 133–34.  As noted above, this was deemed quite 
significant by the dissenters in Gross, who characterized Congress’s actions as “ratif[ying] Price 
Waterhouse’s [motivating-factor test].”  Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2355 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
text accompanying note 191. 
402. My thanks to Jamie Prenkert for helping me articulate this point. 
403. Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1994) (emphasis added). 
404. Id. at 313 n.12.  This discussion arose in the context of the retroactivity of overrides.  See 
Widiss, supra note 12, at 534–36 (summarizing and discussing the Court’s reasoning in Rivers,
which held that, generally, a substantive override of an interpretation of a civil rights statute would 
not be applied retroactively). 
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means.  The overriding Congress does not necessarily know the will of the 
enacting Congress—but neither does the Court.  The interpretive proposal 
that I endorse suggests that, on balance, given this uncertainty, the recogni-
tion that statutory text can often bear multiple plausible interpretations, the 
barriers to amending multiple statutes, and the problems with enacting a 
blanket override, it is better to privilege congressional signals over judicial 
signals—a position I develop in the next subpart. 
B. Better Respecting the Institutional Capabilities of Courts and Congress 
Gross shows how application of standard principles of statutory 
interpretation and standard rules of precedent to the interpretation of 
overrides means that congressional amendment of a single statute—the stat-
ute actually interpreted in a given case—can be understood as a license to 
depart both from the prior precedent and from the meaning Congress 
ascribes.  By contrast, a judicial interpretation of a single statute, such as 
Gross’s interpretation of the ADEA, is readily applied by lower courts to 
numerous other statutes.  This aggrandizes the judicial role relative to the 
congressional role in ascribing meaning to statutory text and turns the 
premise of legislative supremacy on its head.  In prior work, I advocated that 
courts adopt a rebuttable presumption that overrides require “fresh” statutory 
interpretation of preexisting language rather than ongoing reliance on the 
shadow precedent.405  In light of Gross—in which the Court engaged in fresh 
interpretation as if on a blank slate and with a strong presumption against 
adopting the preferred interpretation signaled by Congress—I realize that my 
proposal needs to be clarified.  The fresh interpretation I argue is warranted 
should be consistent with the meaning Congress signaled it ascribes to the 
relevant language, so long as the preexisting language can reasonably bear 
such meaning.  This interpretive rule could be announced by the Supreme 
Court, or, potentially, enacted by Congress as a general instruction to govern 
the interpretation of overrides and the statutes they amend.406
Under the approach I suggest, enactment of an override that endorses a 
plausible interpretation of the preexisting language would function in a 
manner similar to a decision by a court higher than the Supreme Court.  It 
would explain how that language should be interpreted in the context actually 
addressed in the override and would create a rebuttable presumption that in 
situations “relevantly similar” to the issue addressed head-on in the 
override—including statutory provisions that would typically be interpreted 
405. See Widiss, supra note 12, at 566 (arguing that “[r]ather than simply relying on Congress 
to draft specific overrides ‘more clearly,’ courts interpreting overrides should do so in a manner that 
is more respectful of the significance of a congressional override” and proposing that the courts 
adopt a rebuttable presumption that overrides require “fresh” statutory analysis of preexisting 
language).
406. As discussed above, commentators disagree about whether Congress can constitutionally 
direct how courts interpret statutes.  See supra note 383 and accompanying text. 
934 Texas Law Review [Vol. 90:859 
consistently under the in pari materia canon—the interpretation suggested by 
Congress should likewise apply.  In other words, this is the same reasoning a 
court would employ if the interpretation at issue were put forth by a superior 
court rather than by Congress.  Rather than being deemed to create a 
meaningful variation between statutes (or within a single statute), the 
override would inform the understanding of preexisting language common to 
multiple statutes.  This would not mean that Congress could not enact 
overrides that carve out a narrow rule from a more generally applicable 
interpretation or that change the interpretation of one statute but not multiple 
statutes.  Congress simply would need to enact statutory language that made 
this intent clear, perhaps partially codifying the prior interpretation in some 
key statutes or enacting a “findings or purposes” clause stating an intent to 
change only the interpretation of a single statute.  The approach I advocate 
would simply shift the inference drawn from legislative “silence” regarding 
related statutes from a presumption that Congress “chose” to grant courts 
absolute freedom in interpreting such statutes to a presumed preference for 
the interpretation endorsed in the override. 
Importantly, under the approach I advocate, the statutory language itself 
still controls, thus mitigating the risk that application of this rule would 
undermine compromises reached through the legislative process.  “Because 
of” can mean both motivating-factor and but-for causation.  The issue in 
Gross was simply which of these plausible interpretations should be adopted, 
with the added knowledge that in Title VII, a substantively similar statute, 
Congress had explicitly stated that proving an illegitimate criterion was a 
motivating factor in a decision was sufficient to establish liability.  In this 
circumstance, I suggest that courts should understand the override as func-
tionally reinterpreting “because of” in Title VII.407  Then, applying the 
standard in pari materia canon, courts would naturally interpret “because of” 
in related statutes, such as the ADA and the ADEA, to also establish a 
motivating-factor standard (unless, as discussed below, other differences 
between the statutes, such as the ADEA’s “reasonable factor other than age” 
defense, affected this analysis).  Courts might reasonably conclude as well 
that related statutes that contain similar but not identical words—e.g., “on the 
basis of” or “by reason of”—that could also reasonably be interpreted to 
establish a motivating-factor standard should likewise be interpreted 
consistently.408
407. As noted, Congress added an explicit provision defining the causal standard as “motivating 
factor” and a limitation on remedies, but, as established in Part IV, the preexisting language of 
Title VII could also easily bear this interpretation. 
408. Sometimes courts deem such small differences to be a meaningful variation, while other 
times they gloss over differences and instead aver that the language is similar enough that it should 
bear a consistent meaning.  In the particular example given in the text, courts have generally 
interpreted these differences in causation language among employment discrimination statutes to be 
insignificant.  See supra text accompanying notes 289, 323–24 (discussing how courts have applied 
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If, by contrast, the preexisting language of a related statute could not 
reasonably bear the meaning signaled by Congress through enactment of an 
override, courts would be free (indeed, expected) to consider the significance 
of such differences.  The Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits discrimination 
“solely by reason of” a disability,409 is a good example of this.  Even under 
the approach I advocate, courts could reasonably interpret this language to 
preclude mixed-motive claims; if Congress disagreed, it would be 
appropriate to expect Congress to amend the statute explicitly.  Moreover, 
even if Congress were to amend the Rehabilitation Act to override decisions 
interpreting the “solely by reason of” language to preclude mixed-motive 
claims, that override would not necessarily call for reinterpretation of any 
other statutory provisions that also prohibit actions “solely by reason of” a 
given factor because that language cannot reasonably be interpreted to permit 
mixed-motive claims.  In other words, the rule I am proposing would make a 
distinction between overrides (including, I contend, Congress’s partial codi-
fication and partial override of Price Waterhouse) that endorse a plausible 
interpretation of preexisting language and overrides (such as a potential 
modification of the Rehabilitation Act to permit mixed-motive claims) that 
correct a prior mistake, update a statute, or choose a substantively different 
policy that was not a plausible interpretation of the preexisting language. 
Similarly, courts could reasonably consider the significance of statutory 
differences entirely unrelated to the override that might have bearing on a 
given interpretive question.  For example, as discussed above, although 
Title VII and the ADEA both prohibit discrimination “because of” specified 
factors, the ADEA also explicitly provides that acts based on a “reasonable 
factor other than age” are not unlawful;410 Title VII does not include an 
analogous provision.  Under the rule I propose, courts could assess the 
significance of such differences when determining whether “because of” in 
the two statutes should bear a consistent meaning; again, this would be the 
same analysis that they would naturally undertake if a judicial interpretation, 
Gross’s interpretation of “because of” to other statutes prohibiting discrimination “on the basis of” 
or “by reason of” the outlawed conduct). 
409. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006).  The Rehabilitation Act and its relationship to other 
antidiscrimination statutes provides a good example of the complexity that can arise when applying 
the in pari materia canon.  Long before Gross, courts struggled to determine whether to interpret 
the causation standard under the ADA as consistent with Title VII or with the Rehabilitation Act.  
The Supreme Court has never ruled on this question.  Most circuits concluded (at least prior to 
Gross) that mixed-motive claims were cognizable under the ADA because the operative language of 
the relevant provision was drawn from Title VII, but the Sixth and Tenth Circuits followed 
Rehabilitation Act precedent to preclude mixed-motive claims under the ADA as well.  See Macy v. 
Hopkins Cnty. Sch. Bd., 484 F.3d 357, 363 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing this split).  As noted 
above, Gross raises new questions regarding the viability of mixed-motive claims under the ADA.  
See supra notes 303–10 and accompanying text. 
410. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2006). 
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rather than a congressional amendment, established the motivating-factor 
standard in Title VII.411
The outer scope of the rule I propose would flow naturally from the 
analysis, admittedly fuzzy at times, that courts currently undertake when 
determining whether statutes are similar enough that judicial interpretations 
of a given statute’s language should be applied to other statutes.412 In other 
words, the Court’s reasoning in Gross relied heavily upon the foundational 
premise that the ADEA and Title VII were similar enough that it would have 
been natural for Congress to amend them both if it wanted to indicate that a 
specific consistent causation standard would govern both.  This was a 
plausible (although I assert, as discussed above, a deeply flawed) proposition 
only because they were already recognized as related statutes that were 
typically interpreted consistently.  The Court would not have assumed that 
Congress would naturally have amended a criminal statute that also included 
the words “because of” when it enacted the Price Waterhouse override, and 
accordingly, it would have been unlikely to infer any significance from 
Congress’s failure to do so.  My approach simply suggests that, as applied to 
statutes that courts typically deemed to be related, there would be a 
rebuttable presumption that Congress’s interpretation of shared language be 
applied just as a judicial interpretation of shared language is applied.  This 
has the significant added benefit of making it more likely that statutes in a 
related area will—absent clear statutory language to the contrary—be 
interpreted in a relatively consistent manner, increasing predictability, 
efficiency, and fairness.  But if statutes are too dissimilar to expect that a 
judicial interpretation of similar language would be applied, there would be 
neither a positive nor negative inference drawn from Congress’s amendment 
of one statute when determining the meaning of language found in such other 
statutes. 
A few additional limitations are important to note.  As I explained in 
previous work, this rule would only apply to nonconstitutional decisions.413
If a court strikes down a statute on constitutional grounds, its constitutional 
analysis is fully binding precedent.  The rule would only apply to the aspects 
of the precedential case that are related to the issue addressed in the 
override.414  Although my approach would preclude reliance on the general 
rationales undergirding an interpretation that was overridden, it would permit 
411. See supra text accompanying notes 260–61 (discussing the significance of the RFOA 
defense in the causation question). 
412. See supra subpart II(B). 
413. See Widiss, supra note 12, at 569 (limiting the proposed interpretative rule to 
nonconstitutional rulings because the courts, not Congress, “have ultimate authority for 
constitutional interpretation” and observing that “[t]o the extent that a court either struck down or 
narrowly interpreted a statute on constitutional grounds, the court’s constitutional analysis would 
continue to be applied”). 
414. Id.
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ongoing reliance on other parts of a precedential case unrelated to the 
override.
The interpretative regime I suggest would promote the orderly 
development of statutory law in a relatively uniform, predictable, and 
consistent fashion, not only within the federal system but also between 
federal and analogous state statutes.415  Indeed, state courts and federal courts 
applying state law have long implicitly adopted the approach I advocate by 
interpreting state statutes that are generally similar to analogous federal law 
in line with such federal law, even if the state statutes were not themselves 
amended to include an override.  Thus, for example, it was quite common, at 
least prior to Gross, for courts to interpret “because of” in state statutes to 
mean that a plaintiff must show that an illegitimate criterion was a 
motivating factor in a decision, even if the state language had not been 
amended to include the motivating-factor language added to Title VII.416
Given the challenges to amending multiple statutes, discussed in Part V, 
I think the approach I advocate is also, on balance, more likely to accord with 
congressional intent.  But it is not necessary to consider legislative intent to 
adopt this rule.  A jurist who refused to consider intent at all could reach the 
same result by interpreting the plain meaning of the text and recognizing the 
independent virtue of the consistent and coherent development of the law.  
The key is that the presumption I suggest would supersede what I contend are 
flawed indicators of intent that courts currently infer from congressional 
inaction associated with overrides. 
The approach I advocate avoids the excesses that are otherwise 
encouraged by the rule announced in Gross.  As noted, Gross suggests that to 
end reliance on Price Waterhouse and to control interpretation of related 
statutes, Congress should have amended each and every other discrimination 
415. The potential that a given interpretation of federal law will be unworkable or 
administratively difficult because of the interrelationship of federal laws is clearly a factor that 
courts can legitimately consider when engaging in statutory interpretation.  For example, as noted 
above, both Justice Kennedy (dissenting in Price Waterhouse) and Justice Stevens (dissenting in 
Gross) cited potential confusion among related statutes as significant in their analysis.  See supra 
notes 192, 247 and accompanying text.  See generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Anti-messiness 
Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1800082 (demonstrating that courts frequently cite administrability 
concerns as a factor in statutory interpretation).  It is less clear that courts should, as a normative 
matter, consider potential confusion caused by interpreting federal statutes differently from state 
statutes.  Clearly, when the language adopted by a relevant legislative body (either Congress or a 
state legislature) or surrounding principles of federal or state law merit interpreting statutes 
differently, it is appropriate for courts to do so notwithstanding any potential confusion.  See supra 
text accompanying note 342 (discussing state courts that, prior to the ADA amendments of 2008, 
interpreted state disability laws to apply more broadly than did the pre-2008 ADA).  That said, it is 
obvious from a purely descriptive perspective that Gross has caused widespread confusion 
regarding state law.  See supra subpart V(B).  One benefit of the rule that I propose, even if it is not 
a normative justification for the rule, is that it would mitigate this confusion. 
416. See, e.g., Ames v. Cartier, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 762, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (applying the 
Title VII mixed-motive standard, including the motivating-factor analysis, to state and local claims 
based on statutes in which motivating-factor language was not added following Price Waterhouse).
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and retaliation statute.  Institutional realities suggest that it would be quite 
hard for Congress to live up to this putative expectation.  But even if it did, 
this is a second-best result.  It requires (or at least makes it quite likely) that 
Congress would seek to enact a blanket amendment of all relevant statutes, 
because listing or selectively amending some would only increase the 
significance ascribed to a failure to list or amend others.  Such a global 
approach might well sweep in statutes that already include language in 
tension with the override.  If Congress considered each law individually, it 
might choose to except out such statutes, but given the all-or-nothing choice 
implicit in a blanket amendment, I think it is likely that Congress would at 
least sometimes err on the side of overinclusiveness.  My approach, by 
contrast, gives courts the interpretive space to consider whether truly 
meaningful variation among statutes—e.g., the Rehabilitation Act’s 
prohibition of decisions made “solely by reason of” disability417—merits a 
different interpretation. 
A criticism of my proposal might be that it continues to rely on and trust 
courts to do responsible statutory interpretation.  If one believes that courts 
act primarily to achieve their ideological objectives, then a rebuttable 
presumption such as that I suggest will make little difference.  This is a risk, 
but it guards against the opposite risk that enacting an absolute rule that an 
override supersedes preexisting judicial interpretations could permit a 
special-interest override to swallow up a general rule.418  More generally, 
although there is a significant body of empirical research demonstrating that 
ideology plays a role in judicial decision making, it is also well documented 
that courts independently care about institutional legitimacy.419  Adoption of 
a rule such as that I advocate would shift the default in a way that would, I 
believe, often shift judicial behavior.  That said, the approach I advocate is 
warranted in part because of the danger that the rule announced in Gross 
empowers courts to engage in ends-oriented adjudication. 
Importantly, the rule itself is ideologically neutral.  The rule I propose 
would tend to shift the relative balance of power between courts and 
Congress to more fully realize Congress’s authority to shape statutory law.  
As applied to the particular issue addressed in Gross, application of the rule I 
propose would make it easier for plaintiffs in employment discrimination 
lawsuits to establish unlawful discrimination.  This is a position more 
typically favored by Democrats than by Republicans.420  Even in this context, 
417. See supra note 409 and accompanying text. 
418. See Widiss, supra note 12, at 571–72 (discussing this concern more fully). 
419. See supra notes 41–49 and accompanying text. 
420. The proposed override of Gross was sponsored primarily by Democrats in both the House 
and the Senate. See Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, S. 1756, 111th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 2009) (listing as sponsors Senators Harkin, Leahy, Durbin, Specter, Kohl, Schumer, 
Franken, Sanders, Brown, Cardin, Merkley, Feinstein, Dodd, Boxer, Lautenberg, Kaufman, and 
Nelson of Florida); Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 2009) (listing as sponsors Representatives George Miller of California, Conyers, 
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it would also make it easier for plaintiffs in “reverse discrimination suits,” 
such as challenges to affirmative action programs or diversity-based hiring, 
to establish unlawful discrimination,421 and here the typical ideological align-
ment is reversed.  But the more general point is that in other contexts, or at 
other times, Congress could be more conservative than the Court, and 
applying this rule could support interpretations more typically favored by 
conservatives than by liberals. 
Acknowledging that ideology can play a role in judicial interpretation 
does help underscore that the rebuttable presumption I advocate still places 
an onus on Congress to draft overrides clearly and to consider strategies that 
minimize the risk that a hydra problem develops.  The more concretely 
Congress defines the scope of an override, the more completely it controls 
judicial interpretation.  This is true whether or not courts adopt (or Congress 
enacts legislation requiring) the interpretive rule I advocate, although they 
are obviously more essential in the absence of the approach I propose.  As a 
threshold matter, congressional drafters should obviously be aware that 
courts may ascribe little or no significance to statements in committee reports 
or other legislative history.  Therefore, even if it would be institutionally 
difficult to amend all potentially affected statutes, it would be prudent for 
Congress to enact findings and purposes that explicitly state an intent to 
change the interpretation of similar language in related statutes or that 
explicitly repudiate prior judicial interpretations.  Use of definitional 
amendments rather than the addition of separate substantive provisions might 
ameliorate the problem (although courts might still consider the absence of a 
comparable definition in a related statute grounds to infer that Congress did 
not intend the definition to apply to other statutes).422  A more radical 
departure from current practice would be to override a prior judicial 
interpretation by enacting a joint resolution that does not modify the 
preexisting statutory language but clearly—in language passed by both 
houses and signed by the President—indicates Congress disagrees with the 
Andrews, Nadler of New York, Courtney, Chu, Clarke, Holt, Hare, Kildee, Loebsack, Sablan, Scott 
of Virginia, Hirono, Woolsey, Bishop of New York, and Sestak). 
421. Cf. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 281–83 (1976) (establishing 
that “reverse” racial discrimination claims brought by whites are analyzed under the same burden-
shifting framework as claims brought by racial minorities). 
422. This could be addressed to some extent by enacting a stand-alone definition applicable to 
multiple statutes, but that could lead to difficulties similar to those posed by the blanket amendment 
considered to override Gross.  See supra text accompanying notes 372–77. There is a separate risk 
that addressing a specific aspect of the meaning of a more general term would be considered a 
purposeful exclusion of other potential meanings of the same general term.  For example, as I have 
discussed elsewhere, courts have reasoned that Congress’s failure to explicitly mention 
breastfeeding when it amended Title VII to add a definition of sex as including “pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions”—an amendment enacted to override a Supreme Court 
decision holding that pregnancy discrimination was not sex discrimination—is reason to conclude 
that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of breastfeeding, even though that also 
might plausibly be included in a more general understanding of discrimination because of “sex.”  
Widiss, supra note 12, at 551–56. 
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prior interpretation and sets forth a different (plausible) interpretation of the 
preexisting language; this would only be effective, however, if courts in turn 
understood such a resolution as compelling the overruling of the disfavored 
precedent and requiring reinterpretation of the preexisting language in the 
manner Congress dictates.423  To some extent, these drafting strategies could 
be used in place of the rule of interpretation I advocate; note, however, that 
most would still be ineffective under the reasoning applied in Gross.
Because of this concern, I believe these drafting strategies would be more 
effective as supplements to the rule I propose than as alternatives to it.424
Finally, it is crucially important to recognize that once the text of an 
override is part of a statute, it informs future interpretation of the statute 
more generally.  Accordingly, enactment of an override and corollary 
presumptions of so-called meaningful variations stemming from an override 
may have entirely unforeseen consequences.  For example, lower courts have 
long been divided regarding how to assess employer liability for decisions 
made in reliance on reports or evaluations by biased subordinates (typically 
known as “cat’s paw” liability).425  In the past two decades, a wide split 
among circuits developed regarding the standard that should be applied under 
423. This is particularly complicated for lower courts that cannot legitimately ignore precedent 
from a higher court that they consider on point.  See Widiss, supra note 12, at 572–74 (fleshing out 
this concern and arguing that lower courts should not be bound by overridden aspects of precedent).  
Additionally, enactment of a resolution “clarifying” the meaning of prior legislation could raise 
complicated retroactivity questions.  See Legislation—Declaratory Legislation, 49 HARV. L. REV.
137, 138 & n.3 (1935) (collecting now extremely dated case law applying such declarations 
prospectively and asserting retroactive application would raise constitutional concerns).  The 
Supreme Court has since stated that Congress may generally make an override retroactive without 
violating the Constitution but that Congress must enact statutory language expressing this intent 
clearly.  Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 313 (1994).  Courts presumably would 
likewise conclude that a joint resolution that was intended to supersede a prior judicial interpretation 
and indicate a different interpretation for preexisting statutory language would be applied 
prospectively only, unless the resolution included language explicitly making the resolution 
retroactive. 
424. This is also important to ensure that overrides Congress enacted prior to Gross are
effective.  In some sense, Gross is a result of what could be characterized as a bait and switch on 
Congress regarding the significance courts will ascribe to legislative history and the inferences that 
would be drawn from “neglect[ing]” to amend all other potentially relevant statutes.  Gross v. FBL 
Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The 
Supreme Court 1993 Term—Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 85 (1994) 
(describing significant changes in courts’ statutory interpretation canons as having a “bait and 
switch” quality). 
425. See EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 484 (10th Cir. 2006) (“In 
the employment discrimination context, ‘cat’s paw’ refers to a situation in which a biased 
subordinate, who lacks decision-making power, uses the formal decisionmaker as a dupe in a 
deliberate scheme to trigger a discriminatory employment action.”); Sara Atherton Mason, Note, 
Cat’s Paw Cases: The Standard for Assessing Subordinate Bias Liability, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
435, 436–37 (2011) (“The cat’s paw principle derives from a fable . . . in which a monkey 
convinces a gullible cat to pull chestnuts from a hot fire. . . .  [W]ith subordinate bias liability, the 
monkey is the person who convinces the decisionmaker, the cat, to unknowingly engage in 
employment discrimination.” (footnotes omitted)). 
2012] Undermining Congressional Overrides 941 
a variety of employment discrimination statutes.426  In March 2011, the 
Supreme Court first analyzed the question in Staub v. Proctor Hospital.427
This case arose under the Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), an Act that, like Title VII, includes 
explicit motivating-factor language.428  The Court relied heavily on the 
motivating-factor language to hold that liability could be established if the 
biased report was a “proximate cause” of the decision, even if the ultimate 
“decisionmaker’s exercise of judgment is also a proximate cause of the 
employment decision.”429  Prior circuit court decisions had not deemed 
the existence of motivating-factor language in Title VII, or its absence in the 
ADEA and ADA, significant in their analysis of cat’s paw claims; the 
decisions had instead discussed basic agency principles implicit in all 
employment discrimination statutes and suggested that a consistent standard 
should be employed.430  But, post-Staub, two circuit courts have highlighted 
this distinction in holding that a higher standard applies to cat’s paw claims 
under the ADEA.431  Similar analysis could be done with respect to the ADA 
or any other statute that lacks explicit motivating-factor language.432  On the 
other hand, some courts have readily applied Staub to statutes that lack 
explicit motivating-factor language,433 further confusing the already muddy 
waters left behind by Gross.  Such issues will continue to arise unless and 
until courts adopt a more realistic and productive approach to interpreting 
overrides.
426. BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d at 484–85 (collecting cases demonstrating the variety of 
standards applied by various circuits). 
427. 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011). 
428. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1) (2006).  USERRA probably includes this language because it was 
enacted in 1994, when the 1991 CRA and the fight over Price Waterhouse were still fresh in 
congressional memories.  Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-353, § 2, 108 Stat. 3149, 3153 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1) 
(2006)).
429. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1192. 
430. See, e.g., Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 227 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(collecting and discussing “cat’s paw” cases that analyze derivative liability under the ADEA, 
Title VII, and § 1981 in terms of agency principles and not mentioning differences in language 
among these statutes). 
431. See Wojtanek v. Dist. No. 8, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 435 F. 
App’x 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that in cat’s paw cases under the ADEA, a subordinate’s 
age-related bias must be “the determinative factor—not just a motivating factor” in the decision to 
take adverse action against the plaintiff); Simmons v. Sykes Enters. Inc., 647 F.3d 943, 949–50 
(10th Cir. 2011) (holding that the plaintiff must prove that a subordinate’s age-related animus was 
the but-for cause of the ultimate decision). 
432. See Mark J. Chumley, Cat’s Paw Liability Arguably Not an Option in ADA Cases in the 
6th and 10th Circuits, KEATING MUETHING & KLEKAMP PLL (Mar. 18, 2011), http://
www.kmklaw.com/assets/pdf/blogpost_164.pdf (arguing that in addition to ADEA claims, “ADA 
claims in the Sixth and Tenth Circuits should also be outside the [Staub] decision since they require 
that a disability be the ‘sole reason’ for adverse employment action”). 
433. See, e.g., Ordogne v. AAA Tex., LLC, No. H-09-1872, 2011 WL 3438466, at *1, *4 (S.D. 
Tex. Aug. 5, 2011) (applying Staub in a § 1981 case); Blount v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., No. 1:10-CV-
01439, 2011 WL 867551, at *1, *6 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2011) (applying Staub in a FMLA case). 
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VII. Conclusion 
Overrides are expected to play a central role in ensuring that Congress 
has the power to ascribe meaning to statutory text.  The approach taken by 
the Supreme Court in Gross undermines this expectation.  The Court 
interprets Congress’s “neglect[ing]” to amend statutes other than the statute 
actually interpreted in the overridden precedent as a license to disregard both 
likely congressional intent and prior Court precedent.434  The Court’s putative 
expectation that Congress must amend all other statutes to which a disfa-
vored application might be applied is unreasonable.  Rather than serving as a 
tool for promoting legislative supremacy, enactment of an override, as 
interpreted by the Court in Gross, has the perverse effect of aggrandizing the 
judicial role.  Courts should instead employ a rebuttable presumption that 
enactment of an override calls for fresh interpretation of preexisting language 
in line with the meaning signaled by Congress, so long as the language can 
plausibly bear that interpretation.  This approach would better respect the 
institutional capabilities of courts and Congress.  It furthers the promise of 
legislative supremacy and the independent objectives of efficient, consistent, 
and fair development of statutory law. 
434. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009). 
